philosophy a level essay structure

AQA Philosophy Course Content

Epistemology

Epistemology means theory of knowledge. The epistemology module covers what the definition of knowledge is, as well as how much knowledge comes from perception and how much from reason. It also covers the idea of scepticism.

Moral Philosophy

Moral philosophy is often referred to as ethics. It’s about right and wrong, good and bad. This module covers ethical theories, applications of these theories, and the meaning of moral language.

Metaphysics of God

This module covers the concept of God as typically conceived by the three main monotheistic religions. It covers whether such a concept is possible as well as arguments for and against the existence of God.

Metaphysics of Mind

Philosophy of mind looks at what minds and mental states actually are. This module covers various theories which say the mind is a physical thing and others which argue it is non-physical.

Course Textbook

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Includes: straightforward explanations of syllabus topics for all 4 modules , bullet point summaries at the end of each module, exam blueprint for each question type (with example answers), and example 25 mark answer plans on every major topic.

How to get an A in A-level philosophy

Exam Practice Workbooks

Reinforce your philosophical knowledge while building writing skills for exam success. Helpful exam tips are mixed in among the various activities – which include crossword puzzles, fill-in-the-blanks, multiple choice, and more – to provide a clear structure for answering the 3, 5, 12, and 25 mark questions that come up in the exam.

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Example Essays

Download A* grade example essays based on the AQA philosophy A level syllabus and be prepared for every potential 25 mark question!

Example essays enable you to cover both the course content and exam technique simultaneously . Each document includes a short essay plan to help reinforce how to structure your essays to achieve maximum marks.

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Model essay plans for theories of perception

AQA Philosophy model essays

Note that this model essay plan is merely one possible way to write an essay on this topic.

Points highlighted in light blue are integration points Points highlighted in green are weighting points

This page contains essay plans for Direct realism, Indirect realism and Idealism.

Direct realism

• Direct realism – the view that the objects of perception are mind-independent objects and their properties.
• This theory is realist as it claims there is a mind-independent reality.
• We perceive reality immediately. We do not perceive a mental representation of reality like sense data. We simply perceive objective reality without any mediation.
• This gives direct realism the strength of seeming to avoid scepticism. If direct realism is true then all our perceptions are veridical.

The perceptual variation issue

• Russell’s table: imagine a shiny table with a beam of light falling on it from a window.
• If you stand in different places in relation to the table, the light can appear to fall on different parts of the table.
• This makes different areas of the table appear lighter brown or darker brown.
• So, this shows that the colour of the table cannot be a mind-independent property of it. It depends on the mind perceiving it.
• Russell also points to the texture of the table feeling smooth, but under a microscope appearing bumpy, or the shape of the table being square or rectangular depending on where you stand.
• Locke’s illustration – if a person puts one hot hand and one cold hand into some lukewarm water, it will feel hot to one hand but cold to the other. 
• So, direct realism is false.
• An intrinsic property is a property a thing has in itself. 
• A relational property is a property a thing has due to its relation to something else.
• Perceptual relational properties exist due to the relation of a thing to an observer. 
• So the direct realist could say that a certain part of the table has the relational property of ‘looking light brown’ to some observer conditions, while also having the relational property of ‘looking dark brown’ to other observer conditions. 
• Similarly, Locke’s water has an intrinsic property of a certain temperature, but it can also have the relational property of ‘feeling hotter than’ and ‘feeling colder than’ depending on the temperature of the organ used to perceive it.
• Locke’s illustration only shows that it’s possible for a single observer to directly perceive two different relational properties at once.
• Direct realists claimed that the objects of perception are mind-independent objects and their properties. 
• They can thus respond that this includes relational properties. 
• So, perceptual variation does not undermine direct realism.
• Sometimes we directly observe an object’s relational properties, which can make it appear different to its intrinsic property, however we still directly observe its properties.

Evaluation:

• Some could attack the relational properties as ‘mind-dependent’. However, they are not. A square table would really have the relational property of ‘looking rectangular’ to a certain perceiver from a certain physical angle, even if there was no perceiver.
• Perceptual variation could be explained by either relational properties or sense data. 
• Indirect realism faces the issue of scepticism since it claims we never directly perceive reality. 
• Ockham’s razor also shows that direct realism is simpler due to not proposing that sense-data exists.
• This puts direct realism in a stronger position than indirect realism. 
• So, we seem justified in accepting its relational property explanation of perceptual variation over the indirect realist sense data explanation.
• However, the relational properties response arguably leads to scepticism.
• If one person sees the table as light brown and another as dark brown, this creates a sceptical issue for direct realism. How could we ever know what colour the table actually is? How can we tell which perception is directly perceiving the intrinsic property?
• We could never tell what the actual intrinsic property of an object is, since every time we perceive it for all we know we could be perceiving its relational properties instead.
• So, direct realism is unconvincing as it is not in a stronger position than indirect realism regarding scepticism. 

