the great man thesis

I T IS NATURAL to believe in great men. If the companions of our childhood should turn out to be heroes, and their condition regal it would not surprise us. All mythology opens with demigods, and the circumstance is high and poetic; that is, their genius is paramount. In the legends of the Gautama, the first men ate the earth and found it deliciously sweet.

Nature seems to exist for the excellent. The world is upheld by the veracity of good men: they make the earth wholesome. They who lived with them found life glad and nutritious. Life is sweet and tolerable only in our belief in such society; and, actually or ideally, we manage to live with superiors. We call our children and our lands by their names. Their names are wrought into the verbs of language, their works and effigies are in our houses, and every circumstance of the day recalls an anecdote of them.

The search after the great man is the dream of youth and the most serious occupation of manhood. We travel into foreign parts to find his works,- if possible, to get a glimpse of him. But we are put off with fortune instead. You say, the English are practical; the Germans are hospitable; in Valencia the climate is delicious; and in the hills of the Sacramento there is gold for the gathering. Yes, but I do not travel to find comfortable, rich and hospitable people, or clear sky, or ingots that cost too much. But if there were any magnet that would point to the countries and houses where are the persons who are intrinsically rich and powerful, I would sell all and buy it, and put myself on the road today.

The race goes with us on their credit. The knowledge that in the city is a man who invented the railroad, raises the credit of all the citizens. But enormous populations, if they be beggars, are disgusting, like moving cheese, like hills of ants or of fleas,- the more, the worse.

If now we proceed to inquire into the kinds of service we derive from others, let us be warned of the danger of modern studies, and begin low enough. We must not contend against love, or deny the substantial existence of other people. I know not what would happen to us. We have social strengths. Our affection toward others creates a sort of vantage or purchase which nothing will supply. I can do that by another which I cannot do alone. I can say to you what I cannot first say to myself. Other men are lenses through which we read our own minds. Each man seeks those of different quality from his own, and such as are good of their kind; that is, he seeks other men, and the otherest. The stronger the nature, the more it is reactive. Let us have the quality pure. A little genius let us leave alone. A main difference betwixt men is, whether they attend their own affair or not. Man is that noble endogenous plant which grows, like the palm, from within outward. His own affair, though impossible to others, he can open with celerity and in sport. It is easy to sugar to be sweet and to nitre to be salt. We take a great deal of pains to waylay and entrap that which of itself will fall into our hands. I count him a great man who inhabits a higher sphere of thought, into which other men rise with labor and difficulty; he has but to open his eyes to see things in a true light and in large relations, whilst they must make painful corrections and keep a vigilant eye on many sources of error. His service to us is of like sort. It costs a beautiful person no exertion to paint her image on our eyes; yet how splendid is that benefit! It costs no more for a wise soul to convey his quality to other men. And every one can do his best thing easiest. "Peu de moyens, beaucoup d'effet." He is great who is what he is from nature, and who never reminds us of others.

But he must be related to us, and our life receive from him some promise of explanation. I cannot tell what I would know; but I have observed there are persons who, in their character and actions, answer questions which I have not skill to put. One man answers some question which none of his contemporaries put, and is isolated. The past and passing religions and philosophies answer some other questions. Certain men affect us as rich possibilities, but helpless to themselves and to their times,- the sport perhaps of some instinct that rules in the air;- they do not speak to our want. But the great are near; we know them at sight. They satisfy expectation and fall into place. What is good is effective, generative; makes for itself room, food and allies. A sound apple produces seed,- a hybrid does not. Is a man in his place, he is constructive, fertile, magnetic, inundating armies with his purpose, which is thus executed. The river makes its own shores, and each legitimate idea makes its own channels and welcome,- harvests for food, institutions for expression, weapons to fight with and disciples to explain it. The true artist has the planet for his pedestal; the adventurer, after years of strife, has nothing broader than his own shoes.

