the virtue of moral integrity essay

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4 Chapter 4: Virtue Ethics—The Role of Character in Moral Philosophy

“We are what we repeatedly do. Excellence, then, is not an act, but a habit.” – Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics “To put the world in order, we must first put the nation in order; to put the nation in order, we must first put the family in order; to put the family in order, we must first cultivate our personal life; we must first set our hearts right.” – Confucius, The Great Learning

In this chapter, you’ll embark on an exploration of virtue ethics, an approach that seeks to answer the fundamental questions, “What does it mean to be a good person? And how can I become one?” Virtue ethics diverges from other moral theories by focusing on the character of the moral agent rather than the act or the consequences. This approach views virtues – traits like wisdom, courage, kindness, and justice – as central to leading a morally good life.

Our exploration begins with a captivating tale called “Unaltered Virtue,” set in the intricate city of Eudaimon. Through the journey of Prudence, a young citizen facing a defining rite of passage, you’ll delve into a world where virtues can be genetically imprinted, shedding light on the nuances and complexities of virtue ethics in action. Alongside the story, discussion questions will prompt deeper thought and reflection on these concepts.

The chapter further delves into ‘Big Ideas’, starting with Aristotelian virtue ethics. Aristotle’s profound insights into moral virtue and the concept of eudaimonia – a flourishing life – serve as the cornerstone of our understanding of this approach.

We will also venture beyond Aristotle, exploring diverse interpretations and applications of virtue ethics from different cultures and perspectives, including Confucianism with its focus on “Ren” or benevolence, Dharma-based virtue ethics from Ancient India, the African philosophy of Ubuntu, and Care Ethics, which is a feminist approach that emphasizes relationships and caring as moral virtues.

A section on contemporary debates adds another layer to the discourse, focusing on issues related to genetic engineering and moral enhancement. This engages with provocative questions about the implications of technology on our understanding and practice of virtues.

Story: Unaltered Virtue

The day was growing dim, and a luminous orange haze painted the horizon, illuminating the imposing city of Eudaimon. Nestled within valleys of metal and rivets, the sprawling metropolis was a testament to the union of human ambition and machinery, a vast labyrinth of steam-driven technologies and elaborate bronze edificacies, punctuated by the rhythmic echoes of clanking gears and whirring pistons.

This was Prudence’s realm, a labyrinth of possibility and purpose. Born of this city, she was more than just its inhabitant. She was its daughter, its testament, and soon to be, its beacon of virtuous transformation.

Her hair was a tempest of burnished copper curls, mirroring the hues of the city that birthed her. Her eyes, twin orbs of rich mahogany, shimmered with the flame of inquisitiveness, always seeking, forever questioning. There was an energy about her, a restless vitality, as though she was a gear cog forever revolving in the clockwork of her existence.

On the eve of her 18th birthday, as was tradition, she was due to choose a virtue to be genetically imprinted upon her being, a defining attribute to guide her path in the machinations of her society. The virtues were many; wisdom, courage, humility, honesty, a veritable lexicon of human strength and kindness. The process, once an outlandish concept, had now become a rite

As her eighteenth year approached, Prudence wandered the city, watching its people, contemplating the virtues that shaped their existence. She observed the enigmatic artists, blessed with creativity, their fingers stained with ink and color, as they drew forth wondrous creations from the depths of their souls. She beheld the scholars, gifted with wisdom, their minds a labyrinth of knowledge, as they explored the mysteries of the universe and unwound the puzzles of time.

Prudence stumbled upon the more peculiar and unique citizens, those who had walked unexpected roads. She came across a woman who had chosen infinite patience, now sitting by a river, eternally tranquil, awaiting the day the waters would reveal their secrets. She met a man, graced with ceaseless curiosity, whose mind thirsted constantly for new discoveries, and who had become the keeper of the city’s complex library, forever entangled in its maze of words.

However, not all who wandered the city’s twisting streets had chosen their virtues wisely, however. In the shadows of the gleaming towers, a darker world thrived, a realm of lost souls who had succumbed to the alluring allure of virtues that twisted and corrupted them. As Prudence’s eighteenth year drew near, she sought them out – a quest driven by curiosity, fueled by her desire to learn from their mistakes.

She encountered a man who had chosen ambition – unyielding, insatiable – and had soared to greatness like a comet streaking across the night. But as ambition’s fire consumed him, his heart grew cold, and his once-vibrant eyes reflected only an abyss of emptiness. He had lost all he held dear, and still, he hungered for more. In another of the city’s forgotten corners, Prudence found a woman who had sought eternal beauty. Her skin, flawless porcelain; her hair, spun gold. Yet, her pursuit had led her to a prison of vanity, where her reflection was both her captor and her only companion. Her laughter, once like the tinkling of silver bells, had faded into a hollow echo. Finally, there was the boy who had chosen the gift of absolute honesty, believing it a righteous virtue. His words became a torrent of truth, unfiltered and merciless, and he watched as relationships crumbled around him. Friendless and alone, he wandered the city’s streets, haunted by the ghosts of his own words.

The Unmodified

Prudence wandered through the marketplace, her senses awash in the sights, sounds, and smells of the city. The air was thick with the scent of spices and flowers, and the sound of laughter and music filled the air. She paused to admire a stall of bioluminescent blooms, their petals glowing like stars in the night. As she turned away, she caught sight of a small, unassuming wooden booth tucked away in an alcove. Atop the booth hung a sign, its letters etched in an elegant script: “The Unmodified.”

Prudence’s curiosity piqued, she drew closer to the booth. Behind it stood an old man, his hair a shock of silver, cascading to his shoulders, and his beard a snowy tuft. His eyes were warm and wise, and his smile was gentle.

“Hello,” he said. “My name is Areté. What can I do for you?”

“I’m Prudence,” she replied. “I was drawn to your sign. What does it mean?”

“It means that I am an unmodified human,” Areté said. “I have not chosen to have my genes modified, as is the custom in this city.”

Prudence was surprised. “Why not?” she asked.

“Because I believe that true virtue cannot be achieved through genetic engineering,” Areté said. “It must be cultivated through deliberate practice and self-reflection. I believe that each of us has a unique purpose in life, and that the only way to truly live is to discover and fulfill that purpose.”

Prudence was intrigued by Areté’s words. She had never thought about it that way before.

“Can you tell me more?” she asked.

And so Areté began to speak. He spoke of eudaimonia, the ultimate goal for humans – a flourishing life, rich in happiness and fulfillment. He spoke of phronesis, practical wisdom – the ability to discern the best course of action in a given situation. He spoke of teleology, the notion that everything in the universe has a purpose, and that the essence of a virtuous life lay in fulfilling one’s unique purpose or function.

With a glimmer in his eyes, he described the doctrine of the mean – finding the balance between excess and deficiency in one’s actions and emotions. He explained that virtues such as courage, generosity, and patience were not fixed points, but rather, lay in the equilibrium of each individual’s character.

As Prudence listened to Areté, she noticed a gentle figure approaching from behind the booth. The woman, with her long silver hair braided in an elegant style, exuded a sense of calm and grace as she joined the conversation. Areté introduced her as his wife, Lian, a devoted Confucian who, like her husband, had refused the city’s tradition of genetic virtue implantation.

Lian began by highlighting the similarities between her own beliefs and those of her husband. Both Confucianism and Aristotelian virtue ethics placed emphasis on the cultivation of virtues through a lifetime of practice and self-reflection. She explained that, in Confucian thought, virtues such as ren, or benevolence, and li, or propriety, were essential in achieving harmony within oneself and society.

The key difference, Lian noted, lay in the focus of each philosophy. While Aristotle’s virtue ethics revolved around individual flourishing and eudaimonia, Confucianism placed greater importance on the interconnectedness of individuals within society. The ultimate goal of a Confucian was to bring about social harmony through the practice of virtues and the adherence to the proper rituals and relationships.

She spoke of the Five Constant Virtues – benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom, and integrity – that shaped the Confucian path. These virtues were not merely qualities to be possessed, but a way of life, woven into the fabric of one’s daily existence. Lian described the importance of filial piety, the respect and devotion to one’s parents and ancestors, as well as the significance of moral exemplars – individuals who embodied the virtues and served as guiding lights for others.

As Prudence listened to Lian’s words, she found herself drawn to the idea of harmony – the delicate balance between the self and the world, the pursuit of virtues in the service of both personal and collective well-being. The girl with the starlit eyes and laughter like a forgotten melody now had two distinct paths before her, both rooted in the wisdom of ancient traditions, both promising a life of meaning and purpose.

Areté and Lian exchanged a knowing glance, seeing in Prudence’s eyes the spark of curiosity and the desire to explore alternative paths. They offered to introduce her to their circle of friends, a group known as “The Unaltered” – individuals who had chosen to remain unmodified, embracing various philosophical traditions and the lifelong pursuit of virtue.

Together, they led Prudence to a secret courtyard hidden within the city’s heart, a sanctuary where The Unaltered gathered. The place was an oasis of tranquility, bathed in the gentle glow of lanterns, with lush greenery and the soothing sound of a burbling fountain. Here, Prudence met the others, each a unique embodiment of their chosen path.

She met Ravi, a follower of Indian philosophy, who spoke of dharma, the inherent nature and moral duty of an individual. He explained the concept of karma, the belief that one’s actions determine their future, and the importance of living a life in accordance with one’s dharma, to achieve harmony and balance.

Prudence was introduced to Amara, a devotee of African Ubuntu philosophy, who emphasized the interconnectedness of humanity. “I am because we are,” she said, explaining that one’s character and virtues could only be fully realized through relationships and interactions with others. Ubuntu highlighted the importance of compassion, empathy, and respect for the collective well-being.

There was also Sol, a student of Stoicism, who believed in the cultivation of inner strength and resilience in the face of life’s challenges. He shared the Stoic principles of living in accordance with reason, practicing self-discipline, and seeking inner peace by recognizing the difference between what one could control and what one could not.

As Prudence listened to their stories, she marveled at the rich tapestry of virtue ethics from around the world, each offering a unique perspective on the journey of self-cultivation and the pursuit of a meaningful life. She felt a sense of kinship with The Unaltered, a connection born of the shared belief in the power of human potential, unbound by genetic modification.

The Argument

Prudence sat in the dimly lit room, her heart racing as she glanced at her two older sisters. Their presence, both comforting and intimidating, stirred a whirlwind of memories within her. Amelia, the eldest, had always been the pragmatic one—Prudence recalled the countless times Amelia had mediated their childhood disputes, weighing the pros and cons of each side with careful consideration. Cassia, the middle sister, was the embodiment of steadfastness, her unwavering sense of duty and moral principles guiding her actions.

As the sisters sat together, the room seemed to shrink, as if the weight of their collective history was pressing in on them. Prudence knew that she was about to embark on a journey that defied her sisters’ beliefs, and the air crackled with unspoken tension.

Amelia was the first to speak, her voice steady but laden with concern. “Prudence, your decision to remain unaltered reminds me of when we were children, and you refused to accept help with your schoolwork. You were always determined to learn and grow on your own, but sometimes, accepting help can lead to greater understanding and success.”

“My dear sisters,” Amelia continued, “I respect your beliefs and your choices, but I must share my thoughts on why I believe genetic engineering, from a utilitarian perspective, can improve our world and maximize overall well-being.”

She continued, “By genetically implanting virtues, we can create a society in which individuals possess the necessary qualities to contribute to the greater good. A person who is genetically engineered to be empathetic, for example, will be more inclined to consider the well-being of others in their actions, thereby reducing suffering and increasing happiness.”

Addressing Prudence’s newfound interest in virtue ethics, Amelia delved into her critique. “While I appreciate the focus on personal growth and self-cultivation, virtue ethics is, in many ways, a subjective and inconsistent approach to morality. What might be considered virtuous in one situation could lead to negative outcomes in another. In contrast, utilitarianism provides a clear, objective standard by which we can assess the morality of our actions: the maximization of happiness and minimization of suffering.”

Amelia went on to express her concerns about the potential pitfalls of virtue ethics. “The emphasis on character traits and individual virtues can sometimes lead to a form of moral elitism, where those who have cultivated certain virtues may believe themselves to be morally superior to others. Genetic engineering, on the other hand, provides everyone with equal access to virtues, leveling the playing field and allowing each person to contribute positively to society.”

She concluded her speech with an earnest plea. “I understand that the path of The Unaltered offers a rich tradition of self-cultivation and exploration, but I urge you both to consider the potential of genetic engineering as a powerful tool for achieving the greater good. The goal of utilitarianism is to create a world in which happiness and well-being are maximized, and genetic engineering, when applied ethically and responsibly, could be an invaluable means to that end.”

Cassia chimed in, her voice gentle yet firm. “Prudence, I too, remember when you struggled to make decisions as a child, caught between your desire for personal growth and your fear of making the wrong choice. Your choice to remain unaltered echoes that same indecisiveness. Genetic engineering, when used responsibly, can be a tool for enhancing our capacity to contribute positively to the world.”

“I appreciate the passion with which you both approach the question of ethics. While Amelia’s utilitarian viewpoint has its merits, I believe that deontological ethics provides a more solid foundation for moral action.”

Cassia continued, “Deontology is based on the premise that certain moral duties and principles are inherently right or wrong, regardless of the consequences. By adhering to these duties and principles, we are able to create a just and harmonious society, one in which individuals are respected and treated with dignity.”

Turning her attention to Prudence’s interest in virtue ethics, Cassia shared her concerns. “While the focus on personal growth and self-cultivation is admirable, virtue ethics leaves much room for subjectivity and ambiguity. Different people may interpret the virtues in different ways, and what might be considered a virtuous action in one situation could be deemed inappropriate in another. Deontological ethics, however, provides a clear and objective framework for moral decision-making, grounded in the unwavering commitment to moral principles and duties.”

Cassia then addressed the potential shortcomings of virtue ethics. “By placing such emphasis on the cultivation of individual virtues, virtue ethics may inadvertently encourage a sense of moral complacency. One might believe that, by possessing certain virtues, they are inherently good, regardless of their actions. In contrast, deontological ethics calls for an ongoing commitment to moral principles and duties, fostering a sense of responsibility and accountability for one’s actions.”

She then presented a deontological argument for genetic engineering, focusing on duties to family. “From a deontological standpoint, we have a duty to care for and support our parents, grandparents, and (yes) our sisters. Genetic engineering, when used responsibly, can provide an opportunity to uphold this duty by enhancing our capacity to contribute positively to the well-being of our loved ones. By choosing to enhance traits that allow us to more fully meet our moral principles and duties, we can create a harmonious balance between our deontological commitments and the potential benefits of genetic engineering.”

Cassia concluded her speech with a heartfelt appeal. “Prudence, I understand the allure of The Unaltered and the wisdom of ancient traditions, but I encourage you to consider the importance of moral duties and principles in guiding our actions, as well as the potential benefits of responsible genetic engineering. By embracing the duties outlined in deontological ethics and carefully selecting virtues that enhance our ability to fulfill those duties, we can create a world that is just, compassionate, and grounded in unshakable moral principles.”

As her sisters’ words echoed in the room, Prudence felt a surge of gratitude for the love and respect they shared, despite their differing beliefs. With a heart full of emotion, she prepared to offer her own defense of virtue ethics and her choice to remain unaltered. “Amelia, Cassia,” Prudence began, her starlit eyes shining with conviction, “I am deeply grateful for your insights and the care with which you’ve presented your arguments. Your perspectives have broadened my understanding, and I feel honored to call you both my sisters.”

Prudence continued, “While utilitarianism and deontological ethics provide valuable frameworks for moral decision-making, I believe that virtue ethics offers a more holistic approach to ethical living. It focuses not only on our actions but also on the cultivation of our character, which ultimately shapes the decisions we make and the way we interact with the world.”

Addressing the concerns raised by her sisters, Prudence offered a nuanced perspective. “I understand that virtue ethics can be subjective and open to interpretation, but it is precisely this flexibility that allows for personal growth and self-reflection. Virtue ethics encourages us to continually evaluate our character and strive for moral excellence, fostering a deep sense of empathy and understanding towards others.”

She then defended her choice to remain unaltered. “I have chosen to join The Unaltered not because I dismiss the potential benefits of genetic engineering, but because I believe that the journey of self-cultivation, with its trials and triumphs, holds intrinsic value. Through the pursuit of virtue, we gain a deeper understanding of ourselves and our place in the world, fostering a sense of interconnectedness and shared responsibility.”

Prudence further elaborated, “By choosing to cultivate virtues within ourselves, rather than relying on genetic engineering, we embrace the challenge of personal growth and take ownership of our moral development. In doing so, we nurture our capacity for moral discernment, allowing us to navigate the complexities of life with wisdom and compassion.”

As she concluded her speech, Prudence’s voice carried the weight of her conviction. “My dear sisters, I respect and admire your dedication to your chosen ethical paths. It is my hope that, by embracing the wisdom of virtue ethics and the challenge of self-cultivation, I can contribute to the well-being of our family and society, while honoring the beauty and richness of human potential.”