The hallucination issue

• P1. According to direct realism, if I perceive object p, then object p exists mind-independently.
• P2. During a hallucination I observe an object p , but there is no object p.
• C1. Therefore, the object of perception p must be mind-dependent sense data.
• P3. Hallucinations can be subjectively indistinguishable from veridical perception.
• C2. Therefore, in all cases, the objects of perception are mind-dependent sense data. So direct realism is false.
• The disjunctive theory of perception
• Firstly, P1 & P2 does not justify C1. Hallucinations might not be sense data since they might not be perceptions at all – they could be uncontrollable projections of the imagination, which explains their being mind-dependent. 
• Secondly, P3 does not justify C2. It could be true that hallucinations are mind-dependent, and yet other perceptions are not mind-dependent.
• Just because hallucinations look like ordinary perceptions, even if they were mind-dependent, that wouldn’t prove that ordinary perceptions are mind-dependent.
• Just because we are epistemically unable to tell them apart, doesn’t mean they are ontologically the same type of thing.
• So, direct realists could still be correct about perceptions being of mind-independent objects.
• There is still a sceptical issue for direct realism arising from this, however.
• If hallucinations appear like ordinary perceptions, then even if technically that doesn’t mean they are like ordinary perceptions, nonetheless we still can’t tell them apart.
• This means that all of our perceptions could be a hallucination for all we know. So, we can’t gain knowledge from perception.
• This version of the hallucination argument is in a stronger position because it cannot be avoided by the disjunctive theory of perception.
• So, direct realism leads to scepticism – making it less convincing as an epistemological theory of perception.

The time lag argument

• It takes time for light to bounce off an object and then enter our eyes.
• This means that our perceptions of objects are not as they exist exactly now, but at some time in the past.
• This seems to question whether we are seeing objects directly.
• This becomes clearer with the example of distant stars. Their light can take millions of years to reach us. Some of the stars we see have actually exploded or died, but we still see them.
• It can’t make sense to say we are directly perceiving something if it doesn’t actually exist.
• The objects of perception cannot be a mind-independent object, if that object does not exist.
• However, the direct realist can respond that this issue confuses what we see with how we see.
• Light is a physical medium by which we perceive objects. 
• We don’t actually perceive the light itself, except in special cases – like seeing light reflecting off paper or a lake.
• Normally, when perceiving an object, we simply perceive the object, not the light.
• Light therefore does not mediate our perception – it doesn’t present us with a representation that we perceive (since we don’t perceive the light). It simply presents us with the object itself.
• Light is how we perceive objects, but not what we perceive.
• Light delays our perception because it takes time, but it does not mediate our perception.
• Directness does not require instantaneity.
• Time lag can only show that our perception is delayed, not that it isn’t direct.
• Direct realists can thus be successfully defended because the necessary condition of directness is immediacy, not instantaneity.
• Seeing something directly doesn’t require seeing it as it is now, it simply requires that our perception of it is not mediated, that we aren’t perceiving it ‘through’ something else (like sense data) that represents it. 
• We are just directly perceiving the object, but as it was, not as it currently is.
• Direct realism only claims that the objects of perception are mind-independent objects and their properties.
• Direct realism is not committed to the objects we perceive actually existing at the moment of perception. It claims only that our perception of them is direct – unmediated.

Conclusion: 

• Direct realism can be defended against the time-lag argument. The perceptual variation and hallucination issues cannot prove direct realism false because of the appeal to relational properties. However that defence did lead to scepticism. So, direct realism is unconvincing as an epistemological theory of perception.

Indirect realism

• Indirect realism is the view that the objects of perception are mind-dependent objects which are caused by and represent mind-independent objects.
• The strength of indirect realism is that it fits with the common-sense understanding of our perception that our experience teaches us. We are all familiar with the way our perception can be altered. Illusions, hallucination and perceptual variation suggests that our experience is a mental representation of reality, not reality itself.

The issue that indirect realism leads to scepticism about the existence of mind-independent objects

• Indirect realism claims that we only perceive sense data and that sense data is caused by a mind-independent reality.
• However, if we only have direct awareness of sense data, how do we know that sense data is actually caused by mind-independent objects? How do we know there is an external world at all? 
• On this view, for all we know, so-called ‘sense data’ is actually caused by our imagination and there is no external world at all.
• If indirect realism is true, sense data is a ‘veil of perception’ behind which we cannot perceive or know.
• So, indirect realism’s claim that sense data is caused by mind-independent objects is epistemically undermined by its claim that sense data is all we perceive.
• Locke’s argument from the coherence of the various senses.
• When we perceive an apple, we see it, feel it and can taste it. The senses cohere and thus provide evidence for the validity of each other. 
• We have multiple different senses – it seems the fact that they all cohere and sense the same things at the same time is good evidence for thinking there really is a mind-independent object. The chance that each sense would mistakenly report the same object at the same time seems very low.
• Locke’s argument from the involuntary nature of experience.
• If there was no mind-independent world, our perceptions would come from our imagination.
• However, we have control over our imagination, but not our perception.
• So, our perceptions must originate from an external world.
• So, we have a basis for rejecting scepticism and claiming that sense data is caused by mind-independent objects.
• Locke’s argument is inductive because he’s arguing there is evidence about the nature of our experience that can be used to infer the nature of its origin.
• However, Locke’s argument is weak because even if it succeeds in showing that our perceptions originate from outside our minds, that wouldn’t show it was caused by a mind-independent reality. It could be caused by another mind or higher being, like the mind of God, as Berkeley suggests.
• Perceptions could simply be caused by an unconscious part of our imagination (e.g. hallucinations) we have no awareness of control over, which produces perceptions for all our senses in a way which coheres with each other.
• So, Locke can’t escape scepticism about the existence of mind-independent reality nor solipsism.