Our common discourse respects two kinds of use or service from superior men. Direct giving is agreeable to the early belief of men; direct giving of material or metaphysical aid, as of health, eternal youth, fine senses, arts of healing, magical power and prophecy. The boy believes there is a teacher who can sell him wisdom. Churches believe in imputed merit. But, in strictness, we are not much cognizant of direct serving. Man is endogenous, and education is his unfolding. The aid we have from others is mechanical compared with the discoveries of nature in us. What is thus learned is delightful in the doing, and the effect remains. Right ethics are central and go from the soul outward. Gift is contrary to the law of the universe. Serving others is serving us. I must absolve me to myself. "Mind thy affair," says the spirit:- "coxcomb, would you meddle with the skies, or with other people?" Indirect service is left. Men have a pictorial or representative quality, and serve us in the intellect. Behmen *(1) and Swedenborg saw that things were representative. Men are also representative; first, of things, and secondly, of ideas.

As plants convert the minerals into food for animals, so each man converts some raw material in nature to human use. The inventors of fire, electricity, magnetism, iron, lead, glass, linen, silk, cotton; the makers of tools; the inventor of decimal notation; the geometer; the engineer; the musician,- severally make an easy way for all, through unknown and impossible confusions. Each man is by secret liking connected with some district of nature, whose agent and interpreter he is; as Linnaeus, of plants; Huber, of bees; Fries, of lichens; Van Mons, of pears; Dalton, of atomic forms; Euclid, of lines; Newton, of fluxions.

A man is a centre for nature, running out threads of relation through every thing, fluid and solid, material and elemental. The earth rolls; every clod and stone comes to the meridian: so every organ, function, acid, crystal, grain of dust, has its relation to the brain. It waits long, but its turn comes. Each plant has its parasite, and each created thing its lover and poet. Justice has already been done to steam, to iron, to wood, to coal, to loadstone, to iodine, to corn and cotton; but how few materials are yet used by our arts The mass of creatures and of qualities are still hid and expectant. It would seem as if each waited, like the enchanted princess in fairy tales, for a destined human deliverer. Each must be disenchanted and walk forth to the day in human shape. In the history of discovery, the ripe and latent truth seems to have fashioned a brain for itself. A magnet must be made man in some Gilbert *(2) , or Swedenborg , or Oerstad, before the general mind can come to entertain its powers.

If we limit ourselves to the first advantages, a sober grace adheres to the mineral and botanic kingdoms, which, in the highest moments, comes up as the charm of nature,- the glitter of the spar, the sureness of affinity, the veracity of angles. Light and darkness, heat and cold, hunger and food, sweet and sour, solid, liquid and gas, circle us round in a wreath of pleasures, and, by their agreeable quarrel, beguile the day of life. The eye repeats every day the first eulogy on things,- "He saw that they were good." We know where to find them; and these performers are relished all the more, after a little experience of the pretending races. We are entitled also to higher advantages. Something is wanting to science until it has been humanized. The table of logarithms is one thing, and its vital play in botany, music, optics and architecture, another. There are advancements to numbers, anatomy, architecture, astronomy, little suspected at first, when, by union with intellect and will, they ascend into the life and reappear in conversation, character and politics.

But this comes later. We speak now only of our acquaintance with them in their own sphere and the way in which they seem to fascinate and draw to them some genius who occupies himself with one thing, all his life long. The possibility of interpretation lies in the identity of the observer with the observed. Each material thing has its celestial side; has its translation, through humanity, into the spiritual and necessary sphere where it plays a part as indestructible as any other. And to these, their ends, all things continually ascend. The gases gather to the solid firmament: the chemic lump arrives at the plant, and grows; arrives at the quadruped, and walks; arrives at the man, and thinks. But also the constituency determines the vote of the representative. He is not only representative, but participant. Like can only be known by like. The reason why he knows about them is that he is of them; he has just come out of nature, or from being a part of that thing. Animated chlorine knows of chlorine, and incarnate zinc, of zinc. Their quality makes his career; and he can variously publish their virtues, because they compose him. Man, made of the dust of the world, does not forget his origin; and all that is yet inanimate will one day speak and reason. Unpublished nature will have its whole secret told. Shall we say that quartz mountains will pulverize into innumerable Werners, Von Buchs and Beaumonts, and the laboratory of the atmosphere holds in solution I know not what Berzeliuses and Davys?