Years had passed since that fateful night when Prudence and her sisters had engaged in their emotional debate, their words weaving a tapestry of love, conviction, and memory. The choices each sister made that day had reverberated through the tapestry of their lives, shaping not only their paths but also the lives of those around them. Prudence had remained steadfast in her decision to live a life of arete, embracing the challenge of self-cultivation and personal growth. The virtues she chose to pursue—wisdom, courage, empathy, and integrity—became the cornerstones of her character, guiding her actions and decisions with unwavering dedication.

As a mother, Prudence nurtured her children with love and understanding, teaching them the importance of moral discernment and the pursuit of excellence in all aspects of life. Her children grew up to be compassionate, wise, and resilient individuals, their own lives embodying the virtues their mother had instilled in them. Her influence extended beyond her family, touching the lives of her students, coworkers, and fellow citizens. As a teacher, she inspired her students to question, explore, and strive for moral excellence, guiding them on their journey toward self-discovery and growth. Her unwavering commitment to virtue ethics became a source of inspiration, fostering a sense of unity and shared responsibility within her community.

Discussion Questions: Unaltered Virtue

• How do the ethical theories of utilitarianism, deontological ethics, and virtue ethics differ in their approach to moral decision-making? How are these differences reflected in the perspectives of Amelia, Cassia, and Prudence?
• In what ways do the sisters’ childhood experiences and memories inform their ethical beliefs and choices as adults? How do their childhood weaknesses relate to the ethical frameworks they adopt?
• How does Prudence’s choice to remain unaltered and embrace virtue ethics affect her relationships with her family, students, and fellow citizens? Can you think of any potential drawbacks to her decision?
• What are some of the key virtues that Prudence pursues, and how do they manifest in her actions and decisions throughout the story? How do these virtues contribute to her sense of purpose and fulfillment?
• How does the story depict the balance between the sisters’ love and respect for each other and their commitment to their respective ethical beliefs? What can we learn from their relationship about navigating disagreements on moral issues?
• How does the concept of arete, or moral excellence, influence Prudence’s approach to self-cultivation and personal growth? Do you agree with her belief in the intrinsic value of this journey, or do you think genetic engineering can also play a role in moral development?
• Based on the story, what role does empathy and understanding play in the sisters’ ethical journey? How does this contribute to their capacity for moral discernment and decision-making?
• In your opinion, which ethical framework—utilitarianism, deontological ethics, or virtue ethics—resonates most with you and why? Can these theories coexist, or do they inherently conflict with one another?
• How might the story have unfolded differently if Prudence had chosen to embrace genetic engineering and alter her virtues? What implications could this have had for her relationships and her impact on others?
• What questions does the story raise about the role of personal choice, responsibility, and agency in ethical living? How does Prudence’s journey challenge or support your own beliefs about the nature of morality and personal growth?

Big Ideas: Aristotelian Virtue Ethics

Aristotle’s virtue ethics , an agent-centered theory, places individuals and their characters at the core of ethical deliberation. This approach prompts introspection, encouraging one to ask, “how should I be?” rather than simply “what should I do?” It’s a journey towards moral character rather than a singular focus on moral actions.

One of the central concepts in Aristotle’s virtue ethics is “ eudaimonia “, a Greek term often translated as “flourishing” or “the good life”. Aristotle believed that all actions ultimately aim at eudaimonia, making it the ultimate goal of human life. This idea shifts the perspective from individual actions to the broader context of a person’s life. For Aristotle, leading a good life isn’t about individual good deeds but about cultivating a character that consistently leads to these deeds.

The pursuit of eudaimonia leads us to another key concept in Aristotle’s virtue ethics: the doctrine of the mean . According to this doctrine, every virtue lies between two vices, one of excess and one of deficiency. For instance, courage, a virtue, stands between recklessness (excess) and cowardice (deficiency). A courageous person is neither too rash nor too timid but finds a balanced approach to dealing with danger.

Consider a situation where one must decide whether to confront a bully. The reckless response might be to initiate a violent conflict, while the deficient response might be to run away or ignore the situation entirely. The courageous response, according to Aristotle, would be to find a balanced approach, perhaps standing up to the bully in a non-violent way.

Like any skill, virtues such as courage, honesty, or generosity, must be practiced to be refined. Aristotle, following Socrates and Plato, viewed virtues as central to a well-lived life. He believed ethical virtues, like justice, courage, and temperance, are complex rational, emotional, and social skills that one develops over time. The goal is not merely to act virtuously but to become a virtuous person.

Aristotle and other virtue ethicists distinguish between full or perfect virtue and “ continence “, or strength of will. Fully virtuous individuals naturally act in line with their virtuous character, without struggling against contrary desires. Conversely, continent individuals must consciously control their desires or temptations to act otherwise.

For example, a fully virtuous person doesn’t struggle with the decision to give to charity; it is a natural extension of their generous character. A continent person, on the other hand, might feel an initial reluctance to part with their money but chooses to do so through strength of will. Over time, with repeated acts of generosity, this struggle may lessen as the virtue of generosity becomes more ingrained in their character.

Big ideas: Other Versions of Virtue Ethics

While Western ideas (including Judaism, Christianity, Islamic, and secular philosophies) have been strongly influenced by Aristotle, similar ideas can be found in most other traditions, including China (Confucianism), India (Dharma-based ethics), and Africa (Ubuntu). There are also a number of more recent ideas about how to “update” the general virtue ethics framework to empathize different virtues (such as that of “caring”).

Confucianism and the Virtue of “Ren”

Confucian Virtue Ethics: Confucianism, based on the teachings of the Chinese philosopher Confucius, emphasizes the importance of moral virtues in achieving social harmony and personal fulfillment. Confucian ethics is centered around the cultivation of virtues and the development of moral character through reflection and practice.

Relationships, particularly familial relationships, play a central role in Confucian virtue ethics. Confucius believed that the foundation of a harmonious society lies in the cultivation of virtues within the context of social roles and responsibilities. By fulfilling one’s duties within the family and society, individuals contribute to social harmony and personal growth.

Key virtues in Confucianism include benevolence (ren), righteousness (yi), and wisdom (zhi). Benevolence (ren) is the virtue of compassion and empathy, which involves caring for others and treating them with respect. Righteousness (yi) refers to the sense of moral duty and the commitment to act ethically in all situations . Wisdom (zhi) i s the ability to discern right from wrong and make morally sound decisions based on knowledge and experience.

Confucian virtue ethics also emphasizes the concept of the “superior person” or “ junzi, ” an individual who embodies the virtues of benevolence, righteousness, and wisdom, and serves as a moral exemplar for others. The junzi is committed to personal growth, self-reflection, and the cultivation of virtues, ultimately contributing to the betterment of society as a whole.

Dharma-Based Virtue Ethics

Dharma-based virtue ethics is grounded in the religious and philosophical traditions of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism. Central to this approach is the concept of dharma , which refers to the moral and ethical duties an individual must fulfill to maintain social harmony and personal growth. Dharma is often interpreted as the cosmic order or natural law governing the universe, and each person has a unique dharma based on their social position, stage of life, and individual circumstances.

In Hinduism, dharma is often associated with pursuing one of the Four Yogas that can shape human life:

• Jnana Yoga (path of knowledge),
• Bhakti Yoga (path of devotion),
• Karma Yoga (path of selfless action), and
• Raja Yoga (path of meditation).

By fulfilling their dharma, individuals contribute to the stability of society and their own personal development. Key virtues in Hinduism include nonviolence (ahimsa), truthfulness (satya), purity (shaucha), and self-control (brahmacharya).

In Buddhism, the concept of dharma is linked to the teachings of the Buddha, which provide a path to enlightenment and liberation from suffering. The Noble Eightfold Path , a central tenet of Buddhism, outlines the moral virtues and practices necessary for spiritual growth, such as right view, right intention, right speech, right action, and right mindfulness.

In Jainism, dharma refers to the ethical principles guiding one’s spiritual progress towards liberation. Central to Jain dharma are the principles of nonviolence (ahimsa), truthfulness (satya), non-stealing (asteya), chastity (brahmacharya), and non-attachment (aparigraha). Jainism emphasizes the importance of cultivating virtues and adhering to these ethical principles in order to purify the soul and achieve spiritual liberation.

Ubuntu Virtue Ethics

Ubuntu, a Bantu term that roughly translates to “humanity” or “humanness,” is a virtue ethics framework that originates from African philosophical traditions. Ubuntu emphasizes the interconnectedness of all people and the importance of community in fostering moral development.

According to Ubuntu, a person becomes a fully realized human being through their relationships with others. Moral virtues are developed through acts of compassion, empathy, and solidarity that contribute to the well-being of the community. The philosophy of Ubuntu suggests that a person’s moral worth is not determined solely by their individual actions but also by their contribution to the collective good.

Some of the key virtues in Ubuntu include compassion, empathy, respect, generosity, and reciprocity. These virtues are cultivated through interpersonal relationships and community engagement, emphasizing the importance of maintaining harmony within the community and between individuals.

Ubuntu challenges the notion of individualism, asserting that individuals are fundamentally interconnected and interdependent. It highlights the importance of collective well-being, shared responsibility, and the recognition of the humanity in others. Ubuntu virtue ethics provides a framework for understanding morality as a communal endeavor that shapes and is shaped by the relationships between individuals and their communities.

Care Ethics

Care ethics, sometimes referred to as the ethics of care, is a variety of virtue ethics that emphasizes the moral importance of relationships and the role of care in ethical decision-making. Developed primarily by feminist philosophers such as Carol Gilligan and Nel Noddings, care ethics seeks to address the limitations of traditional moral theories, which have often neglected the significance of emotions and interpersonal connections in shaping moral character.

At its core, care ethics focuses on the importance of caring relationships and the virtues that arise from these relationships, such as empathy, compassion, and responsiveness to the needs of others. Care ethicists argue that moral development is grounded in the context of human relationships and the cultivation of virtues that foster care and concern for others.

Key aspects of care ethics include:

• Emphasis on relationships: Care ethics asserts that moral considerations should be grounded in the context of human relationships, both personal and societal. This approach challenges the individualistic focus of many traditional moral theories and underscores the importance of social interconnectedness in moral development.
• The moral significance of emotions: Care ethics recognizes the essential role of emotions, such as empathy and compassion, in guiding ethical decision-making. By valuing emotional responsiveness, care ethics highlights the importance of understanding the experiences and perspectives of others in order to make morally sound decisions.
• The importance of care: Care ethicists argue that care is a fundamental moral value, central to human flourishing. Acts of care, both in personal relationships and in social and political contexts, are essential for promoting the well-being of individuals and communities.
• Attentiveness to particularity: Care ethics emphasizes the importance of attending to the unique needs and circumstances of individuals in ethical decision-making, rather than relying on abstract principles or rules. This focus on particularity encourages a more nuanced understanding of ethical situations and a greater sensitivity to the diverse experiences and perspectives of others.

Some key virtues associated with care ethics include empathy, compassion, attentiveness, responsiveness, and responsibility. These virtues are cultivated through caring relationships and the practice of attending to the needs and well-being of others.

Care ethics provides a distinctive approach to virtue ethics that foregrounds the importance of relationships, emotions, and care in the development of moral character and ethical decision-making. By highlighting the interconnectedness of individuals and the role of care in fostering human flourishing, care ethics offers a valuable perspective on morality and the cultivation of virtues.

Contemporary Debates: Genetic Engineering and Moral Enhancement

The prospect of genetic engineering and moral enhancement has sparked significant debate in contemporary philosophy, raising questions about the ethical implications of modifying human beings at the genetic level to promote specific moral qualities or virtues. (This idea is sometimes called the debate over moral enhancement. ) Our original story, which explores the idea of genetically implanting virtues, serves as a springboard to examine various philosophical arguments and ideas surrounding this controversial issue.

• Virtue Ethics and Genetic Engineering: Virtue ethicists, who prioritize the cultivation of moral character and virtues, may argue that genetic engineering could potentially undermine the importance of personal growth and moral development. They might contend that the process of cultivating virtues requires effort, reflection, and experience, which cannot be bypassed through genetic modification. Some virtue ethicists, such as Michael Sandel, have expressed concerns that genetic engineering could lead to a loss of human dignity, authenticity, and the value of individual achievements.
• Utilitarianism and Genetic Engineering: Utilitarians, who focus on maximizing overall happiness or utility, might view genetic engineering as a tool to enhance well-being and reduce suffering. They could argue that if moral enhancement leads to individuals making more morally sound decisions, it would result in greater happiness for the greatest number of people. However, utilitarians would also consider potential negative consequences, such as the possibility of creating new inequalities or undermining personal autonomy.
• Deontology and Genetic Engineering: Deontologists, who emphasize adherence to moral rules or duties, might be concerned with the potential violation of individual autonomy and human dignity through genetic engineering. They could argue that manipulating an individual’s genetic makeup without their consent infringes upon their rights, even if it results in morally beneficial outcomes. However, some deontologists might also consider the potential benefits of genetic engineering, such as the reduction of suffering or the promotion of moral duties, as long as it is done within the boundaries of respecting individual autonomy and dignity.
• Moral Enhancement and the Role of Emotions: Philosophers like Martha Nussbaum have emphasized the role of emotions in moral decision-making and the importance of cultivating emotional intelligence. In the context of genetic engineering, proponents of moral enhancement might argue that enhancing emotional capacities, such as empathy and compassion, could lead to more morally responsive individuals. Critics, however, might argue that emotions are complex and context-dependent, and artificially enhancing them could result in unforeseen consequences or even an oversimplification of moral judgments.
• The Limits of Genetic Engineering: Some philosophers, like Julian Savulescu, have argued that genetic engineering and moral enhancement should be pursued with caution, acknowledging that there may be limits to our understanding of the human genome and the long-term implications of genetic manipulation. They emphasize the importance of continued philosophical and scientific inquiry to better understand the ethical implications of these advancements and to ensure that they are employed in ways that promote human flourishing and well-being.

The debate surrounding genetic engineering and moral enhancement touches upon various philosophical arguments and ideas, from virtue ethics to utilitarianism and deontology. Our original story serves as a starting point for exploring these complex issues and engaging with the works of contemporary philosophers who grapple with the ethical implications of genetic engineering and its potential impact on human morality and well-being.

Discussion Questions

• How does the concept of eudaimonia, or human flourishing, differ among various virtue ethics traditions, such as Aristotelian, Confucian, and Ubuntu? Which understanding of human flourishing resonates with you the most, and why?
• What role does moral education play in the development of virtues, according to virtue ethicists? How might this perspective inform contemporary debates about education policy and practices?
• In the context of virtue ethics, do you think the process of cultivating virtues can be genuinely achieved through genetic engineering? Why or why not?
• Considering the role of emotions in moral decision-making, should genetic engineering target emotional capacities such as empathy and compassion? What potential consequences or challenges might arise from such an approach?
• How do utilitarian and deontological perspectives on genetic engineering differ? Do you find one approach more compelling than the other? Explain your reasoning.
• How might the idea of moral enhancement through genetic engineering impact our understanding of personal autonomy, dignity, and authenticity? Do the potential benefits outweigh the risks?
• Compare and contrast the focus on relationships in Confucian virtue ethics with the individualistic focus of Aristotelian virtue ethics. How might these different emphases shape ethical decision-making and personal development in each tradition?
• Discuss the role of context in virtue ethics and how it affects moral decision-making. How does this compare to the approaches taken by utilitarianism and deontology?
• What are some practical implications of adopting a virtue ethics approach in contemporary society, such as in public policy, healthcare, or environmental issues?
• How might virtue ethics contribute to ongoing debates about genetic engineering and moral enhancement? Do you think virtue ethics offers valuable insights that could help guide the development and regulation of such technologies?

Ethical Explorations: Moral Dilemmas in a Universe of Possibilities Copyright © 2023 by Brendan Shea is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License , except where otherwise noted.

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The Importance of Virtue Ethics

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Virtue Ethics

Virtue ethics is currently one of three major approaches in normative ethics. It may, initially, be identified as the one that emphasizes the virtues, or moral character, in contrast to the approach that emphasizes duties or rules (deontology) or that emphasizes the consequences of actions (consequentialism). Suppose it is obvious that someone in need should be helped. A utilitarian will point to the fact that the consequences of doing so will maximize well-being, a deontologist to the fact that, in doing so the agent will be acting in accordance with a moral rule such as “Do unto others as you would be done by” and a virtue ethicist to the fact that helping the person would be charitable or benevolent.

This is not to say that only virtue ethicists attend to virtues, any more than it is to say that only consequentialists attend to consequences or only deontologists to rules. Each of the above-mentioned approaches can make room for virtues, consequences, and rules. Indeed, any plausible normative ethical theory will have something to say about all three. What distinguishes virtue ethics from consequentialism or deontology is the centrality of virtue within the theory (Watson 1990; Kawall 2009). Whereas consequentialists will define virtues as traits that yield good consequences and deontologists will define them as traits possessed by those who reliably fulfil their duties, virtue ethicists will resist the attempt to define virtues in terms of some other concept that is taken to be more fundamental. Rather, virtues and vices will be foundational for virtue ethical theories and other normative notions will be grounded in them.