Rusell’s best hypothesis response

• Russell’s response to scepticism is in a stronger position than Locke’s inductive approach. 
• The nature of our experience, including its involuntary and coherent nature, are not better evidence for its origin being a real world compared to an evil demon or our own subconscious. 
• We cannot prove there is a mind-independent reality, but nor can we prove there isn’t.  
• Russell claims such cases justify resorting to an abductive approach of determining which explanation provides the best hypothesis. This means which explanation has the most explanatory power , i.e., provides the most explanation of why our perceptions are the way they are.
• There are two possibilities. Either there is a mind-independent reality causing our perceptions, or there isn’t. Russell gives the example of seeing his cat in his room, but the next time he looks it’s somewhere else.
• If there is no mind-independent reality causing those perceptions then we have no explanation of why those perceptions occurred. We have no explanation of the regularity and order in which our perceptions tend to appear.
• Yet if there is a mind-independent reality causing our perceptions, then we have an explanation of why they are the way they are. The cat’s perceived location changed because it has a mind-independent existence and it moved.
• So, we are justified in believing that our perceptions are caused by a mind-independent external world because it is the best hypothesis.
• Russell’s argument is abductive. Even if it succeeds, it’s not defeating scepticism to a convincing degree. (link to idealism as in a stronger position due to defeating scepticism more convincingly?)
• Furthermore, it doesn’t even succeed. There could be some reason why our unconscious imagination is producing perceptions that are orderly and regular. Perhaps we are living in a hallucinated dream-world that our mind has created to protect us from reality. Our minds could be completely disconnected from reality, if there even is one.
• Or, it could be that another powerful mind which wants to produce deceptively seemingly real perceptions in us is producing our orderly and regular perceptions. If there’s an evil demon and us, there need not be a physical ‘realist’ reality. Or Berkley’s suggestion that God is the origin of our perceptions would also be an equally powerful explanation.
• This possibility would explain the orderliness and regularity of our perceptions just as well as the possibility that a mind-independent reality causes them.
• So, a mind-independent reality causing our perceptions doesn’t have more explanatory power than other possible explanations, so we can’t claim it is the ‘best ‘hypothesis.

Berkeley’s criticism that mind-dependent objects cannot be like (resemble) mind-independent objects.

• IDR claims that sense data represents mind-independent objects.
• Berkeley responds that for something to represent something else, they must be alike.
• Berkeley’s ‘likeness principle’ claims that to justifiably know that two things are alike, requires that we can compare them – to verify that they are in fact alike.
• However, since IDR leads to a veil of perception, we never directly experience mind-independent objects.
• In that case, we can never compare sense data to what it supposedly represents.
• So, we can never justifiably claim that sense data represents mind-independent objects.
• If we perceive, e.g. a table, how do we know that this represents a mind-independent object, if we never directly perceive the mind-independent object?
• So, indirect realism is self-undermining since its claim that we only experience mind-dependent sense data undermines its further claim that this sense data represents mind-independent objects.
• A limitation of Berkeley’s critique is that he assumes representation requires likeness or resemblance. 
• Representation seems to be possible without likeness/resemblance.
• For example, the symbols we use in language are arbitrary, meaning they have no resemblance or likeness to the objects they represent.
• The word ‘chair’ is not like a chair but nonetheless can represent it. 
• So, mind-dependent objects could still represent mind-independent objects even if they are not like them.
• However, we can defend Berkeley’s conclusion by improving his argument into a stronger form which does not rely on his likeness principle.
• The claim of representation still requires justification.
• How does one know that a mind-dependent object represents a mind-independent object, if a mind-independent object has never been perceived.
• We only know that the word ‘chair’ represents a chair, because we have experienced a chair.
• If we have no experienced mind-independent objects, then we can’t know that our perceptions represent them in any way.
• Even if we accept that ‘likeness’ isn’t’ required for representation, nonetheless for all we know, our perceptions might not even represent the mind-independent world. It could be totally non-representative of our perceptions in any respect.
• So, we just cannot know whether our perceptions represent mind-independent objects. 
• So, indirect realism’s claim that the objects of perception are mind-dependent objects does undermine its claim that they represent mind-independent objects and the theory thus leads to scepticism.