Thus we sit by the fire and take hold on the poles of the earth. This quasi omnipresence supplies the imbecility of our condition. In one of those celestial days when heaven and earth meet and adorn each other, it seems a poverty that we can only spend it once: we wish for a thousand heads, a thousand bodies, that we might celebrate its immense beauty in many ways and places. Is this fancy? Well, in good faith, we are multiplied by our proxies. How easily we adopt their labors! Every ship that comes to America got its chart from Columbus. Every novel is a debtor to Homer. Every carpenter who shaves with a fore-plane borrows the genius of a forgotten inventor. Life is girt all round with a zodiac of sciences, the contributions of men who have perished to add their point of light to our sky. Engineer, broker, jurist, physician, moralist, theologian, and every man, inasmuch as he has any science,- is a definer and map-maker of the latitudes and longitudes of our condition. These roadmakers on every hand enrich us. We must extend the area of life and multiply our relations. We are as much gainers by finding a new property in the old earth as by acquiring a new planet.

We are too passive in the reception of these material or semi-material aids. We must not be sacks and stomachs. To ascend one step,- we are better served through our sympathy. Activity is contagious. Looking where others look, and conversing with the same things, we catch the charm which lured them. Napoleon said, "You must not fight too often with one enemy, or you will teach him all your art of war." Talk much with any man of vigorous mind, and we acquire very fast the habit of looking at things in the same light, and on each occurrence we anticipate his thought.

Men are helpful through the intellect and the affections. Other help I find a false appearance. If you affect to give me bread and fire, I perceive that I pay for it the full price, and at last it leaves me as it found me, neither better nor worse: but all mental and moral force is a positive good. It goes out from you, whether you will or not, and profits me whom you never thought of. I cannot even hear of personal vigor of any kind, great power of performance, without fresh resolution. We are emulous of all that man can do. Cecil's saying of Sir Walter Raleigh, "I know that he can toil terribly," is an electric touch. So are Clarendon's portraits,- of Hampden, "who was of an industry and vigilance not to be tired out or wearied by the most laborious, and of parts not to be imposed on by the most subtle and sharp, and of a personal courage equal to his best parts";- of Falkland, "who was so severe an adorer of truth, that he could as easily have given himself leave to steal, as to dissemble." We cannot read Plutarch without a tingling of the blood; and I accept the saying of the Chinese Mencius: "A sage is the instructor of a hundred ages. When the manners of Loo are heard of, the stupid become intelligent, and the wavering, determined."

This is the moral of biography; yet it is hard for departed men to touch the quick like our own companions, whose names may not last as long. What is he whom I never think of? Whilst in every solitude are those who succor our genius and stimulate us in wonderful manners. There is a power in love to divine another's destiny better than that other can, and, by heroic encouragements, hold him to his task. What has friendship so signal as its sublime attraction to whatever virtue is in us? We will never more think cheaply of ourselves, or of life. We are piqued to some purpose, and the industry of the diggers on the railroad will not again shame us.

Under this head too falls that homage, very pure as I think, which all ranks pay to the hero of the day, from Coriolanus and Gracchus down to Pitt, Lafayette, Wellington, Webster, Lamartine. Hear the shouts in the street! The people cannot see him enough. They delight in a man. Here is a head and a trunk! What a front! what eyes! Atlantean shoulders, and the whole carriage heroic, with equal inward force to guide the great machine! This pleasure of full expression to that which, in their private experience, is usually cramped and obstructed, runs also much higher, and is the secret of the reader's joy in literary genius. Nothing is kept back. There is fire enough to fuse the mountain of ore. Shakespeare's principal merit may be conveyed in saying that he of all men best understands the English language, and can say what he will. Yet these unchoked channels and floodgates of expression are only health or fortunate constitution. Shakespeare's name suggests other and purely intellectual benefits.

Senates and sovereigns have no compliment, with their medals, swords and armorial coats, like the addressing to a human being thoughts out of a certain height, and presupposing his intelligence. This honor, which is possible in personal intercourse scarcely twice in a lifetime, genius perpetually pays; contented if now and then in a century the proffer is accepted. The indicators of the values of matter are degraded to a sort of cooks and confectioners, on the appearance of the indicators of ideas. Genius is the naturalist or geographer of the supersensible regions, and draws their map; and, by acquainting us with new fields of activity, cools our affection for the old. These are at once accepted as the reality, of which the world we have conversed with is the show.