We begin by discussing two concepts that are central to all forms of virtue ethics, namely, virtue and practical wisdom. Then we note some of the features that distinguish different virtue ethical theories from one another before turning to objections that have been raised against virtue ethics and responses offered on its behalf. We conclude with a look at some of the directions in which future research might develop.

1.2 Practical Wisdom

2.1 eudaimonist virtue ethics, 2.2 agent-based and exemplarist virtue ethics, 2.3 target-centered virtue ethics, 2.4 platonistic virtue ethics, 3. objections to virtue ethics, 4. future directions, other internet resources, related entries, 1. preliminaries.

In the West, virtue ethics’ founding fathers are Plato and Aristotle, and in the East it can be traced back to Mencius and Confucius. It persisted as the dominant approach in Western moral philosophy until at least the Enlightenment, suffered a momentary eclipse during the nineteenth century, but re-emerged in Anglo-American philosophy in the late 1950s. It was heralded by Anscombe’s famous article “Modern Moral Philosophy” (Anscombe 1958) which crystallized an increasing dissatisfaction with the forms of deontology and utilitarianism then prevailing. Neither of them, at that time, paid attention to a number of topics that had always figured in the virtue ethics tradition—virtues and vices, motives and moral character, moral education, moral wisdom or discernment, friendship and family relationships, a deep concept of happiness, the role of the emotions in our moral life and the fundamentally important questions of what sorts of persons we should be and how we should live.

Its re-emergence had an invigorating effect on the other two approaches, many of whose proponents then began to address these topics in the terms of their favoured theory. (One consequence of this has been that it is now necessary to distinguish “virtue ethics” (the third approach) from “virtue theory”, a term which includes accounts of virtue within the other approaches.) Interest in Kant’s virtue theory has redirected philosophers’ attention to Kant’s long neglected Doctrine of Virtue , and utilitarians have developed consequentialist virtue theories (Driver 2001; Hurka 2001). It has also generated virtue ethical readings of philosophers other than Plato and Aristotle, such as Martineau, Hume and Nietzsche, and thereby different forms of virtue ethics have developed (Slote 2001; Swanton 2003, 2011a).

Although modern virtue ethics does not have to take a “neo-Aristotelian” or eudaimonist form (see section 2), almost any modern version still shows that its roots are in ancient Greek philosophy by the employment of three concepts derived from it. These are arête (excellence or virtue), phronesis (practical or moral wisdom) and eudaimonia (usually translated as happiness or flourishing). (See Annas 2011 for a short, clear, and authoritative account of all three.) We discuss the first two in the remainder of this section. Eudaimonia is discussed in connection with eudaimonist versions of virtue ethics in the next.

A virtue is an excellent trait of character. It is a disposition, well entrenched in its possessor—something that, as we say, goes all the way down, unlike a habit such as being a tea-drinker—to notice, expect, value, feel, desire, choose, act, and react in certain characteristic ways. To possess a virtue is to be a certain sort of person with a certain complex mindset. A significant aspect of this mindset is the wholehearted acceptance of a distinctive range of considerations as reasons for action. An honest person cannot be identified simply as one who, for example, practices honest dealing and does not cheat. If such actions are done merely because the agent thinks that honesty is the best policy, or because they fear being caught out, rather than through recognising “To do otherwise would be dishonest” as the relevant reason, they are not the actions of an honest person. An honest person cannot be identified simply as one who, for example, tells the truth because it is the truth, for one can have the virtue of honesty without being tactless or indiscreet. The honest person recognises “That would be a lie” as a strong (though perhaps not overriding) reason for not making certain statements in certain circumstances, and gives due, but not overriding, weight to “That would be the truth” as a reason for making them.

An honest person’s reasons and choices with respect to honest and dishonest actions reflect her views about honesty, truth, and deception—but of course such views manifest themselves with respect to other actions, and to emotional reactions as well. Valuing honesty as she does, she chooses, where possible to work with honest people, to have honest friends, to bring up her children to be honest. She disapproves of, dislikes, deplores dishonesty, is not amused by certain tales of chicanery, despises or pities those who succeed through deception rather than thinking they have been clever, is unsurprised, or pleased (as appropriate) when honesty triumphs, is shocked or distressed when those near and dear to her do what is dishonest and so on. Given that a virtue is such a multi-track disposition, it would obviously be reckless to attribute one to an agent on the basis of a single observed action or even a series of similar actions, especially if you don’t know the agent’s reasons for doing as she did (Sreenivasan 2002).

Possessing a virtue is a matter of degree. To possess such a disposition fully is to possess full or perfect virtue, which is rare, and there are a number of ways of falling short of this ideal (Athanassoulis 2000). Most people who can truly be described as fairly virtuous, and certainly markedly better than those who can truly be described as dishonest, self-centred and greedy, still have their blind spots—little areas where they do not act for the reasons one would expect. So someone honest or kind in most situations, and notably so in demanding ones, may nevertheless be trivially tainted by snobbery, inclined to be disingenuous about their forebears and less than kind to strangers with the wrong accent.

Further, it is not easy to get one’s emotions in harmony with one’s rational recognition of certain reasons for action. I may be honest enough to recognise that I must own up to a mistake because it would be dishonest not to do so without my acceptance being so wholehearted that I can own up easily, with no inner conflict. Following (and adapting) Aristotle, virtue ethicists draw a distinction between full or perfect virtue and “continence”, or strength of will. The fully virtuous do what they should without a struggle against contrary desires; the continent have to control a desire or temptation to do otherwise.

Describing the continent as “falling short” of perfect virtue appears to go against the intuition that there is something particularly admirable about people who manage to act well when it is especially hard for them to do so, but the plausibility of this depends on exactly what “makes it hard” (Foot 1978: 11–14). If it is the circumstances in which the agent acts—say that she is very poor when she sees someone drop a full purse or that she is in deep grief when someone visits seeking help—then indeed it is particularly admirable of her to restore the purse or give the help when it is hard for her to do so. But if what makes it hard is an imperfection in her character—the temptation to keep what is not hers, or a callous indifference to the suffering of others—then it is not.

Another way in which one can easily fall short of full virtue is through lacking phronesis —moral or practical wisdom.

The concept of a virtue is the concept of something that makes its possessor good: a virtuous person is a morally good, excellent or admirable person who acts and feels as she should. These are commonly accepted truisms. But it is equally common, in relation to particular (putative) examples of virtues to give these truisms up. We may say of someone that he is generous or honest “to a fault”. It is commonly asserted that someone’s compassion might lead them to act wrongly, to tell a lie they should not have told, for example, in their desire to prevent someone else’s hurt feelings. It is also said that courage, in a desperado, enables him to do far more wicked things than he would have been able to do if he were timid. So it would appear that generosity, honesty, compassion and courage despite being virtues, are sometimes faults. Someone who is generous, honest, compassionate, and courageous might not be a morally good person—or, if it is still held to be a truism that they are, then morally good people may be led by what makes them morally good to act wrongly! How have we arrived at such an odd conclusion?

The answer lies in too ready an acceptance of ordinary usage, which permits a fairly wide-ranging application of many of the virtue terms, combined, perhaps, with a modern readiness to suppose that the virtuous agent is motivated by emotion or inclination, not by rational choice. If one thinks of generosity or honesty as the disposition to be moved to action by generous or honest impulses such as the desire to give or to speak the truth, if one thinks of compassion as the disposition to be moved by the sufferings of others and to act on that emotion, if one thinks of courage as mere fearlessness or the willingness to face danger, then it will indeed seem obvious that these are all dispositions that can lead to their possessor’s acting wrongly. But it is also obvious, as soon as it is stated, that these are dispositions that can be possessed by children, and although children thus endowed (bar the “courageous” disposition) would undoubtedly be very nice children, we would not say that they were morally virtuous or admirable people. The ordinary usage, or the reliance on motivation by inclination, gives us what Aristotle calls “natural virtue”—a proto version of full virtue awaiting perfection by phronesis or practical wisdom.

Aristotle makes a number of specific remarks about phronesis that are the subject of much scholarly debate, but the (related) modern concept is best understood by thinking of what the virtuous morally mature adult has that nice children, including nice adolescents, lack. Both the virtuous adult and the nice child have good intentions, but the child is much more prone to mess things up because he is ignorant of what he needs to know in order to do what he intends. A virtuous adult is not, of course, infallible and may also, on occasion, fail to do what she intended to do through lack of knowledge, but only on those occasions on which the lack of knowledge is not culpable. So, for example, children and adolescents often harm those they intend to benefit either because they do not know how to set about securing the benefit or because their understanding of what is beneficial and harmful is limited and often mistaken. Such ignorance in small children is rarely, if ever culpable. Adults, on the other hand, are culpable if they mess things up by being thoughtless, insensitive, reckless, impulsive, shortsighted, and by assuming that what suits them will suit everyone instead of taking a more objective viewpoint. They are also culpable if their understanding of what is beneficial and harmful is mistaken. It is part of practical wisdom to know how to secure real benefits effectively; those who have practical wisdom will not make the mistake of concealing the hurtful truth from the person who really needs to know it in the belief that they are benefiting him.

Quite generally, given that good intentions are intentions to act well or “do the right thing”, we may say that practical wisdom is the knowledge or understanding that enables its possessor, unlike the nice adolescents, to do just that, in any given situation. The detailed specification of what is involved in such knowledge or understanding has not yet appeared in the literature, but some aspects of it are becoming well known. Even many deontologists now stress the point that their action-guiding rules cannot, reliably, be applied without practical wisdom, because correct application requires situational appreciation—the capacity to recognise, in any particular situation, those features of it that are morally salient. This brings out two aspects of practical wisdom.

One is that it characteristically comes only with experience of life. Amongst the morally relevant features of a situation may be the likely consequences, for the people involved, of a certain action, and this is something that adolescents are notoriously clueless about precisely because they are inexperienced. It is part of practical wisdom to be wise about human beings and human life. (It should go without saying that the virtuous are mindful of the consequences of possible actions. How could they fail to be reckless, thoughtless and short-sighted if they were not?)

The second is the practically wise agent’s capacity to recognise some features of a situation as more important than others, or indeed, in that situation, as the only relevant ones. The wise do not see things in the same way as the nice adolescents who, with their under-developed virtues, still tend to see the personally disadvantageous nature of a certain action as competing in importance with its honesty or benevolence or justice.

These aspects coalesce in the description of the practically wise as those who understand what is truly worthwhile, truly important, and thereby truly advantageous in life, who know, in short, how to live well.

2. Forms of Virtue Ethics

While all forms of virtue ethics agree that virtue is central and practical wisdom required, they differ in how they combine these and other concepts to illuminate what we should do in particular contexts and how we should live our lives as a whole. In what follows we sketch four distinct forms taken by contemporary virtue ethics, namely, a) eudaimonist virtue ethics, b) agent-based and exemplarist virtue ethics, c) target-centered virtue ethics, and d) Platonistic virtue ethics.

The distinctive feature of eudaimonist versions of virtue ethics is that they define virtues in terms of their relationship to eudaimonia . A virtue is a trait that contributes to or is a constituent of eudaimonia and we ought to develop virtues, the eudaimonist claims, precisely because they contribute to eudaimonia .

The concept of eudaimonia , a key term in ancient Greek moral philosophy, is standardly translated as “happiness” or “flourishing” and occasionally as “well-being.” Each translation has its disadvantages. The trouble with “flourishing” is that animals and even plants can flourish but eudaimonia is possible only for rational beings. The trouble with “happiness” is that in ordinary conversation it connotes something subjectively determined. It is for me, not for you, to pronounce on whether I am happy. If I think I am happy then I am—it is not something I can be wrong about (barring advanced cases of self-deception). Contrast my being healthy or flourishing. Here we have no difficulty in recognizing that I might think I was healthy, either physically or psychologically, or think that I was flourishing but be wrong. In this respect, “flourishing” is a better translation than “happiness”. It is all too easy to be mistaken about whether one’s life is eudaimon (the adjective from eudaimonia ) not simply because it is easy to deceive oneself, but because it is easy to have a mistaken conception of eudaimonia , or of what it is to live well as a human being, believing it to consist largely in physical pleasure or luxury for example.

Eudaimonia is, avowedly, a moralized or value-laden concept of happiness, something like “true” or “real” happiness or “the sort of happiness worth seeking or having.” It is thereby the sort of concept about which there can be substantial disagreement between people with different views about human life that cannot be resolved by appeal to some external standard on which, despite their different views, the parties to the disagreement concur (Hursthouse 1999: 188–189).

Most versions of virtue ethics agree that living a life in accordance with virtue is necessary for eudaimonia. This supreme good is not conceived of as an independently defined state (made up of, say, a list of non-moral goods that does not include virtuous activity) which exercise of the virtues might be thought to promote. It is, within virtue ethics, already conceived of as something of which virtuous activity is at least partially constitutive (Kraut 1989). Thereby virtue ethicists claim that a human life devoted to physical pleasure or the acquisition of wealth is not eudaimon , but a wasted life.

But although all standard versions of virtue ethics insist on that conceptual link between virtue and eudaimonia , further links are matters of dispute and generate different versions. For Aristotle, virtue is necessary but not sufficient—what is also needed are external goods which are a matter of luck. For Plato and the Stoics, virtue is both necessary and sufficient for eudaimonia (Annas 1993).

According to eudaimonist virtue ethics, the good life is the eudaimon life, and the virtues are what enable a human being to be eudaimon because the virtues just are those character traits that benefit their possessor in that way, barring bad luck. So there is a link between eudaimonia and what confers virtue status on a character trait. (For a discussion of the differences between eudaimonists see Baril 2014. For recent defenses of eudaimonism see Annas 2011; LeBar 2013b; Badhwar 2014; and Bloomfield 2014.)

Rather than deriving the normativity of virtue from the value of eudaimonia , agent-based virtue ethicists argue that other forms of normativity—including the value of eudaimonia —are traced back to and ultimately explained in terms of the motivational and dispositional qualities of agents.

It is unclear how many other forms of normativity must be explained in terms of the qualities of agents in order for a theory to count as agent-based. The two best-known agent-based theorists, Michael Slote and Linda Zagzebski, trace a wide range of normative qualities back to the qualities of agents. For example, Slote defines rightness and wrongness in terms of agents’ motivations: “[A]gent-based virtue ethics … understands rightness in terms of good motivations and wrongness in terms of the having of bad (or insufficiently good) motives” (2001: 14). Similarly, he explains the goodness of an action, the value of eudaimonia , the justice of a law or social institution, and the normativity of practical rationality in terms of the motivational and dispositional qualities of agents (2001: 99–100, 154, 2000). Zagzebski likewise defines right and wrong actions by reference to the emotions, motives, and dispositions of virtuous and vicious agents. For example, “A wrong act = an act that the phronimos characteristically would not do, and he would feel guilty if he did = an act such that it is not the case that he might do it = an act that expresses a vice = an act that is against a requirement of virtue (the virtuous self)” (Zagzebski 2004: 160). Her definitions of duties, good and bad ends, and good and bad states of affairs are similarly grounded in the motivational and dispositional states of exemplary agents (1998, 2004, 2010).

However, there could also be less ambitious agent-based approaches to virtue ethics (see Slote 1997). At the very least, an agent-based approach must be committed to explaining what one should do by reference to the motivational and dispositional states of agents. But this is not yet a sufficient condition for counting as an agent-based approach, since the same condition will be met by every virtue ethical account. For a theory to count as an agent-based form of virtue ethics it must also be the case that the normative properties of motivations and dispositions cannot be explained in terms of the normative properties of something else (such as eudaimonia or states of affairs) which is taken to be more fundamental.

Beyond this basic commitment, there is room for agent-based theories to be developed in a number of different directions. The most important distinguishing factor has to do with how motivations and dispositions are taken to matter for the purposes of explaining other normative qualities. For Slote what matters are this particular agent’s actual motives and dispositions . The goodness of action A, for example, is derived from the agent’s motives when she performs A. If those motives are good then the action is good, if not then not. On Zagzebski’s account, by contrast, a good or bad, right or wrong action is defined not by this agent’s actual motives but rather by whether this is the sort of action a virtuously motivated agent would perform (Zagzebski 2004: 160). Appeal to the virtuous agent’s hypothetical motives and dispositions enables Zagzebski to distinguish between performing the right action and doing so for the right reasons (a distinction that, as Brady (2004) observes, Slote has trouble drawing).

Another point on which agent-based forms of virtue ethics might differ concerns how one identifies virtuous motivations and dispositions. According to Zagzebski’s exemplarist account, “We do not have criteria for goodness in advance of identifying the exemplars of goodness” (Zagzebski 2004: 41). As we observe the people around us, we find ourselves wanting to be like some of them (in at least some respects) and not wanting to be like others. The former provide us with positive exemplars and the latter with negative ones. Our understanding of better and worse motivations and virtuous and vicious dispositions is grounded in these primitive responses to exemplars (2004: 53). This is not to say that every time we act we stop and ask ourselves what one of our exemplars would do in this situations. Our moral concepts become more refined over time as we encounter a wider variety of exemplars and begin to draw systematic connections between them, noting what they have in common, how they differ, and which of these commonalities and differences matter, morally speaking. Recognizable motivational profiles emerge and come to be labeled as virtues or vices, and these, in turn, shape our understanding of the obligations we have and the ends we should pursue. However, even though the systematising of moral thought can travel a long way from our starting point, according to the exemplarist it never reaches a stage where reference to exemplars is replaced by the recognition of something more fundamental. At the end of the day, according to the exemplarist, our moral system still rests on our basic propensity to take a liking (or disliking) to exemplars. Nevertheless, one could be an agent-based theorist without advancing the exemplarist’s account of the origins or reference conditions for judgments of good and bad, virtuous and vicious.

The touchstone for eudaimonist virtue ethicists is a flourishing human life. For agent-based virtue ethicists it is an exemplary agent’s motivations. The target-centered view developed by Christine Swanton (2003), by contrast, begins with our existing conceptions of the virtues. We already have a passable idea of which traits are virtues and what they involve. Of course, this untutored understanding can be clarified and improved, and it is one of the tasks of the virtue ethicist to help us do precisely that. But rather than stripping things back to something as basic as the motivations we want to imitate or building it up to something as elaborate as an entire flourishing life, the target-centered view begins where most ethics students find themselves, namely, with the idea that generosity, courage, self-discipline, compassion, and the like get a tick of approval. It then examines what these traits involve.

A complete account of virtue will map out 1) its field , 2) its mode of responsiveness, 3) its basis of moral acknowledgment, and 4) its target . Different virtues are concerned with different fields . Courage, for example, is concerned with what might harm us, whereas generosity is concerned with the sharing of time, talent, and property. The basis of acknowledgment of a virtue is the feature within the virtue’s field to which it responds. To continue with our previous examples, generosity is attentive to the benefits that others might enjoy through one’s agency, and courage responds to threats to value, status, or the bonds that exist between oneself and particular others, and the fear such threats might generate. A virtue’s mode has to do with how it responds to the bases of acknowledgment within its field. Generosity promotes a good, namely, another’s benefit, whereas courage defends a value, bond, or status. Finally, a virtue’s target is that at which it is aimed. Courage aims to control fear and handle danger, while generosity aims to share time, talents, or possessions with others in ways that benefit them.

A virtue , on a target-centered account, “is a disposition to respond to, or acknowledge, items within its field or fields in an excellent or good enough way” (Swanton 2003: 19). A virtuous act is an act that hits the target of a virtue, which is to say that it succeeds in responding to items in its field in the specified way (233). Providing a target-centered definition of a right action requires us to move beyond the analysis of a single virtue and the actions that follow from it. This is because a single action context may involve a number of different, overlapping fields. Determination might lead me to persist in trying to complete a difficult task even if doing so requires a singleness of purpose. But love for my family might make a different use of my time and attention. In order to define right action a target-centered view must explain how we handle different virtues’ conflicting claims on our resources. There are at least three different ways to address this challenge. A perfectionist target-centered account would stipulate, “An act is right if and only if it is overall virtuous, and that entails that it is the, or a, best action possible in the circumstances” (239–240). A more permissive target-centered account would not identify ‘right’ with ‘best’, but would allow an action to count as right provided “it is good enough even if not the (or a) best action” (240). A minimalist target-centered account would not even require an action to be good in order to be right. On such a view, “An act is right if and only if it is not overall vicious” (240). (For further discussion of target-centered virtue ethics see Van Zyl 2014; and Smith 2016).

The fourth form a virtue ethic might adopt takes its inspiration from Plato. The Socrates of Plato’s dialogues devotes a great deal of time to asking his fellow Athenians to explain the nature of virtues like justice, courage, piety, and wisdom. So it is clear that Plato counts as a virtue theorist. But it is a matter of some debate whether he should be read as a virtue ethicist (White 2015). What is not open to debate is whether Plato has had an important influence on the contemporary revival of interest in virtue ethics. A number of those who have contributed to the revival have done so as Plato scholars (e.g., Prior 1991; Kamtekar 1998; Annas 1999; and Reshotko 2006). However, often they have ended up championing a eudaimonist version of virtue ethics (see Prior 2001 and Annas 2011), rather than a version that would warrant a separate classification. Nevertheless, there are two variants that call for distinct treatment.

Timothy Chappell takes the defining feature of Platonistic virtue ethics to be that “Good agency in the truest and fullest sense presupposes the contemplation of the Form of the Good” (2014). Chappell follows Iris Murdoch in arguing that “In the moral life the enemy is the fat relentless ego” (Murdoch 1971: 51). Constantly attending to our needs, our desires, our passions, and our thoughts skews our perspective on what the world is actually like and blinds us to the goods around us. Contemplating the goodness of something we encounter—which is to say, carefully attending to it “for its own sake, in order to understand it” (Chappell 2014: 300)—breaks this natural tendency by drawing our attention away from ourselves. Contemplating such goodness with regularity makes room for new habits of thought that focus more readily and more honestly on things other than the self. It alters the quality of our consciousness. And “anything which alters consciousness in the direction of unselfishness, objectivity, and realism is to be connected with virtue” (Murdoch 1971: 82). The virtues get defined, then, in terms of qualities that help one “pierce the veil of selfish consciousness and join the world as it really is” (91). And good agency is defined by the possession and exercise of such virtues. Within Chappell’s and Murdoch’s framework, then, not all normative properties get defined in terms of virtue. Goodness, in particular, is not so defined. But the kind of goodness which is possible for creatures like us is defined by virtue, and any answer to the question of what one should do or how one should live will appeal to the virtues.

Another Platonistic variant of virtue ethics is exemplified by Robert Merrihew Adams. Unlike Murdoch and Chappell, his starting point is not a set of claims about our consciousness of goodness. Rather, he begins with an account of the metaphysics of goodness. Like Murdoch and others influenced by Platonism, Adams’s account of goodness is built around a conception of a supremely perfect good. And like Augustine, Adams takes that perfect good to be God. God is both the exemplification and the source of all goodness. Other things are good, he suggests, to the extent that they resemble God (Adams 1999).

The resemblance requirement identifies a necessary condition for being good, but it does not yet give us a sufficient condition. This is because there are ways in which finite creatures might resemble God that would not be suitable to the type of creature they are. For example, if God were all-knowing, then the belief, “I am all-knowing,” would be a suitable belief for God to have. In God, such a belief—because true—would be part of God’s perfection. However, as neither you nor I are all-knowing, the belief, “I am all-knowing,” in one of us would not be good. To rule out such cases we need to introduce another factor. That factor is the fitting response to goodness, which Adams suggests is love. Adams uses love to weed out problematic resemblances: “being excellent in the way that a finite thing can be consists in resembling God in a way that could serve God as a reason for loving the thing” (Adams 1999: 36).

Virtues come into the account as one of the ways in which some things (namely, persons) could resemble God. “[M]ost of the excellences that are most important to us, and of whose value we are most confident, are excellences of persons or of qualities or actions or works or lives or stories of persons” (1999: 42). This is one of the reasons Adams offers for conceiving of the ideal of perfection as a personal God, rather than an impersonal form of the Good. Many of the excellences of persons of which we are most confident are virtues such as love, wisdom, justice, patience, and generosity. And within many theistic traditions, including Adams’s own Christian tradition, such virtues are commonly attributed to divine agents.

A Platonistic account like the one Adams puts forward in Finite and Infinite Goods clearly does not derive all other normative properties from the virtues (for a discussion of the relationship between this view and the one he puts forward in A Theory of Virtue (2006) see Pettigrove 2014). Goodness provides the normative foundation. Virtues are not built on that foundation; rather, as one of the varieties of goodness of whose value we are most confident, virtues form part of the foundation. Obligations, by contrast, come into the account at a different level. Moral obligations, Adams argues, are determined by the expectations and demands that “arise in a relationship or system of relationships that is good or valuable” (1999: 244). Other things being equal, the more virtuous the parties to the relationship, the more binding the obligation. Thus, within Adams’s account, the good (which includes virtue) is prior to the right. However, once good relationships have given rise to obligations, those obligations take on a life of their own. Their bindingness is not traced directly to considerations of goodness. Rather, they are determined by the expectations of the parties and the demands of the relationship.

A number of objections have been raised against virtue ethics, some of which bear more directly on one form of virtue ethics than on others. In this section we consider eight objections, namely, the a) application, b) adequacy, c) relativism, d) conflict, e) self-effacement, f) justification, g) egoism, and h) situationist problems.

a) In the early days of virtue ethics’ revival, the approach was associated with an “anti-codifiability” thesis about ethics, directed against the prevailing pretensions of normative theory. At the time, utilitarians and deontologists commonly (though not universally) held that the task of ethical theory was to come up with a code consisting of universal rules or principles (possibly only one, as in the case of act-utilitarianism) which would have two significant features: i) the rule(s) would amount to a decision procedure for determining what the right action was in any particular case; ii) the rule(s) would be stated in such terms that any non-virtuous person could understand and apply it (them) correctly.

Virtue ethicists maintained, contrary to these two claims, that it was quite unrealistic to imagine that there could be such a code (see, in particular, McDowell 1979). The results of attempts to produce and employ such a code, in the heady days of the 1960s and 1970s, when medical and then bioethics boomed and bloomed, tended to support the virtue ethicists’ claim. More and more utilitarians and deontologists found themselves agreed on their general rules but on opposite sides of the controversial moral issues in contemporary discussion. It came to be recognised that moral sensitivity, perception, imagination, and judgement informed by experience— phronesis in short—is needed to apply rules or principles correctly. Hence many (though by no means all) utilitarians and deontologists have explicitly abandoned (ii) and much less emphasis is placed on (i).

Nevertheless, the complaint that virtue ethics does not produce codifiable principles is still a commonly voiced criticism of the approach, expressed as the objection that it is, in principle, unable to provide action-guidance.

Initially, the objection was based on a misunderstanding. Blinkered by slogans that described virtue ethics as “concerned with Being rather than Doing,” as addressing “What sort of person should I be?” but not “What should I do?” as being “agent-centered rather than act-centered,” its critics maintained that it was unable to provide action-guidance. Hence, rather than being a normative rival to utilitarian and deontological ethics, it could claim to be no more than a valuable supplement to them. The rather odd idea was that all virtue ethics could offer was, “Identify a moral exemplar and do what he would do,” as though the university student trying to decide whether to study music (her preference) or engineering (her parents’ preference) was supposed to ask herself, “What would Socrates study if he were in my circumstances?”

But the objection failed to take note of Anscombe’s hint that a great deal of specific action guidance could be found in rules employing the virtue and vice terms (“v-rules”) such as “Do what is honest/charitable; do not do what is dishonest/uncharitable” (Hursthouse 1999). (It is a noteworthy feature of our virtue and vice vocabulary that, although our list of generally recognised virtue terms is comparatively short, our list of vice terms is remarkably, and usefully, long, far exceeding anything that anyone who thinks in terms of standard deontological rules has ever come up with. Much invaluable action guidance comes from avoiding courses of action that would be irresponsible, feckless, lazy, inconsiderate, uncooperative, harsh, intolerant, selfish, mercenary, indiscreet, tactless, arrogant, unsympathetic, cold, incautious, unenterprising, pusillanimous, feeble, presumptuous, rude, hypocritical, self-indulgent, materialistic, grasping, short-sighted, vindictive, calculating, ungrateful, grudging, brutal, profligate, disloyal, and on and on.)

(b) A closely related objection has to do with whether virtue ethics can provide an adequate account of right action. This worry can take two forms. (i) One might think a virtue ethical account of right action is extensionally inadequate. It is possible to perform a right action without being virtuous and a virtuous person can occasionally perform the wrong action without that calling her virtue into question. If virtue is neither necessary nor sufficient for right action, one might wonder whether the relationship between rightness/wrongness and virtue/vice is close enough for the former to be identified in terms of the latter. (ii) Alternatively, even if one thought it possible to produce a virtue ethical account that picked out all (and only) right actions, one might still think that at least in some cases virtue is not what explains rightness (Adams 2006:6–8).

Some virtue ethicists respond to the adequacy objection by rejecting the assumption that virtue ethics ought to be in the business of providing an account of right action in the first place. Following in the footsteps of Anscombe (1958) and MacIntyre (1985), Talbot Brewer (2009) argues that to work with the categories of rightness and wrongness is already to get off on the wrong foot. Contemporary conceptions of right and wrong action, built as they are around a notion of moral duty that presupposes a framework of divine (or moral) law or around a conception of obligation that is defined in contrast to self-interest, carry baggage the virtue ethicist is better off without. Virtue ethics can address the questions of how one should live, what kind of person one should become, and even what one should do without that committing it to providing an account of ‘right action’. One might choose, instead, to work with aretaic concepts (defined in terms of virtues and vices) and axiological concepts (defined in terms of good and bad, better and worse) and leave out deontic notions (like right/wrong action, duty, and obligation) altogether.

Other virtue ethicists wish to retain the concept of right action but note that in the current philosophical discussion a number of distinct qualities march under that banner. In some contexts, ‘right action’ identifies the best action an agent might perform in the circumstances. In others, it designates an action that is commendable (even if not the best possible). In still others, it picks out actions that are not blameworthy (even if not commendable). A virtue ethicist might choose to define one of these—for example, the best action—in terms of virtues and vices, but appeal to other normative concepts—such as legitimate expectations—when defining other conceptions of right action.

As we observed in section 2, a virtue ethical account need not attempt to reduce all other normative concepts to virtues and vices. What is required is simply (i) that virtue is not reduced to some other normative concept that is taken to be more fundamental and (ii) that some other normative concepts are explained in terms of virtue and vice. This takes the sting out of the adequacy objection, which is most compelling against versions of virtue ethics that attempt to define all of the senses of ‘right action’ in terms of virtues. Appealing to virtues and vices makes it much easier to achieve extensional adequacy. Making room for normative concepts that are not taken to be reducible to virtue and vice concepts makes it even easier to generate a theory that is both extensionally and explanatorily adequate. Whether one needs other concepts and, if so, how many, is still a matter of debate among virtue ethicists, as is the question of whether virtue ethics even ought to be offering an account of right action. Either way virtue ethicists have resources available to them to address the adequacy objection.

Insofar as the different versions of virtue ethics all retain an emphasis on the virtues, they are open to the familiar problem of (c) the charge of cultural relativity. Is it not the case that different cultures embody different virtues, (MacIntyre 1985) and hence that the v-rules will pick out actions as right or wrong only relative to a particular culture? Different replies have been made to this charge. One—the tu quoque , or “partners in crime” response—exhibits a quite familiar pattern in virtue ethicists’ defensive strategy (Solomon 1988). They admit that, for them, cultural relativism is a challenge, but point out that it is just as much a problem for the other two approaches. The (putative) cultural variation in character traits regarded as virtues is no greater—indeed markedly less—than the cultural variation in rules of conduct, and different cultures have different ideas about what constitutes happiness or welfare. That cultural relativity should be a problem common to all three approaches is hardly surprising. It is related, after all, to the “justification problem” ( see below ) the quite general metaethical problem of justifying one’s moral beliefs to those who disagree, whether they be moral sceptics, pluralists or from another culture.

A bolder strategy involves claiming that virtue ethics has less difficulty with cultural relativity than the other two approaches. Much cultural disagreement arises, it may be claimed, from local understandings of the virtues, but the virtues themselves are not relative to culture (Nussbaum 1993).

Another objection to which the tu quoque response is partially appropriate is (d) “the conflict problem.” What does virtue ethics have to say about dilemmas—cases in which, apparently, the requirements of different virtues conflict because they point in opposed directions? Charity prompts me to kill the person who would be better off dead, but justice forbids it. Honesty points to telling the hurtful truth, kindness and compassion to remaining silent or even lying. What shall I do? Of course, the same sorts of dilemmas are generated by conflicts between deontological rules. Deontology and virtue ethics share the conflict problem (and are happy to take it on board rather than follow some of the utilitarians in their consequentialist resolutions of such dilemmas) and in fact their strategies for responding to it are parallel. Both aim to resolve a number of dilemmas by arguing that the conflict is merely apparent; a discriminating understanding of the virtues or rules in question, possessed only by those with practical wisdom, will perceive that, in this particular case, the virtues do not make opposing demands or that one rule outranks another, or has a certain exception clause built into it. Whether this is all there is to it depends on whether there are any irresolvable dilemmas. If there are, proponents of either normative approach may point out reasonably that it could only be a mistake to offer a resolution of what is, ex hypothesi , irresolvable.

Another problem arguably shared by all three approaches is (e), that of being self-effacing. An ethical theory is self-effacing if, roughly, whatever it claims justifies a particular action, or makes it right, had better not be the agent’s motive for doing it. Michael Stocker (1976) originally introduced it as a problem for deontology and consequentialism. He pointed out that the agent who, rightly, visits a friend in hospital will rather lessen the impact of his visit on her if he tells her either that he is doing it because it is his duty or because he thought it would maximize the general happiness. But as Simon Keller observes, she won’t be any better pleased if he tells her that he is visiting her because it is what a virtuous agent would do, so virtue ethics would appear to have the problem too (Keller 2007). However, virtue ethics’ defenders have argued that not all forms of virtue ethics are subject to this objection (Pettigrove 2011) and those that are are not seriously undermined by the problem (Martinez 2011).