We go to the gymnasium and the swimming-school to see the power and beauty of the body; there is the like pleasure and a higher benefit from witnessing intellectual feats of all kinds; as feats of memory, of mathematical combination, great power of abstraction, the transmutings of the imagination, even versatility and concentration,- as these acts expose the invisible organs and members of the mind, which respond, member for member, to the parts of the body. For we thus enter a new gymnasium, and learn to choose men by their truest marks, taught, with Plato, "to choose those who can, without aid from the eyes or any other sense, proceed to truth and to being." Foremost among these activities are the summersaults, spells and resurrections wrought by the imagination. When this wakes, a man seems to multiply ten times or a thousand times his force. It opens the delicious sense of indeterminate size and inspires an audacious mental habit. We are as elastic as the gas of gunpowder, and a sentence in a book, or a word dropped in conversation, sets free our fancy, and instantly our heads are bathed with galaxies, and our feet tread the floor of the Pit. And this benefit is real because we are entitled to these enlargements, and once having passed the bounds shall never again be quite the miserable pedants we were.

The high functions of the intellect are so allied that some imaginative power usually appears in all eminent minds, even in arithmeticians of the first class, but especially in meditative men of an intuitive habit of thought. This class serve us, so that they have the perception of identity and the perception of reaction. The eyes of Plato, Shakespeare, Swedenborg , Goethe , never shut on either of these laws. The perception of these laws is a kind of metre of the mind. Little minds are little through failure to see them.

Even these feasts have their surfeit. Our delight in reason degenerates into idolatry of the herald. Especially when a mind of powerful method has instructed men, we find the examples of oppression. The dominion of Aristotle, the Ptolemaic astronomy, the credit of Luther, of Bacon, of Locke;- in religion the history of hierarchies, of saints, and the sects which have taken the name of each founder, are in point. Alas! every man is such a victim. The imbecility of men is always inviting the impudence of power. It is the delight of vulgar talent to dazzle and to blind the beholder. But true genius seeks to defend us from itself. True genius will not impoverish, but will liberate, and add new senses. If a wise man should appear in our village he would create, in those who conversed with him, a new consciousness of wealth, by opening their eyes to unobserved advantages; he would establish a sense of immovable equality, calm us with assurances that we could not be cheated; as every one would discern the checks and guaranties of condition. The rich would see their mistakes and poverty, the poor their escapes and their resources.

But nature brings all this about in due time. Rotation is her remedy. The soul is impatient of masters and eager for change. Housekeepers say of a domestic who has been valuable, "She had lived with me long enough." We are tendencies, or rather, symptoms, and none of us complete. We touch and go, and sip the foam of many lives. Rotation is the law of nature. When nature removes a great man, people explore the horizon for a successor; but none comes, and none will. His class is extinguished with him. In some other and quite different field the next man will appear; not Jefferson, not Franklin, but now a great salesman, then a road-contractor, then a student of fishes, then a buffalo-hunting explorer, or a semi-savage Western general. Thus we make a stand against our rougher masters; but against the best there is a finer remedy. The power which they communicate is not theirs. When we are exalted by ideas, we do not owe this to Plato, but to the idea, to which also Plato was debtor.

I must not forget that we have a special debt to a single class. Life is a scale of degrees. Between rank and rank of our great men are wide intervals. Mankind have in all ages attached themselves to a few persons who either by the quality of that idea they embodied or by the largeness of their reception were entitled to the position of leaders and law-givers. These teach us the qualities of primary nature,- admit us to the constitution of things. We swim, day by day, on a river of delusions and are effectually amused with houses and towns in the air, of which the men about us are dupes. But life is a sincerity. In lucid intervals we say, "Let there be an entrance opened for me into realities; *(3) I have worn the fool's cap too long." We will know the meaning of our economies and politics. Give us the cipher, and if persons and things are scores of a celestial music, let us read off the strains. We have been cheated of our reason; yet there have been sane men, who enjoyed a rich and related existence. What they know, they know for us. With each new mind, a new secret of nature transpires; nor can the Bible be closed until the last great man is born. These men correct the delirium of the animal spirits, make us considerate and engage us to new aims and powers. The veneration of mankind selects these for the highest place. Witness the multitude of statues, pictures and memorials which recall their genius in every city, village, house and ship:-

"Ever their phantoms arise before us, Our loftier brothers, but one in blood; At bed and table they lord it o'er us With looks of beauty and words of good."