Another problem for virtue ethics, which is shared by both utilitarianism and deontology, is (f) “the justification problem.” Abstractly conceived, this is the problem of how we justify or ground our ethical beliefs, an issue that is hotly debated at the level of metaethics. In its particular versions, for deontology there is the question of how to justify its claims that certain moral rules are the correct ones, and for utilitarianism of how to justify its claim that all that really matters morally are consequences for happiness or well-being. For virtue ethics, the problem concerns the question of which character traits are the virtues.

In the metaethical debate, there is widespread disagreement about the possibility of providing an external foundation for ethics—“external” in the sense of being external to ethical beliefs—and the same disagreement is found amongst deontologists and utilitarians. Some believe that their normative ethics can be placed on a secure basis, resistant to any form of scepticism, such as what anyone rationally desires, or would accept or agree on, regardless of their ethical outlook; others that it cannot.

Virtue ethicists have eschewed any attempt to ground virtue ethics in an external foundation while continuing to maintain that their claims can be validated. Some follow a form of Rawls’s coherentist approach (Slote 2001; Swanton 2003); neo-Aristotelians a form of ethical naturalism.

A misunderstanding of eudaimonia as an unmoralized concept leads some critics to suppose that the neo-Aristotelians are attempting to ground their claims in a scientific account of human nature and what counts, for a human being, as flourishing. Others assume that, if this is not what they are doing, they cannot be validating their claims that, for example, justice, charity, courage, and generosity are virtues. Either they are illegitimately helping themselves to Aristotle’s discredited natural teleology (Williams 1985) or producing mere rationalizations of their own personal or culturally inculcated values. But McDowell, Foot, MacIntyre and Hursthouse have all outlined versions of a third way between these two extremes. Eudaimonia in virtue ethics, is indeed a moralized concept, but it is not only that. Claims about what constitutes flourishing for human beings no more float free of scientific facts about what human beings are like than ethological claims about what constitutes flourishing for elephants. In both cases, the truth of the claims depends in part on what kind of animal they are and what capacities, desires and interests the humans or elephants have.

The best available science today (including evolutionary theory and psychology) supports rather than undermines the ancient Greek assumption that we are social animals, like elephants and wolves and unlike polar bears. No rationalizing explanation in terms of anything like a social contract is needed to explain why we choose to live together, subjugating our egoistic desires in order to secure the advantages of co-operation. Like other social animals, our natural impulses are not solely directed towards our own pleasures and preservation, but include altruistic and cooperative ones.

This basic fact about us should make more comprehensible the claim that the virtues are at least partially constitutive of human flourishing and also undercut the objection that virtue ethics is, in some sense, egoistic.

(g) The egoism objection has a number of sources. One is a simple confusion. Once it is understood that the fully virtuous agent characteristically does what she should without inner conflict, it is triumphantly asserted that “she is only doing what she wants to do and hence is being selfish.” So when the generous person gives gladly, as the generous are wont to do, it turns out she is not generous and unselfish after all, or at least not as generous as the one who greedily wants to hang on to everything she has but forces herself to give because she thinks she should! A related version ascribes bizarre reasons to the virtuous agent, unjustifiably assuming that she acts as she does because she believes that acting thus on this occasion will help her to achieve eudaimonia. But “the virtuous agent” is just “the agent with the virtues” and it is part of our ordinary understanding of the virtue terms that each carries with it its own typical range of reasons for acting. The virtuous agent acts as she does because she believes that someone’s suffering will be averted, or someone benefited, or the truth established, or a debt repaid, or … thereby.

It is the exercise of the virtues during one’s life that is held to be at least partially constitutive of eudaimonia , and this is consistent with recognising that bad luck may land the virtuous agent in circumstances that require her to give up her life. Given the sorts of considerations that courageous, honest, loyal, charitable people wholeheartedly recognise as reasons for action, they may find themselves compelled to face danger for a worthwhile end, to speak out in someone’s defence, or refuse to reveal the names of their comrades, even when they know that this will inevitably lead to their execution, to share their last crust and face starvation. On the view that the exercise of the virtues is necessary but not sufficient for eudaimonia , such cases are described as those in which the virtuous agent sees that, as things have unfortunately turned out, eudaimonia is not possible for them (Foot 2001, 95). On the Stoical view that it is both necessary and sufficient, a eudaimon life is a life that has been successfully lived (where “success” of course is not to be understood in a materialistic way) and such people die knowing not only that they have made a success of their lives but that they have also brought their lives to a markedly successful completion. Either way, such heroic acts can hardly be regarded as egoistic.

A lingering suggestion of egoism may be found in the misconceived distinction between so-called “self-regarding” and “other-regarding” virtues. Those who have been insulated from the ancient tradition tend to regard justice and benevolence as real virtues, which benefit others but not their possessor, and prudence, fortitude and providence (the virtue whose opposite is “improvidence” or being a spendthrift) as not real virtues at all because they benefit only their possessor. This is a mistake on two counts. Firstly, justice and benevolence do, in general, benefit their possessors, since without them eudaimonia is not possible. Secondly, given that we live together, as social animals, the “self-regarding” virtues do benefit others—those who lack them are a great drain on, and sometimes grief to, those who are close to them (as parents with improvident or imprudent adult offspring know only too well).

The most recent objection (h) to virtue ethics claims that work in “situationist” social psychology shows that there are no such things as character traits and thereby no such things as virtues for virtue ethics to be about (Doris 1998; Harman 1999). In reply, some virtue ethicists have argued that the social psychologists’ studies are irrelevant to the multi-track disposition (see above) that a virtue is supposed to be (Sreenivasan 2002; Kamtekar 2004). Mindful of just how multi-track it is, they agree that it would be reckless in the extreme to ascribe a demanding virtue such as charity to people of whom they know no more than that they have exhibited conventional decency; this would indeed be “a fundamental attribution error.” Others have worked to develop alternative, empirically grounded conceptions of character traits (Snow 2010; Miller 2013 and 2014; however see Upton 2016 for objections to Miller). There have been other responses as well (summarized helpfully in Prinz 2009 and Miller 2014). Notable among these is a response by Adams (2006, echoing Merritt 2000) who steers a middle road between “no character traits at all” and the exacting standard of the Aristotelian conception of virtue which, because of its emphasis on phronesis, requires a high level of character integration. On his conception, character traits may be “frail and fragmentary” but still virtues, and not uncommon. But giving up the idea that practical wisdom is the heart of all the virtues, as Adams has to do, is a substantial sacrifice, as Russell (2009) and Kamtekar (2010) argue.

Even though the “situationist challenge” has left traditional virtue ethicists unmoved, it has generated a healthy engagement with empirical psychological literature, which has also been fuelled by the growing literature on Foot’s Natural Goodness and, quite independently, an upsurge of interest in character education (see below).

Over the past thirty-five years most of those contributing to the revival of virtue ethics have worked within a neo-Aristotelian, eudaimonist framework. However, as noted in section 2, other forms of virtue ethics have begun to emerge. Theorists have begun to turn to philosophers like Hutcheson, Hume, Nietzsche, Martineau, and Heidegger for resources they might use to develop alternatives (see Russell 2006; Swanton 2013 and 2015; Taylor 2015; and Harcourt 2015). Others have turned their attention eastward, exploring Confucian, Buddhist, and Hindu traditions (Yu 2007; Slingerland 2011; Finnigan and Tanaka 2011; McRae 2012; Angle and Slote 2013; Davis 2014; Flanagan 2015; Perrett and Pettigrove 2015; and Sim 2015). These explorations promise to open up new avenues for the development of virtue ethics.

Although virtue ethics has grown remarkably in the last thirty-five years, it is still very much in the minority, particularly in the area of applied ethics. Many editors of big textbook collections on “moral problems” or “applied ethics” now try to include articles representative of each of the three normative approaches but are often unable to find a virtue ethics article addressing a particular issue. This is sometimes, no doubt, because “the” issue has been set up as a deontologicial/utilitarian debate, but it is often simply because no virtue ethicist has yet written on the topic. However, the last decade has seen an increase in the amount of attention applied virtue ethics has received (Walker and Ivanhoe 2007; Hartman 2013; Austin 2014; Van Hooft 2014; and Annas 2015). This area can certainly be expected to grow in the future, and it looks as though applying virtue ethics in the field of environmental ethics may prove particularly fruitful (Sandler 2007; Hursthouse 2007, 2011; Zwolinski and Schmidtz 2013; Cafaro 2015).

Whether virtue ethics can be expected to grow into “virtue politics”—i.e. to extend from moral philosophy into political philosophy—is not so clear. Gisela Striker (2006) has argued that Aristotle’s ethics cannot be understood adequately without attending to its place in his politics. That suggests that at least those virtue ethicists who take their inspiration from Aristotle should have resources to offer for the development of virtue politics. But, while Plato and Aristotle can be great inspirations as far as virtue ethics is concerned, neither, on the face of it, are attractive sources of insight where politics is concerned. However, recent work suggests that Aristotelian ideas can, after all, generate a satisfyingly liberal political philosophy (Nussbaum 2006; LeBar 2013a). Moreover, as noted above, virtue ethics does not have to be neo-Aristotelian. It may be that the virtue ethics of Hutcheson and Hume can be naturally extended into a modern political philosophy (Hursthouse 1990–91; Slote 1993).

Following Plato and Aristotle, modern virtue ethics has always emphasised the importance of moral education, not as the inculcation of rules but as the training of character. There is now a growing movement towards virtues education, amongst both academics (Carr 1999; Athanassoulis 2014; Curren 2015) and teachers in the classroom. One exciting thing about research in this area is its engagement with other academic disciplines, including psychology, educational theory, and theology (see Cline 2015; and Snow 2015).

Finally, one of the more productive developments of virtue ethics has come through the study of particular virtues and vices. There are now a number of careful studies of the cardinal virtues and capital vices (Pieper 1966; Taylor 2006; Curzer 2012; Timpe and Boyd 2014). Others have explored less widely discussed virtues or vices, such as civility, decency, truthfulness, ambition, and meekness (Calhoun 2000; Kekes 2002; Williams 2002; and Pettigrove 2007 and 2012). One of the questions these studies raise is “How many virtues are there?” A second is, “How are these virtues related to one another?” Some virtue ethicists have been happy to work on the assumption that there is no principled reason for limiting the number of virtues and plenty of reason for positing a plurality of them (Swanton 2003; Battaly 2015). Others have been concerned that such an open-handed approach to the virtues will make it difficult for virtue ethicists to come up with an adequate account of right action or deal with the conflict problem discussed above. Dan Russell has proposed cardinality and a version of the unity thesis as a solution to what he calls “the enumeration problem” (the problem of too many virtues). The apparent proliferation of virtues can be significantly reduced if we group virtues together with some being cardinal and others subordinate extensions of those cardinal virtues. Possible conflicts between the remaining virtues can then be managed if they are tied together in some way as part of a unified whole (Russell 2009). This highlights two important avenues for future research, one of which explores individual virtues and the other of which analyses how they might be related to one another.

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Aristotle | character, moral | character, moral: empirical approaches | consequentialism | ethics: deontological | moral dilemmas

Acknowledgments

Parts of the introductory material above repeat what was said in the Introduction and first chapter of On Virtue Ethics (Hursthouse 1999).

Copyright © 2022 by Rosalind Hursthouse Glen Pettigrove < glen . pettigrove @ glasgow . ac . uk >

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Moral Integrity in the Modern Society Essay

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What is moral integrity?

Moral integrity is a complicated notion which includes such phenomena as personal morality, societal morality and group morality. An individual’s personal integrity is a combination of these phenomena (Morrison, 2009).

Moral integrity affects choices and decisions made. Thus, people develop own moral values. Individuals also tend to impose certain duties, i.e. people expect others act in certain ways. Apart from personal morality, people follow certain conventions existing in the society. These conventions have been developed throughout decades and centuries. These conventions are based on cultural peculiarities, political economic traits of the country and even geographical peculiarities of the area.

Finally, there are moral conventions developed by certain groups, e.g. health care professionals. Members of these groups have to comply with the rules accepted. Thus, moral integrity is a combination of the three types of morality. It is also necessary to note that moral integrity also includes the way people act, i.e. make decisions. Moral integrity is not the way people think only, but it is also the way they act.

What temptations will you face in choosing moral integrity as a basis for your professional actions?

Health care professionals enjoy respect in the society. Position of a health care professional is also associated with certain privileges. Even though health care professionals may choose moral integrity as the basis for their actions, their position is still associated with certain temptations. For instance, health care professionals are often exposed to suffering and lots of mistakes made by people. This can make the former more hard-hearted and less moral. This may make people cross their bottom line and start tolerating quite immoral actions.

Furthermore, health care professionals also enjoy high level of authority. This may lead to some violations. It is really tempting to make people do some things (pay more, accept options which are not thoroughly considered, etc.) as they trust health care professionals and rely on their viewpoints.

Of course, such kind of violation leads to immoral behavior. As a result, the leader may create unhealthy atmosphere in the organization. Admittedly, immoral behavior of one of the members of the organization often leads to immoral actions of other people within the organization.

What is the best way for you to maintain your moral integrity?

There are several ways to maintain one’s moral integrity. First, it is important to identify one’s moral bottom line (Morrison, 2009). Every individual should have specific moral codes and follow them, without exceptions. It is impossible to adjust one’s code to each situation.

There should be a bottom line which can never be crossed. It is also crucial to choose the organization where employees follow similar moral conventions (Morrison, 2009). In other words, it is important to evaluate group morality within the organization and compare it with own moral integrity. If an individual’s bottom line may somehow be crossed in an organization, the individual should avoid working there.

Besides, it can be helpful to have a moral diary where all major decision and actions made are highlighted (Morrison, 2009). The individual may trace his/her behavior. It will be easy to identify whether there is a risk of crossing the bottom line. Finally, it is also a good idea to have a moral mentor, i.e. a person who can give some advice. Health care professionals have to make a variety of decisions. Many of these decisions are really hard. A mentor can help handle difficult problems and maintain moral integrity.

Reference List

Morrison, E.E. (2009). Ethics in health administration: A practical approach for decision makers. Sudbury, MA: Jones & Bartlett Publishers.

• Ethic Problem of the Withdrawal of Medical Equipment in Medicine
• Ethics in Health Administration: Four Principles of Autonomy
• Nature and Convention Relation
• "The Grand Inquisitor" on the Nature of Man
• The Concept of Mentoring
• Why Active Euthanasia is Morally Wrong
• The Ethics of Abortion
• Euthanasia Moral Permissibility
• Definition of the Placebo Effect in Medicine
• Should Assisted Suicide Be Legalized
• Chicago (A-D)
• Chicago (N-B)

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Moral Aims: Essays on the Importance of Getting It Right and Practicing Morality with Others

Cheshire Calhoun, Moral Aims: Essays on the Importance of Getting It Right and Practicing Morality with Others , Oxford University Press, 2016, 259pp., $45.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780199328796.

Reviewed by Kathryn J. Norlock, Trent University

This collection of previously published essays by Cheshire Calhoun, with an original introduction, supplies an absorbing assemblage of some well-known and some lesser-known essays that hang together remarkably well. The overall effect is that of a robust and provocative approach to ethical theory, in a form that will appeal to readers of nonideal theory and readers of feminist ethical work such as that of Margaret Urban Walker (whom Calhoun cites as an influence). It is a study in meta-philosophy as well as morality, consistently recalling our attention to how ethical theorists justify our methods. The meta-philosophical strengths of the whole move me to recommend it to anyone in moral philosophy; I particularly recommend the book to scholars of nonideal theory who may find it easy to forget that past work in feminist philosophy offers some of the best models of nonidealizing methodology. The hardcover is, happily, not priced unreasonably, so I can further commend it to instructors for use in graduate and upper-level undergraduate seminars in ethics.

Calhoun builds a persuasive case for morality as an enterprise constituted as much by social practices as by abstract theorizing. Calhoun's is not merely the position that moral theory has feasibility constraints when applied. On the contrary, she offers these essays as multiple viewing angles on her position that "Absent a social practice, there is no morality, although there might be moral knowledge" (13). Conventionally, we conceive of morality as a correct action guide, a theory that aims for accuracy in an attempt to "get it right," which we then carry into application in the world. Calhoun argues that our critically reflective aim of theorizing toward accuracy supervenes on -- and often unwittingly presumes -- the backdrop of a social practice of morality (17).

Reflection on the content of the social practice of morality is what normative moral theorizing should be about. The theorist is not to begin by ignoring actual social practices of morality, including those that shape the theorist's own thought, in order to construct an ideal normative standard to then be applied in evaluating actual practices (14).

In short, morality refers to how we engage others as much as it refers to how we develop and shape principles and theories, and moral social practices are not anterior applications of theories; "the social practice of morality really is morality" (26). The rest of the book is a study in the ways that these two conceptions of morality, the theoretical one aiming to get it right and the social one aiming to live with others, work together and sometimes in tension due to the plurality of our moral aims.

The book has nine chapters, divided into four parts. Part I, "Critical Morality and Social Norms," includes the first two chapters. Chapter 1, "Moral Failure," takes up the topic of "moral revolutionaries," that is, "people who succeed in thinking from a moral point of view that both exceeds and improves upon the conventional moral understandings broadly shared in their social worlds" (27). Revolutionaries and resisters bear a special burden in light of the tension between morality as getting principles right and morality as living with others. Calhoun persuasively demonstrates that admirable revolutionaries can "get it right" in a way that "actually produces a particular kind of moral failure of their lives," and the kind of moral failure she has in mind can include moral revolutionaries' nonacceptance by less principled peers, loneliness or abandonment in the course of living up to their convictions, even compromise and loss of integrity if they must find a way to navigate a morally nonideal world knowing that their compromises are wrong (27). Showing this does not show that traditional moral theorizing is wrong, Calhoun says; rather, her account of moral failure indicates that traditional ethical views of morality as "getting it right" fail to capture something that matters about the good or bad life of one who fails, a tantalizing contemporary appreciation of the ancient puzzle as to whether one can be unhappy and virtuous.

The chapter is compelling, although ideally it would be updated to show connection to the next chapter on shame. For example, Calhoun notes the "two ideals for what moral lives should look like, . . . the familiar ideal of getting it right" and "the ideal of participating in a shared scheme of social cooperation" (42). In light of the tragedies and compromises faced by revolutionaries and resisters, and knowing that Chapter 2 is titled "An Apology for Moral Shame," I wondered if perhaps shame accomplishes the second ideal when the familiar ideal is unmet, that is, if shame is a form of participation in the shared scheme that is available to someone who could not maintain adherence to a correct action-guiding principle. I think Calhoun would agree that this is a main point of Chapter 2, that shame serves precisely this function, and it is a downside of a collection of previous publications that those sorts of synthesizing connections are not always offered. Chapter 2, in its turn, is a gripping account of shame, a major contribution to understanding it as "a mark of moral maturity" (49), and immensely helpful to understanding how one can feel moral shame in a sensible way even when one does not morally endorse the ideal one is not meeting.

Part II, "Reaching, Relying On, and Contesting Social Consensus on Moral Norms," includes chapters 3 through 5, the most thematically connected chapters of the book. Chapter 3, "The Virtue of Civility," deals with the potential objection that civility, like etiquette, is a mere conformity to others' expectations. Calhoun offers energetic arguments to the contrary, arguing that a function of civility is to communicate basic moral attitudes. Civility is the social virtue of expressiveness of one's respect for others. I am only partly persuaded by Calhoun's view that civility is further owed to those who do not get morality right; that is, she maintains that civility is not obviously ruled out when one is confronted with others with moral views one deplores. Even here, Calhoun maintains, if one is committed to morality, then one must be committed to its instantiation in a social world, including one's communication of respect and interest in living with others. If each moral agent individually decided whether or not to be civil depending on the moral principles of the other, then we would have to abandon hopes of working out our differences ("civility anarchy" (96)) and living together in a civil society. If this yields a conflict with integrity, Calhoun accepts that cost; "it may be unwise to expect or desire a unity of the virtues" (100). It is the virtue that most heavily draws on Calhoun's commitment to morality as not, first and foremost, getting principles right, and rather as, more basically, "something we do together" (102). I remain concerned that when one who does not get morality right also refuses to get together, and I continue respecting another who has committed to disrespect and withdrawal, then the goal posts of morality may continually move away from what seems right.

Chapter 4, "Common Decency," offers an argument for the minimal gifts of kindness as something between the required and the supererogatory, a form of social moral practice that it is wrong never to offer. This is not merely an argument for an imperfect virtue, which arguably is always elective on particular occasions even if required over time. Calhoun argues that decency is not always simply elective on every particular occasion, and instead comprises the day-to-day moral duties of a minimally well-formed moral agent. The essay is an important contribution to the study of supererogatory action.

Chapter 5, "Standing for Something," attends to integrity, a concept in the background of the preceding chapters that now takes center stage. All three social virtues -- civility, decency, and integrity -- are importantly expressive, forms of accounting for oneself before others. Integrity turns out to be a "master virtue" that presses into service "a host of other virtues" including civility (153), but the chapter's appearance after one on civility rather than before it works surprisingly well, as the culmination of arguments for increasingly fundamental virtues as essentially social and communicative. Integrity, as Calhoun develops it, is "the social virtue of acting on one's own judgment," indeed "one's best judgment" (151, 150). Integrity "calls us simultaneously to stand behind our convictions and to take seriously others' doubts about them," if one is sincerely interested in evaluating one's own judgment as one's best. I hesitate at the inclusion of "best" as an ingredient of the judgment one offers with integrity. I continue to think that integrity can be compatible with great epistemological humility regarding whether one thinks one either knows best or has arrived at one's best judgment, and I suspect a reflective agent's willingness to offer oneself for scrutiny and to be wrong goes a long way toward accounting for commitment to stand by one's convictions without having to be optimal or best.

Part III, "Conventionalized Wrongdoing," includes chapters 6 and 7. Chapter 6, "Kant and Compliance with Conventionalized Injustice," is the only essay that I felt was not entirely in keeping with the themes of this collection. Calhoun describes this essay as "a little exercise in doing non-ideal theory" (vii), but the whole collection strikes me as a large work in nonideal theory more broadly conceived; this portion felt out of step with the whole. Yet I found myself regularly entertaining thoughts of assigning the essay to students of Kant's ethics, so its singular value for polemic arguments against Kant's first formulation of the Categorical Imperative may be worth its less than harmonious presence in the book. Kantians will resist the consequentialist take on the methods of universalization of one's maxim, but in offering it, Calhoun raises just the sorts of questions that one must entertain when doing Kant's ethics, regarding whether Kant relies on conventions of social practice to justify his moral obligations.

Chapter 7, "Responsibility and Reproach," does exciting work in examining responsibility and culpability in nonideal contexts, and returns to the themes of Parts I and II, including the roles of blame, excuse, sanction, and reproach in morally compromised and nonideal moral contexts, or in Calhoun's terms, "abnormal moral contexts" (187). These are to be understood as contrasting with "normal moral contexts" in which "the rightness or wrongness of different courses of action is transparent to individuals, where 'transparent' does not mean self-evident," but means that participants "share a common moral language, agree for the most part on moral rules, and use similar methods of moral reasoning," even if they disagree on applications (194). This brings to mind Calhoun's moral revolutionary from Chapter 1, whom I take to be operating in abnormal moral contexts in which being understandable to others may even mean compromising his or her principles. The opacity of such problematic moral contexts makes it difficult to locate blameworthiness or excusable ignorance for participation in nonideal conditions, but this is no reason to give up on social practices of morality; Calhoun concludes that "in abnormal moral contexts, it may be reasonable to reproach moral failings even when individuals are not blameworthy" (208). This chapter has important implications for much political and moral theorizing today, and its import is enhanced by the chapters that precede it.

Part IV, "Telling Moral Stories for Others," develops a different aspect of shared moral life, that of offering our interpretive stories of others' actions in order to make sense of them. Chapter 8, "Emotional Work," is fascinating as an account of our moral experience with the management of the emotions of others. The final chapter, "Changing One's Heart," is Calhoun's well-known essay on aspirational forgiveness. Calhoun notes that she placed it last in the book "because it appears more distant philosophically from the other essays" (212), but it seems more strongly connected to the other chapters than did Chapter 6, and it is an effective thematic conclusion to the sorts of nonideal activities that moral agents must pursue in the imperfect world described throughout the book. Like the integrity-compromising importance of civility, like the elective and yet morally needed sorts of gifts involved in decency, and like the risks involved in the first chapter's moral failure of the revolutionary, forgiveness demands another form of accounting, to oneself and others, in shared moral terms, for what it is that flawed and erring agents do. Her account of aspirational forgiveness for unrepentant wrongdoers was influential in my formation of my own views, although I continue to disagree with some of its aspects. I embrace Calhoun's account of forgiveness as a form of appreciating the biography of the person who commits a wrong, which does not excuse the wrong, but enjoins "that one stop demanding that the person be different from what she is," or that the wrong be different from what it was (245). Aspirational forgiveness "is the choice not to demand that she improve. It is the choice to place respecting another's way of making sense of her life before resentfully enforcing moral standards" (245).

I think that Calhoun errs in arguing that forgiving a deserving penitent cannot be elective, because "Once the decision in favor of desert has been made, forgiveness becomes required" (225). This position seems overcommitted to a view that desert is the only reason to treat another a certain way. It is out of keeping with the preceding chapters in which we are described as having multiple aims and the demands of abstract theories like desert are described as in tension with social moral practices. The Calhoun of the preceding eight chapters does not seem like an author who finds us optionless in the face of desert, and perhaps this is the reason that in her introduction to Part IV, she described this essay as most philosophically distant (that is, perhaps she meant it was most distant from her present views).

Calhoun expresses the aspiration in the introduction that the arrangement of the essays non-chronologically is "designed to disrupt efforts to read these essays as independent topics," and instead to see them as developing her picture of moral philosophy as "reflection on the content of the social practice of morality" (14). Her arrangement succeeds at this, and I am persuaded by her view of morality. I would have been even happier with a chronological ordering of chapters. The arrangement by thematic content is gratifying, but I would prefer to see the evolution of the work of the author over time, and some updating in the form of an epilogue as to whether Calhoun has revised her views in ways that (I think I find) are reflected in the later pieces. Still, this is a volume that should be considered in its entirety as a challenge to traditional moral theory. I am the better for having read it.

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Integrity is an indispensable moral virtue that includes acting with honesty, fairness, and decency.

Integrity, said author C.S. Lewis, “is doing the right thing, even when no one is looking.”  Integrity is a foundational moral virtue, and the bedrock upon which good character is built.

Acting with integrity means understanding, accepting, and choosing to live in accordance with one’s principles, which will include honesty, fairness, and decency. A person of integrity will consistently demonstrate good character by being free of corruption and hypocrisy.

Integrity is revealed when people act virtuously regardless of circumstance or consequences. This often requires moral courage. Indeed, integrity is the critical connection between ethics and moral action.

Related Terms

Corruption is the dishonest conduct for personal gain by people in power.

Ethics refers to both moral principles and to the study of people’s moral obligations in society.

Virtue Ethics

Virtue Ethics is a normative philosophical approach that urges people to live a moral life by cultivating virtuous habits.

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The Virtues of Integrity

Integrity is the cardinal virtue for moral agents. The moral significance of integrity is often unacknowledged because it is usually considered to be a state such as sincerity, having the courage of your convictions, strength of will or standing up for what you believe. Integrity ought not to be construed in such a subjective manner. Persons may have deeply immoral convictions and if integrity consists in a state such as sincerity or having the courage of your convictions, then it is possible for persons with deeply immoral convictions to have integrity. Officers of the SS may be sincere or stand up for what they believe but they ought not to be credited with integrity. There should be some objective constraints on the content of the convictions that persons of integrity may possess. Someone might reply that the intuitive understanding of integrity as a trait such as sincerity or being true to your convictions ought not to be abandoned: since integrity may be possessed by persons with deeply immoral convictions, integrity should not be construed as a moral virtue or any other kind of virtue. The following chapters present a response to this objection that articulates a series of overlapping arguments that reveal integrity to be a virtue of central importance for moral agents. I argue that there are substantive constraints on the content of the commitments of persons of integrity: persons of integrity may pursue a wide range of projects and endeavors but their commitments cannot be evil. I argue that integrity consists in the virtues of moral commitment and standing up for that commitment and these virtues involve integrating one’s commitments. So, perhaps instead of contending that integrity is a virtue for moral agents, it is more literally accurate to maintain that the virtues of integrity are cardinal virtues for moral agents.

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An honesty box on Dartmoor, England. Photo by Loop/Getty

The virtue of honesty requires more than just telling the truth

by Christian B Miller   + BIO

Listen to this Idea.

Honesty has fallen out of fashion, yet it is essential to self-improvement. How can we cultivate this neglected virtue?

There is little controversy that honesty is a virtue. It is an excellence of character. It also promotes trust, fosters healthy relationships, strengthens organisations and societies, and prevents harm.

Sadly, though, honesty has gone missing in recent decades. It is largely absent from academic research. It seems to be rare in society. And it is not commonly found in discussions of how to become a better person.

What is honesty? How is honesty related to integrity, courage and tact? Is it always best to be honest? What are the ways of failing to be honest? These are important questions, but you will be hard pressed to find discussions of them among scholars. In my field of philosophy, for instance, outside of the work of my own team, there have been only two articles on honesty published in the past 50 years .

So what is honesty? It is a character trait that leads us to think, feel and act in honest ways. Let’s focus on the acting for a moment. Naturally, honesty stands in contrast to lying. But it is much broader in scope than that. It also is opposed to cheating, stealing, promise breaking, misleading, bullshitting, hypocrisy, self-deception, and still other forms of wrongdoing. It works against all of them, and so is extremely broad and impactful in scope.

What do all these behaviours have in common? What is at the core of honesty that enables it to cover so much moral ground? The answer, I think, is that honest behaviour is a matter of not intentionally distorting the facts as the honest person sees them.

Consider a student who lies about his grades to his parents. He is misrepresenting his academic performance on purpose to his parents. Or consider an athlete who knowingly uses a banned substance. She is mispresenting her performance as being due to her own efforts, rather than in part to the contribution of the substance.

Honest behaviour is tied to how a person sees the world, to the facts as subjectively understood. If someone genuinely believes the Earth is flat, then, when he reports that belief to a friend, he is being honest, even though the statement is false. Were he to say that the Earth is round, he would be acting dishonestly, even though the statement is true.

If the only reason why the shopkeeper doesn’t cheat his customers is that he is worried about losing business, then he is doing the right thing for the wrong reason

That’s a bit about honest behaviour. How about motivation? In order to be a virtuous person, it is not enough just to act well. One’s heart behind the action matters too. Honesty is no exception. Telling the truth, even if one is reliable in doing so, won’t be an expression of the virtue of honesty if it is done just to make a good impression on others, or to avoid getting punished, or to secure rewards in the afterlife.

Indeed, in my view, any self-interested motive isn’t going to count as a virtuous motive for honesty. The philosopher Immanuel Kant made a similar observation with his example of the shopkeeper who charges fair prices even when he has a chance to overcharge certain customers. Kant claims that if the only reason why the shopkeeper doesn’t cheat his customers is that he is worried about losing business, if he were to be found out, then this would be a case of doing the right thing for the wrong reason. The same point applies for any other self-interested reason.

What would count as a right reason for honest behaviour, then? A variety of other motives, including:

• loving motives (eg, ‘because I care about you’)
• justice motives (eg, ‘because it would be unfair if I cheated on the test’)
• friendship motives (eg, ‘because he’s my friend’)
• dutiful motives (eg, ‘because it was the right thing to do’)
• honesty motives (eg, ‘because it would be honest’)

If someone tells the truth for any of these reasons, it is hard to fault the person’s character. But they are rather different reasons. I think we should be pluralists here, and allow any or all of these to count as what could motivate an honest person to act.

There is much more to say about the contours of this virtue. But already I have said more than most have in a long while.

Here is another way that the virtue of honesty has gone missing – it seems to be rarely possessed by people today. You might conclude this from the nightly news or from your own lived experience. But I am especially interested in what can be concluded from empirical research in psychology and behavioural economics. In a variety of different types of experiments – using die rolls, coin flips, self-graded exams, and other measures of honest behaviour – participants regularly exhibit a pattern of behaviour that does not fit with our expectations of an honest person.

For instance, in a commonly used experimental set-up for assessing cheating, participants are given a 20-problem maths test, and are told that they will be paid for every answer they get right. In a study by Lisa Shu and colleagues, this was $0.50. In the control condition, there was no opportunity to cheat, and participants scored a 7.97 out of 20. In the experimental condition, participants got to grade the test themselves and shred their materials. Given the freedom to cheat if they wanted to, participants ‘scored’ a 13.22 out of 20. That’s a big difference.

As in many areas of psychology, some cheating studies have failed to be replicated

To take another example, online participants in a study by Christopher Bryan and colleagues had to flip a coin 10 times , knowing they would be paid $1 for each heads. The average ‘performance’ was 6.31 heads , well above chance. Even when another group of participants was warned, ‘Please don’t cheat and report that one or more of your coin flips landed heads when it really landed tails! Even a small amount of cheating would undermine the study,’ the average was still 6.22 in that group.

How do these findings line up with our expectations about honesty? A person who is honest will not cheat in situations where she is a free and willing participant and the relevant rules are fair and appropriate, even if by cheating she is assured of acquiring some benefit for herself. That’s what you might expect of an honest person, but it’s not what we see happening in these results.

Of course, these are only two examples. To draw any conclusions about character from just a few results such as these would be very unwise. Fortunately there are dozens and dozens of additional findings that I have reviewed elsewhere , including many more studies using shredder and coin-flip paradigms. The important point here is not what any one study shows, but rather what the patterns of behaviour look like in general and whether they align with our expectations for honesty.

This is also relevant to recent worries about the replication crisis and about fraudulent data. As in many areas of psychology, some cheating studies have failed to be replicated. For instance, a well-known shredder study initially found that recalling the Ten Commandments was effective in reducing cheating, but this result did not hold up in an attempted replication with many more participants from 19 separate labs. Furthermore, it was well documented that an influential study, which purported to show that insurance customers were more honest in their mileage reports if they signed at the top of a form rather than the bottom, was fraudulent.