How to illustrate the distinctive benefit of ideas, the service rendered by those who introduce moral truths into the general mind?- I am plagued, in all my living, with a perpetual tariff of prices. If I work in my garden and prune an apple-tree, I am well enough entertained, and could continue indefinitely in the like occupation. But it comes to mind that a day is gone, and I have got this precious nothing done. I go to Boston or New York and run up and down on my affairs: they are sped, but so is the day. I am vexed by the recollection of this price I have paid for a trifling advantage. I remember the peau d'ane on which whoso sat should have his desire, but a piece of the skin was gone for every wish. I go to a convention of philanthropists. Do what I can, I cannot keep my eyes off the clock. But if there should appear in the company some gentle soul who knows little of persons or parties, of Carolina or Cuba, but who announces a law that disposes these particulars, and so certifies me of the equity which checkmates every false player, bankrupts every self-seeker, and apprises me of my independence on any conditions of country, or time, or human body,- that man liberates me; I forget the clock. I pass out of the sore relation to persons. I am healed of my hurts. I am made immortal by apprehending my possession of incorruptible goods. Here is great competition of rich and poor. We live in a market, where is only so much wheat, or wool, or land; and if I have so much more, every other must have so much less. I seem to have no good without breach of good manners. Nobody is glad in the gladness of another, and our system is one of war, of an injurious superiority. Every child of the Saxon race is educated to wish to be first. It is our system; and a man comes to measure his greatness by the regrets, envies and hatreds of his competitors. But in these new fields there is room: here are no self-esteems, no exclusions.

I admire great men of all classes, those who stand for facts, and for thoughts; I like rough and smooth, "Scourges of God," and "Darlings of the human race." I like the first Caesar; and Charles V, of Spain; and Charles XII, of Sweden; Richard Plantagenet; and Bonaparte, in France. I applaud a sufficient man, an officer equal to his office; captains, ministers, senators. I like a master standing firm on legs of iron, wellborn, rich, handsome, eloquent, loaded with advantages, drawing all men by fascination into tributaries and supporters of his power. Sword and staff, or talents sword-like or staff-like, carry on the work of the world. But I find him greater when he can abolish himself and all heroes, by letting in this element of reason, irrespective of persons, this subtilizer and irresistible upward force, into our thought, destroying individualism; the power so great that the potentate is nothing. Then he is a monarch who gives a constitution to his people; a pontiff who preaches the equality of souls and releases his servants from their barbarous homages; an emperor who can spare his empire.

But I intended to specify, with a little minuteness, two or three points of service. Nature never spares the opium or nepenthe, but wherever she mars her creature with some deformity or defect, lays her poppies plentifully on the bruise, and the sufferer goes joyfully through life, ignorant of the ruin and incapable of seeing it, though all the world point their finger at it every day. The worthless and offensive members of society, whose existence is a social pest, invariably think themselves the most ill-used people alive, and never get over their astonishment at the ingratitude and selfishness of their contemporaries. Our globe discovers its hidden virtues, not only in heroes and archangels, but in gossips and nurses. Is it not a rare contrivance that lodged the due inertia in every creature, the conserving, resisting energy, the anger at being waked or changed? Altogether independent of the intellectual force in each is the pride of opinion, the security that we are right. Not the feeblest grandame, not a mowing idiot, but uses what spark of perception and faculty is left, to chuckle and triumph in his or her opinion over the absurdities of all the rest. Difference from me is the measure of absurdity. Not one has a misgiving of being wrong. Was it not a bright thought that made things cohere with this bitumen, fastest of cements? But, in the midst of this chuckle of self-gratulation, some figure goes by which Thersites too can love and admire. This is he that should marshal us the way we were going. There is no end to his aid. Without Plato we should almost lose our faith in the possibility of a reasonable book. We seem to want but one, but we want one. We love to associate with heroic persons, since our receptivity is unlimited; and, with the great, our thoughts and manners easily become great. We are all wise in capacity, though so few in energy. There needs but one wise man in a company and all are wise, so rapid is the contagion.