Again, this is why it is so important to not rely on just a few studies when trying to think about how honest people tend to be. It is the broader patterns that hopefully tell a reliable story.

Finally, this story is about what the majority of people tend to be like. It is based on average performances. But averages can cover up exceptional behaviour. So we may have a bell curve, with some people who are highly honest and others who are highly dishonest, while the rest of us are somewhere in the middle. Furthermore, the story should be taken to apply, in the first instance, only to inhabitants of North America and Europe, since they tend to be the participants in the existing studies. The story may apply more broadly, but we don’t have nearly enough research yet to say.

Assuming that many of us are not honest people in a variety of circumstances, and assuming that honesty is an important virtue that we should cultivate in ourselves and others, it is important to take practical steps to do so. And here is a third place where the virtue of honesty has gone missing. For very little has been said about strategies for growing in honesty, and about testing those strategies to see if they are really successful.

In my own classes, we all read aloud the honour code before the students sign it and begin their exam

Here are three preliminary suggestions that might be fruitful, but that also need empirical confirmation. One is seeking out and better understanding exemplars of honesty. These can be historical exemplars such as Abraham Lincoln, or contemporaries such as a family member, friend, co-worker or community leader. Admiring role models for their honesty can lead to a desire to emulate those people, to make our own character better reflect the exemplars’ character. Sustained engagement with the exemplars can typically be more effective than one-time interactions, and relatable and attainable exemplars can have a greater impact than their opposites.

Another suggestion is to have regular moral reminders of honesty in our lives. Such reminders can make our moral norms salient, such that they more actively work against a desire to cheat, lie or steal. Honesty reminders can take a wide variety of forms, including diaries, readings, signs and emails. There can also be institutional reminders, which we encounter at work or school. One such moral reminder in many schools is an honour code, which students have to sign before taking a test. And there is some very preliminary experimental evidence that such a reminder can be effective in preventing cheating. Returning to Shu’s research, she and her colleagues also had groups of participants take the maths test after reading or signing an honour code. When there was an opportunity to cheat, the honour code made a difference: participants who did not read the honour code gave themselves an average score of 13.09 out of 20; those who only read the honour code scored 10.05; while those who both read and signed the honour code scored 7.91 (a realistic score for the test, suggesting that they did not cheat at all). In my own classes, we all read aloud the honour code before the students sign it and begin their exam.

A final suggestion is to work against our desire to cheat, a desire that can be especially powerful when we think we can get away with cheating, and benefit in the process. Such a desire seems to be at work in studies such as those by Shu and Bryan, mentioned earlier, and introspectively we can all recognise moments in our lives when it has influenced us as well. One straightforward way to try to reign it in is to increase the policing of cheating and impose harsher penalties on those found guilty. For instance, with the move in education towards take-home exams during the COVID-19 pandemic, computer surveillance of students taking those exams has become a big business, although not without giving rise to a number of moral and psychological concerns.

Increased policing and punishment for cheating might be effective in curbing dishonest behaviour, although that, too, is an empirical claim that needs further study. But, even if it does, that’s not enough to foster the virtue of honesty. As I said earlier, motivation matters too. Here, the motivation for not cheating would be punishment avoidance, and that is a purely self-interested motivation. While I tried to be very ecumenical about what can count as an honest motivation, this is one that’s not going to make it on the list.

Instead, the desire to cheat could be diminished in a more virtuous manner by fostering other virtues alongside honesty, such as friendship and love. If someone is genuinely my friend, I want what’s best for that person, even if it is at the expense of my own self-interest. Similarly, if I love others and care deeply for them, then I am concerned about their own good. The deeper the friendship and love, the less likely it is that we would be dishonest with others for our own gain.

This article draws on Christian B Miller’s book Honesty: The Philosophy and Psychology of a Neglected Virtue (2021), with permission from Oxford University Press.

Prayer and contemplation

What if we learned contemplation like we do arts or sports?

As with football or violin practice, young people could gain versatile life skills through routine contemplative training

by Michael R Sheehy

Parenting and families

Radical love: how my trans child changed my identity as a mother

My child grew into a new version of himself – as all children do – and I wondered about my new role. Anger helped me grasp it

by Patricia Martin

Freedom and choice

Why Charlie Chaplin was an ‘angel of peace’ for Walter Benjamin

Though a tramp and a misfit, Chaplin’s world fit him like a glove. His life of contingency appealed to the émigré Benjamin

by Eli Friedlander

Essay on Integrity

Essay generator.

Integrity, a timeless and universally revered virtue, lies at the heart of our moral compass. For students aspiring to participate in essay writing competitions, exploring the multifaceted concept of integrity is both an intellectually stimulating endeavor and a pathway to understanding the essence of ethical behavior. In this essay, we will delve into the definition, significance, practical applications, and tips for crafting an exemplary essay on integrity.

Integrity is often described as the quality of being honest, truthful, and morally upright. It is the alignment of one’s actions, values, and principles with unwavering honesty and consistency. Integrity is not merely a set of rules but a way of life that guides individuals in making ethical decisions.

The Significance of Integrity

Integrity is the bedrock upon which trust, credibility, and ethical conduct are built. It is the foundation of strong relationships, both personal and professional, and plays a crucial role in fostering a just and harmonious society.

Trust and Credibility:

Integrity is the bedrock of trust. When individuals consistently uphold their values and principles, their actions become predictable and reliable. This reliability forms the basis of trust in personal relationships, professional collaborations, and societal institutions.

Strengthening Relationships: Integrity strengthens the bonds between individuals. Honest and transparent communication, a fundamental aspect of integrity, fosters deeper connections, enhances empathy, and promotes open dialogue in both personal and professional relationships.

Ethical Leadership: Integrity is a defining characteristic of effective leaders. Leaders who embody integrity inspire trust and confidence in their followers. They lead by example, setting high ethical standards for their teams and organizations, thus contributing to the growth and success of their endeavors.

Accountability and Responsibility: The practice of integrity encompasses accountability for one’s actions. Individuals with integrity take responsibility for their decisions and their consequences, reinforcing the idea that ethical behavior is not just a choice but an obligation.

Moral Growth and Self-Respect: Upholding integrity requires individuals to confront ethical dilemmas and make principled choices. This process of moral introspection and growth not only strengthens one’s character but also fosters self-respect and a sense of moral accomplishment.

Conflict Resolution and Mediation: In disputes and conflicts, individuals with integrity often serve as mediators or facilitators. Their impartiality, trustworthiness, and commitment to fairness make them well-suited to navigate and resolve contentious issues.

Building a Just Society: On a broader scale, integrity plays a pivotal role in building a just and equitable society. It underpins the principles of fairness, honesty, and accountability in institutions, governance, and the legal system, contributing to social cohesion and stability.

Enhancing Organizational Reputation: In the business world, integrity is closely tied to an organization’s reputation. Companies that prioritize ethical conduct and integrity not only earn the trust of their customers but also attract top talent and foster a positive work culture.

Promoting Transparency: Integrity promotes transparency in governance and decision-making processes. It discourages corruption, cronyism, and favoritism, ensuring that public and private institutions operate with fairness and equity.

Inspiration and Role Modeling: Individuals with integrity often serve as sources of inspiration and role models for others. Their commitment to ethical behavior sets a standard that encourages others to emulate their principles.

Integrity in Action

a. Honesty: One of the most evident manifestations of integrity is honesty. It involves telling the truth, admitting mistakes, and being transparent in one’s dealings with others.

b. Consistency: Consistency in behavior, values, and principles is a hallmark of integrity. It means adhering to one’s moral code, even in the face of temptation or adversity.

c. Accountability: Integrating accountability into one’s life means taking responsibility for one’s actions and their consequences, regardless of the circumstances.

d. Ethical Decision-Making: Integrity guides individuals to make ethical decisions that align with their values, even when facing challenging moral dilemmas.

Integrity in Leadership

Integrity is a defining characteristic of effective leaders. Leaders who embody integrity inspire trust and loyalty among their followers. They lead by example, setting high ethical standards for their teams and organizations.

Challenges to Integrity

Discuss the common challenges individuals face in upholding their integrity, such as peer pressure, societal norms, and the temptation to compromise one’s values for personal gain. Explore how these challenges can be navigated with integrity intact.

Tips for Writing an Exceptional Essay on Integrity

a. Choose a Thoughtful Angle: Select a specific aspect or angle related to integrity that resonates with you personally or presents an engaging perspective for your essay.

b. Provide Real-Life Examples: Incorporate real-life stories and examples that illustrate the concept of integrity and its impact on individuals and society.

c. Emphasize the Value of Integrity: Highlight the tangible benefits of integrity, such as trustworthiness, credibility, and the positive ripple effect it has on relationships and communities.

d. Address Counterarguments: Acknowledge opposing viewpoints or misconceptions about integrity and construct a compelling argument to refute them.

e. Conclude with Impact: Craft a memorable conclusion that reinforces the significance of integrity and leaves a lasting impression on your readers.

Integrity Beyond the Essay

Encourage students to apply the principles of integrity in their daily lives, fostering a culture of honesty, trust, and ethical behavior in their communities.

In conclusion, integrity stands as a beacon of moral virtue and ethical excellence, guiding individuals towards a life of honesty, accountability, and consistency. As students embark on the journey of crafting essays on integrity, they not only gain a deeper understanding of this essential quality but also contribute to the collective discourse on ethics and character development. By embracing integrity as a guiding principle, we foster a society founded on trust, transparency, and the unwavering commitment to doing what is right, even in the face of adversity.

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• Instructive
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Generate an essay on the importance of extracurricular activities for student development

Write an essay discussing the role of technology in modern education.

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9 Aristotle: Virtue and Morality

• Published: September 2007
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Aristotle formulates an account of the virtues, conceived as states of character; he does not seek primarily to find an account of the different types of actions that a virtuous person chooses. Different claims about the priority of virtues over actions need to be considered. Aristotle's theory of the virtues answers some questions in moral psychology, explaining the connexions between virtue, reason, desire, pleasure, and responsibility. The chapter introduces some of the disagreements in order to identify the features of Aristotle's account that have raised controversies of interpretation and of philosophical assessment. The discussion of Aristotle leads to two things from his account of the virtues: it ought to develop naturalism into a systematic theory of the virtues, and it ought to develop naturalism into a systematic theory of morality.

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The Virtues of Integrity

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Verl Anderson

Nevitt Reesor

Journal of Analytic Theology

Kyle Strobel

JOHN ENYINNAYA

Integrity describes “wholeness and completeness, being indivisible and inviolable ”. This is a general definition that may apply both to moral and non-moral contexts. A person is said to possess integrity in a moral sense when there is harmony between his public and private lives; when the person’s beliefs and actions coalesce. This, however, is only one side of the story. This article elucidates this important concept by highlighting some biblical characters whose lives exemplify this virtue. Perhaps an examination of persons who were presented as paragons of integrity will help to shed light on key aspects of the topic. Thereafter, the paper pursued an exploration of certain philosophical nuances of the concept

Paul N Anderson

Published in the festschrift for Jan van der Watt, Biblical Ethics and Application: Purview, Validity, and Relevance of Biblical Texts in Ethical Discourse (Kontexte und Normen neutestamentlicher Ethik / Contexts and Norms of New Testament Ethics Volume IX), Edited by Ruben Zimmermann and Stephan Joubert (Tuebingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2017): 331-351. This essay analyzes the centripetal thrust of the Johannine Epistles' appeal for unity against centrifugal forces within and without the Johannine community--making interdisciplinary use of the cognitive-critical work of Carl Rogers: identity and congruence theory. Psychology and Biblical Studies are here combined with historical- and literary-critical approaches to the Johannine situation.

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Looks at the significance of ethics in the Old Testament theologies of Brevard S. Childs, H. H. Scobie, John Goldingay, Walter Brueggemann, and Pablo R. Andiñach

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The Importance of Moral Integrity in Leadership

Work culture, what is moral integrity.

Moral integrity is doing the right thing when nobody’s watching.

We know what is right and wrong, and we choose to do the right thing. Doing the right thing when it’s the easiest or the most profitable isn’t what matters, though. When things are easy, anyone can appear to have a backbone. It’s the hard times that matter.

When doing the wrong thing has a pot of gold at the end, or when doing the right thing might end up hurting you, that’s when the moral integrity of that person reveals itself. Having the courage to follow what we believe in our hearts is right is what moral integrity means, and it’s something that teams crave in their company leadership.

What is Moral Integrity in Leadership?

Moral integrity in leadership is a cornerstone of ethical conduct and moral decision-making. It includes the commitment in upholding moral values and doing what is right, even when faced with challenges or temptations. 

Leaders with moral integrity lead by example and consistently demonstrate accountability, transparency, and fairness. They take responsibility for their actions, readily admit mistakes, and prioritize the well-being of others above personal gain. 

Integrity in leadership is not limited to words; it is reflected in actions. Leaders with moral integrity align their behavior with their stated values, fostering a culture of trust and respect within their organizations. They inspire and motivate their teams by setting high ethical standards and cultivating an environment where everyone feels valued.

By embracing moral integrity, leaders gain the trust and confidence of their employees, creating a positive work atmosphere. This commitment to ethical leadership contributes to the long-term success of organizations and promotes a positive impact on both employees and society as a whole.

Moral integrity in leadership is about consistently upholding moral values, leading by example, and fostering a culture of trust and respect. It is a vital characteristic that sets apart exceptional leaders and paves the way for organizations’ success and ethical growth.

It’s all about following the leader

Leaders influence their company directly. The decisions they make determine how things are going to be. They are steering the ship, ensuring it gets to the correct port.

What they say is less important than what they do. Every company has heard that having a mission statement is a good idea, and we are always optimistic when crafting them.

Even the most corrupt agencies have inspiring messages to try to sell us. It’s easy to print out posters and paste them on the walls in the office. People don’t react to what leaders say; it’s what leaders do. They have to act in line with what they state their values are.

Leaders affect their companies indirectly too. Their actions can make significant changes in where the company goes. The actions that they take at every turn are setting a precedent. It’s a blueprint for acceptable behavior. Leaders are crafting their company culture, which is as important if not more important than their stated values. Culture determines what leaders do when nobody is watching and what every single employee does behind closed doors.

Why is Integrity in Leadership Important?

Integrity in leadership plays a crucial role in the success and effectiveness of individuals and organizations. It’s an essential quality that fosters trust, inspires confidence, and drives ethical behavior. 

Here are several reasons why integrity in leadership is of key importance:

Building Trust :

Leaders with integrity create an atmosphere of trust within their teams and organizations. When leaders consistently act with honesty, transparency, and reliability, they earn the trust and respect of their employees, fostering a collaborative and productive work environment.

Inspiring Confidence :

Integrity in leadership inspires confidence and followership. When leaders consistently uphold moral values, make principled decisions, and take responsibility for their actions, they become role models that others want to emulate.

Driving Ethical Behavior:

Leaders set the tone for ethical conduct within organizations. By demonstrating integrity in their actions and decision-making, leaders establish clear expectations for ethical behavior and create a culture where honesty, fairness, and respect are valued.

Enhancing Reputation:

Organizations led by leaders with integrity tend to have a positive reputation in the marketplace. When leaders consistently align with their values and demonstrate ethical leadership, it strengthens the organization’s brand, attracts stakeholders, and enhances its overall reputation.

Nurturing Long-Term Success:

Integrity in leadership is essential for sustainable success. By prioritizing ethical considerations, leaders make sound and responsible decisions that contribute to the long-term growth and viability of the organization.

Integrity in leadership is vital for building trust, inspiring confidence, driving ethical behavior, enhancing reputation, and nurturing long-term success. It is a foundational element that sets the stage for effective leadership and fosters a culture of integrity throughout the organization. 

Company leaders shape company culture

Leaders can change their company culture by helping to focus attention on specific issues and addressing how the team should react to them. They can help determine how to respond to crises and show what problem-solving should look like. They are a role model for everyone in the company, and embracing that power can help others improve too. Leaders get to allocate how to distribute rewards, how they structure it when they reward someone, and which actions merit awards.

Leaders can determine what behaviors they want their employees to take and have positive pressure on them to take those actions. They set the criteria for hiring people. Leaders choose what kind of person the company is looking for and what their standards should be. These leaders also decide when someone has crossed the line or failed and gets fired. 

Leaders can choose the flow of pressure for their employees, good and bad, and their behaviors will automatically adjust to the pressures they put in place.

Traits of leadership with moral integrity

Many qualities contribute to the moral integrity of a leader. A leader with moral integrity will exhibit the following traits:

Accountability:

Taking responsibility for their actions and decisions without making excuses or shifting blame. The easiest way to earn respect is not to make excuses. If you did it, you need to make it right.

Transparency :

Being open and honest in communication, sharing information, and admitting mistakes when necessary. To err is human; denying that only aggravates those around you.

Ethical behavior:

Prioritizing the needs of others and making decisions that align with moral principles and values. They realize that there is more to life than serving themselves.

Treating all individuals with justice and equity, considering diverse perspectives, and avoiding favoritism. 