Great men are thus a collyrium to clear our eyes from egotism and enable us to see other people and their works. But there are vices and follies incident to whole populations and ages. Men resemble their contemporaries even more than their progenitors. It is observed in old couples, or in persons who have been housemates for a course of years, that they grow like, and if they should live long enough we should not be able to know them apart. Nature abhors these complaisances which threaten to melt the world into a lump, and hastens to break up such maudlin agglutinations. The like assimilation goes on between men of one town, of one sect, of one political party; and the ideas of the time are in the air, and infect all who breathe it. Viewed from any high point, this city of New York, yonder city of London, the Western civilization, would seem a bundle of insanities. We keep each other in countenance and exasperate by emulation the frenzy of the time. The shield against the stingings of conscience is the universal practice, or our contemporaries. Again, it is very easy to be as wise and good as your companions. We learn of our contemporaries what they know without effort, and almost through the pores of the skin. We catch it by sympathy, or as a wife arrives at the intellectual and moral elevations of her husband. But we stop where they stop. Very hardly can we take another step. The great, or such as hold of nature and transcend fashions by their fidelity to universal ideas, are saviors from these federal errors, *(4) and defend us from our contemporaries. They are the exceptions which we want, where all grows like. A foreign greatness is the antidote for cabalism.

Thus we feed on genius, and refresh ourselves from too much conversation with our mates, and exult in the depth of nature in that direction in which he leads us. What indemnification is one great man for populations of pigmies! Every mother wishes one son a genius, though all the rest should be mediocre. But a new danger appears in the excess of influence of the great man. His attractions warp us from our place. We have become underlings and intellectual suicides. Ah! yonder in the horizon is our help;- other great men, new qualities, counterweights and checks on each other. We cloy of the honey of each peculiar greatness. Every hero becomes a bore at last. Perhaps Voltaire was not bad-hearted, yet he said of the good Jesus, even, "I pray you, let me never hear that man's name again." They cry up the virtues of George Washington,- "Damn George Washington!" is the poor Jacobin's whole speech and confutation. But it is human nature's indispensable defence. The centripetence augments the centrifugence. We balance one man with his opposite, and the health of the state depends on the see-saw.

There is however a speedy limit to the use of heroes. Every genius is defended from approach by quantities of unavailableness. They are very attractive, and seem at a distance our own: but we are hindered on all sides from approach. The more we are drawn, the more we are repelled. There is something not solid in the good that is done for us. The best discovery the discoverer makes for himself. It has something unreal for his companion until he too has substantiated it. It seems as if the Deity dressed each soul which he sends into nature in certain virtues and powers not communicable to other men, and sending it to perform one more turn through the circle of beings, wrote, "Not transferable" and "Good for this trip only," on these garments of the soul. There is somewhat deceptive about the intercourse of minds. The boundaries are invisible, but they are never crossed. There is such good will to impart, and such good will to receive, that each threatens to become the other; but the law of individuality collects its secret strength: you are you, and I am I, and so we remain.

For nature wishes every thing to remain itself; and whilst every individual strives to grow and exclude and to exclude and grow, to the extremities of the universe, and to impose the law of its being on every other creature, Nature steadily aims to protect each against every other. Each is self-defended. Nothing is more marked than the power by which individuals are guarded from individuals, in a world where every benefactor becomes so easily a malefactor only by continuation of his activity into places where it is not due; where children seem so much at the mercy of their foolish parents, and where almost all men are too social and interfering. We rightly speak of the guardian angels of children. How superior in their security from infusions of evil persons, from vulgarity and second thought! They shed their own abundant beauty on the objects they behold. Therefore they are not at the mercy of such poor educators as we adults. If we huff and chide them they soon come not to mind it and get a self-reliance ; and if we indulge them to folly, they learn the limitation elsewhere.