Consistency:

Demonstrating consistency in actions and decision-making, ensuring reliability and predictability. 

Trustworthiness:

Building trust by being reliable, keeping commitments, and maintaining confidentiality when required. 

Respect and consideration towards others, valuing their opinions and contributions. Everyone deserves respect, and everyone should have it.

Authenticity :

Being genuine to oneself, aligning actions with values, and avoiding pretense. 

The courage to stand up for what is right, even in adversity or difficult situations.

Displaying humility by recognizing limitations, admitting mistakes, and valuing the contributions of others. They know the difference between confidence and arrogance and stay on the right side.

These qualities collectively contribute to a leader’s moral integrity, shaping their character and influencing their interactions with others. By embodying these traits, leaders can inspire trust, foster a positive work culture, and create an environment where ethical behavior thrives.

It’s important for leaders to strive for these qualities and continually develop their moral integrity, as it sets the foundation for effective leadership and the success of their organizations. 

It’s what employees want

According to a survey by LRN, employees feel that morality has an essential role in business decisions. We should have been paying more attention in kindergarten. Like when they were drilling into us that we should treat others how we would like to be treated. Employees want the company they work for to obey the ‘golden rule’; they want moral managers and believe morality can improve a company’s resilience.

Of the employees surveyed: 

83% believe companies should follow the ‘golden rule.’ 

62% believe that their managers would be more effective if they leaned on their morals 

59% think that their employer would be able to handle more challenges if they were more morally sound. 

What employees want is in stark contrast with what they believe they are seeing. 

23% say that their direct managers are moral leaders. 

17% say that their leaders stand up for those mistreated. 

Finally, a whole 12% say their managers take the time to speak with them about why their work is meaningful. 

Yet…60% of managers expect loyalty from their team. 

It’s what customers want

Your customers want you to stand up for what is correct as well. For social and political issues, they are interested in knowing what your company believes in and how firm you are on those beliefs. It’s important to note that they don’t want your words. Statements by companies get almost no reactions. It is the actions that companies take that bring people to pay attention. If you are telling people anything, announce when you are donating to a specific cause and encourage others to do the same. 66% of consumers think that it is essential for brands to take a stand. 

39% of people think that company announcements are effective 

It is also imperative that you don’t just go about town making random donations. Your actions’ impact depends most on your company’s relevance to those issues. It also depends on who your customer base is. If the consumers you target bleed blue. They are much more likely to want your brand to take a stand and will see your positions as much more critical. If you have a more conservative crowd, they will likely be indifferent, as only 52% think that a company taking a stand is necessary, as opposed to 82% for liberals. 

What do your customers care about? 

47% said they care about issues that directly affect them 

40% said your employees 

31% said business operations 

Thanks, Sprout Social , for keying us into these insights. 

Remember Enron? 

Enron is a classic example of how things can go wrong from the top down. Their prominent leaders, Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey Skilling, were initially praised. They surged Enron’s stock price to a peak of $90.75 a share and had a valuation of around $70 billion. 

Their flare for using fake holdings and off-the-books accounting practices allowed them to fool investors of how much money they were bringing in. At the same time, their use of special purpose vehicles (SPVs) and unique purpose entities (SPEs) were used to hide toxic assets and piles of debt. If they opened a power plant, they would mark its potential income as real income from day one. If the actual profits came in under the projections, they transferred the asset to a corporation that was off the books and did not report the loss. 

Jeffrey Skilling, their fearless leader, was an adrenaline junkie and fierce competitor. His belief that it was eat or be eaten trickled down to the rest of his company. He also instituted a grading system for employees, firing employees who failed to meet their performance objectives. Prioritizing cutthroat tactics bred cutthroat traders. 

The traders would choke off power to parts of California’s grid, forcing demand and surging the prices. The recording shows men who were unashamed of what they were doing and proud of their ingenuity. The lack of moral integrity poisoned Enron from the top down. Having someone in charge whose moral compass didn’t point north led to immoral actions by his hand and emphasized a culture that did shady things on his behalf. 

5 Steps to Build Integrity in Leadership

Building integrity in leadership is essential for creating a culture of trust, ethical behavior, and long-term success. By following these 5 steps, leaders can actively cultivate and strengthen integrity in their approach, setting a positive example for their team and organization.

Define Your Values:

One of the first steps to build integrity in leadership is to define your core values. Identify the principles and beliefs that guide your decision-making and shape your leadership style. Clearly articulating your values will provide a strong foundation for ethical leadership.

Set Clear Expectations:

Communicate your expectations for ethical behavior to your team and organization. Establish clear guidelines and standards that align with your values. Setting explicit expectations creates a framework for ethical conduct and provides a roadmap for your team members.

Lead by Example:

Integrity starts at the top. As a leader, leading by example and consistently demonstrating integrity in your actions and decisions is essential. Act in alignment with your values, make ethical choices, and hold yourself accountable. Your behavior sets the tone for the entire organization.

Seek Feedback: 

Regularly seek feedback from your team and stakeholders regarding your leadership and integrity. Encourage open and honest communication, and be receptive to constructive criticism. Listen to different perspectives and use the feedback to improve your leadership approach.

Continuously Improve:

Integrity in leadership is a lifelong journey of growth and improvement. Commit to ongoing self-reflection and personal development. Continuously evaluate your actions, decisions, and their alignment with your values. Learn from your experiences and strive to become an even more effective and ethical leader.

The Power of Moral Integrity in Leadership

Integrity in leadership is the foundation of successful companies. It encompasses actions aligned with ethical principles, transparency, and accountability. 

Leaders with integrity inspire trust, shape organizational culture, and set the stage for sustainable success. Whether it’s through taking responsibility for their actions, prioritizing the needs of others, or fostering a culture of respect and fairness, leaders with moral integrity make a profound impact. 

Examples like Enron’s downfall highlight the devastating consequences of compromised integrity. Moral integrity in leadership is the right thing to do and essential for building thriving organizations in today’s business landscape.

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Essay on Integrity | Integrity Essay for Students and Children in English

February 13, 2024 by Prasanna

Essay on Integrity: The word “integrity” originated from the Latin word “integer,” which means a feeling of wholesomeness. So, overall integrity is a sense of togetherness and completeness that one enjoys while living an honest and moral life. A person with integrity believes in a set of values and rules that he follows throughout his lifetime and tries to pass it on to people around him and his next generation. We have compiled some extended, short, and ten lines essays on integrity.

You can read more  Essay Writing  about articles, events, people, sports, technology many more.

Long and Short Essays on Integrity for Students and Kids in English

Given below is an Integrity essay of approximately 400-500 words and is suitable for the students of standards 7, 8, 9, and 10 and a short piece of nearly 100-150 words for the students of standard 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.

Long Essay on Integrity in English 500 words

“Honesty is telling the truth to other people, and integrity is telling the truth to myself.” This famous saying describes integrity in a perfect manner. Integrity is the completeness one feels when he leads an honest and moral life. Integrity is wisely choosing between what is right and what is wrong. If a person has nothing else, he can always feel proud of his integrity. Integrity helps a person to make trustworthy bonds with people around him.

Integrity is not something one can purely teach to others. It is more of a virtue that comes from within a person. Integrity is something a man needs to be proud of because it is a valuable possession no one can take away from him. Integrity means being honest and authentic to oneself and following a strict set of rules. Without integrity, the world would be merely anarchy.

In the academic field, there are a set of moral codes and ethical policies that are to be abided by. This is known as Academic Integrity. Integrity is needed for my people to flourish and bring morality to their life. Academic integrity should be developed in early life as it is an essential virtue for the students.

It is a quality that great leaders and academicians have in their lives, which allows them to be honest even when no one is watching them. Completing one’s work without plagiarizing from someone else’s work, not cheating on home tests and assignments, and working ethically are the significant milestones one has to achieve for building up his academic integrity.

Integrity is an essential quality every employer wants in his employees so that he can trust his employees with all his heart and expect a colloquial behavior from him. Professional integrity increases work productivity and helps in maintaining a positive environment. People with professional integrity have a significant benefit at the workplace because they do not have to put in any extra effort, to be honest, and become a person on whom everyone depends.

It is not that the academic and professional integrities are the highest levels of integrity a man should possess. Everyone should strive to attain integrity in their lives and practice integrity as it is a way of living and achieving prosperity. It helps the community grow and prosper. Integrity augments enthusiasm, fearlessness, accomplishment, creativity, purposefulness, and energy. It is the freedom, honesty, and moral soundness of a human being.

Short Essay on Integrity in English 150 words

All do not possess the virtue of integrity. It is developed by an individual slowly and steadily. It is a state of freedom and honesty and helps a man to be independent and trustworthy. A community where everyone respects each other’s integrity is an ideal society. Integrity allows individuals to flourish in their respective fields in the organization. In the educational field, academic integrity is essential. Respecting everybody’s work and not copying from them is a virtue that eyone should strive for. A person with true integrity will consider taking responsibility for their actions.

In the work field, the employees, as well as the employers, need to have professional integrity. It imposes the fact that everyone should be helpful and should respect each other’s opinions. This helps in building a positive workplace for the workers to explore their creativity and maximize their outputs. Right doings, modesty, and humbleness are some unique qualities that comes with integrity. Integrity is a trait that helps a human being live a long and healthy life.

10 Lines on Essay on Integrity in English

• Integrity is the quality of a person being sincere, faithful, and truthful in appearance, speech, and action.
• Integrity is inherited from family, parents, and belief systems.
• Surroundings and situations also impact it.
• The ethical behavior of a person makes them courageous and fearless.
• A person with integrity can look towards any situation in life through self-confidence and courage.
• Integrity makes the person free of guilt as the one who is loyal and honest will never run away from admitting mistakes.
• People with integrity live a peaceful and happy life as they don’t have to lie to others to save the truth, which makes them guilt-free.
• A person with integrity is always respected in society as the character of the person is clean.
• There’s no specific place to learn integrity, but the two prime areas for a child to learn are school and family.
• There has been a decline in the integrity of our society, which results in the recent uprise in corruption.

Frequently Asked Questions on Essay on Integrity

Question 1. Why is integrity a vital quality?

Answer: Integrity improves the personality of a human being. It also helps in enhancing the quality of life. It also makes an individual a trustworthy and dependable person.

Question 2. Is integrity beneficial?

Answer: Integrity enforces respect, standards, purpose, and encourages values to gain modesty and honesty in life.

Question 3. How can integrity be applied in daily life?

Answer: Integrity has a massive impact on society. Small activities of staying honest while nobody is watching is also an act of integrity. Good understanding and excellent communication skills also contribute to virtue.

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How to cite ChatGPT

Use discount code STYLEBLOG15 for 15% off APA Style print products with free shipping in the United States.

We, the APA Style team, are not robots. We can all pass a CAPTCHA test , and we know our roles in a Turing test . And, like so many nonrobot human beings this year, we’ve spent a fair amount of time reading, learning, and thinking about issues related to large language models, artificial intelligence (AI), AI-generated text, and specifically ChatGPT . We’ve also been gathering opinions and feedback about the use and citation of ChatGPT. Thank you to everyone who has contributed and shared ideas, opinions, research, and feedback.

In this post, I discuss situations where students and researchers use ChatGPT to create text and to facilitate their research, not to write the full text of their paper or manuscript. We know instructors have differing opinions about how or even whether students should use ChatGPT, and we’ll be continuing to collect feedback about instructor and student questions. As always, defer to instructor guidelines when writing student papers. For more about guidelines and policies about student and author use of ChatGPT, see the last section of this post.

Quoting or reproducing the text created by ChatGPT in your paper

If you’ve used ChatGPT or other AI tools in your research, describe how you used the tool in your Method section or in a comparable section of your paper. For literature reviews or other types of essays or response or reaction papers, you might describe how you used the tool in your introduction. In your text, provide the prompt you used and then any portion of the relevant text that was generated in response.

Unfortunately, the results of a ChatGPT “chat” are not retrievable by other readers, and although nonretrievable data or quotations in APA Style papers are usually cited as personal communications , with ChatGPT-generated text there is no person communicating. Quoting ChatGPT’s text from a chat session is therefore more like sharing an algorithm’s output; thus, credit the author of the algorithm with a reference list entry and the corresponding in-text citation.

When prompted with “Is the left brain right brain divide real or a metaphor?” the ChatGPT-generated text indicated that although the two brain hemispheres are somewhat specialized, “the notation that people can be characterized as ‘left-brained’ or ‘right-brained’ is considered to be an oversimplification and a popular myth” (OpenAI, 2023).

OpenAI. (2023). ChatGPT (Mar 14 version) [Large language model]. https://chat.openai.com/chat

You may also put the full text of long responses from ChatGPT in an appendix of your paper or in online supplemental materials, so readers have access to the exact text that was generated. It is particularly important to document the exact text created because ChatGPT will generate a unique response in each chat session, even if given the same prompt. If you create appendices or supplemental materials, remember that each should be called out at least once in the body of your APA Style paper.

When given a follow-up prompt of “What is a more accurate representation?” the ChatGPT-generated text indicated that “different brain regions work together to support various cognitive processes” and “the functional specialization of different regions can change in response to experience and environmental factors” (OpenAI, 2023; see Appendix A for the full transcript).

Creating a reference to ChatGPT or other AI models and software

The in-text citations and references above are adapted from the reference template for software in Section 10.10 of the Publication Manual (American Psychological Association, 2020, Chapter 10). Although here we focus on ChatGPT, because these guidelines are based on the software template, they can be adapted to note the use of other large language models (e.g., Bard), algorithms, and similar software.

The reference and in-text citations for ChatGPT are formatted as follows:

• Parenthetical citation: (OpenAI, 2023)
• Narrative citation: OpenAI (2023)

Let’s break that reference down and look at the four elements (author, date, title, and source):

Author: The author of the model is OpenAI.

Date: The date is the year of the version you used. Following the template in Section 10.10, you need to include only the year, not the exact date. The version number provides the specific date information a reader might need.

Title: The name of the model is “ChatGPT,” so that serves as the title and is italicized in your reference, as shown in the template. Although OpenAI labels unique iterations (i.e., ChatGPT-3, ChatGPT-4), they are using “ChatGPT” as the general name of the model, with updates identified with version numbers.

The version number is included after the title in parentheses. The format for the version number in ChatGPT references includes the date because that is how OpenAI is labeling the versions. Different large language models or software might use different version numbering; use the version number in the format the author or publisher provides, which may be a numbering system (e.g., Version 2.0) or other methods.

Bracketed text is used in references for additional descriptions when they are needed to help a reader understand what’s being cited. References for a number of common sources, such as journal articles and books, do not include bracketed descriptions, but things outside of the typical peer-reviewed system often do. In the case of a reference for ChatGPT, provide the descriptor “Large language model” in square brackets. OpenAI describes ChatGPT-4 as a “large multimodal model,” so that description may be provided instead if you are using ChatGPT-4. Later versions and software or models from other companies may need different descriptions, based on how the publishers describe the model. The goal of the bracketed text is to briefly describe the kind of model to your reader.

Source: When the publisher name and the author name are the same, do not repeat the publisher name in the source element of the reference, and move directly to the URL. This is the case for ChatGPT. The URL for ChatGPT is https://chat.openai.com/chat . For other models or products for which you may create a reference, use the URL that links as directly as possible to the source (i.e., the page where you can access the model, not the publisher’s homepage).

Other questions about citing ChatGPT

You may have noticed the confidence with which ChatGPT described the ideas of brain lateralization and how the brain operates, without citing any sources. I asked for a list of sources to support those claims and ChatGPT provided five references—four of which I was able to find online. The fifth does not seem to be a real article; the digital object identifier given for that reference belongs to a different article, and I was not able to find any article with the authors, date, title, and source details that ChatGPT provided. Authors using ChatGPT or similar AI tools for research should consider making this scrutiny of the primary sources a standard process. If the sources are real, accurate, and relevant, it may be better to read those original sources to learn from that research and paraphrase or quote from those articles, as applicable, than to use the model’s interpretation of them.

We’ve also received a number of other questions about ChatGPT. Should students be allowed to use it? What guidelines should instructors create for students using AI? Does using AI-generated text constitute plagiarism? Should authors who use ChatGPT credit ChatGPT or OpenAI in their byline? What are the copyright implications ?

On these questions, researchers, editors, instructors, and others are actively debating and creating parameters and guidelines. Many of you have sent us feedback, and we encourage you to continue to do so in the comments below. We will also study the policies and procedures being established by instructors, publishers, and academic institutions, with a goal of creating guidelines that reflect the many real-world applications of AI-generated text.

For questions about manuscript byline credit, plagiarism, and related ChatGPT and AI topics, the APA Style team is seeking the recommendations of APA Journals editors. APA Style guidelines based on those recommendations will be posted on this blog and on the APA Style site later this year.

Update: APA Journals has published policies on the use of generative AI in scholarly materials .

We, the APA Style team humans, appreciate your patience as we navigate these unique challenges and new ways of thinking about how authors, researchers, and students learn, write, and work with new technologies.

American Psychological Association. (2020). Publication manual of the American Psychological Association (7th ed.). https://doi.org/10.1037/0000165-000

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