We need not fear excessive influence. A more generous trust is permitted. Serve the great. Stick at no humiliation. Grudge no office thou canst render. Be the limb of their body, the breath of their mouth. Compromise thy egotism. Who cares for that, so thou gain aught wider and nobler? Never mind the taunt of Boswellism: the devotion may easily be greater than the wretched pride which is guarding its own skirts. Be another: not thyself, but a Platonist; not a soul, but a Christian; not a naturalist, but a Cartesian; not a poet, but a Shakespearean. In vain, the wheels of tendency will not stop, nor will all the forces of inertia, fear, or of love itself hold thee there. On, and forever onward! The microscope observes a monad or wheel-insect among the infusories circulating in water. Presently a dot appears on the animal, which enlarges to a slit, and it becomes two perfect animals. The ever-proceeding detachment appears not less in all thought and in society. Children think they cannot live without their parents. But, long before they are aware of it, the black dot has appeared and the detachment taken place. Any accident will now reveal to them their independence.

But great men:- the word is injurious. Is there caste? Is there fate? What becomes of the promise to virtue? The thoughtful youth laments the superfoetation of nature. "Generous and handsome," he says, "is your hero; but look at yonder poor Paddy, whose country is his wheelbarrow; look at his whole nation of Paddies." Why are the masses, from the dawn of history down, food for knives and powder? The idea dignifies a few leaders, who have sentiment, opinion, love, self-devotion; and they make war and death sacred;- but what for the wretches whom they hire and kill? The cheapness of man is every day's tragedy. It is as real a loss that others should be as low as that we should be low; for we must have society.

Is it a reply to these suggestions to say, Society is a Pestalozzian school: all are teachers and pupils in turn? We are equally served by receiving and by imparting. Men who know the same things are not long the best company for each other. But bring to each an intelligent person of another experience, and it is as if you let off water from a lake by cutting a lower basin. It seems a mechanical advantage, and great benefit it is to each speaker, as he can now paint out his thought to himself. We pass very fast, in our personal moods, from dignity to dependence. And if any appear never to assume the chair, but always to stand and serve, it is because we do not see the company in a sufficiently long period for the whole rotation of parts to come about. As to what we call the masses, and common men,- there are no common men. All men are at last of a size; and true art is only possible on the conviction that every talent has its apotheosis somewhere. Fair play and an open field and freshest laurels to all who have won them! But heaven reserves an equal scope for every creature. Each is uneasy until he has produced his private ray unto the concave sphere and beheld his talent also in its last nobility and exaltation.

The heroes of the hour are relatively great; of a faster growth; or they are such in whom, at the moment of success, a quality is ripe which is then in request. Other days will demand other qualities. Some rays escape the common observer, and want a finely adapted eye. Ask the great man if there be none greater. His companions are; and not the less great but the more that society cannot see them. Nature never sends a great man into the planet without confiding the secret to another soul.

One gracious fact emerges from these studies,- that there is true ascension in our love. The reputations of the nineteenth century will one day be quoted to prove its barbarism. The genius of humanity is the real subject whose biography is written in our annals. We must infer much, and supply many chasms in the record. The history of the universe is symptomatic, and life is mnemonical. No man, in all the procession of famous men, is reason or illumination or that essence we were looking for; but is an exhibition, in some quarter, of new possibilities. Could we one day complete the immense figure which these flagrant *(5) points compose! The study of many individuals leads us to an elemental region wherein the individual is lost, or wherein all touch by their summits. Thought and feeling that break out there cannot be impounded by any fence of personality. This is the key to the power of the greatest men,- their spirit diffuses itself. A new quality of mind travels by night and by day, in concentric circles from its origin, and publishes itself by unknown methods: the union of all minds appears intimate; what gets admission to one, cannot be kept out of any other; the smallest acquisition of truth or of energy, in any quarter, is so much good to the commonwealth of souls. If the disparities of talent and position vanish when the individuals are seen in the duration which is necessary to complete the career of each, even more swiftly the seeming injustice disappears when we ascend to the central identity of all the individuals, and know that they are made of the substance which ordaineth and doeth.

The genius of humanity is the right point of view of history. The qualities abide; the men who exhibit them have now more, now less, and pass away; the qualities remain on another brow. No experience is more familiar. Once you saw phoenixes: they are gone; the world is not therefore disenchanted. The vessels on which you read sacred emblems turn out to be common pottery; but the sense of the pictures is sacred, and you may still read them transferred to the walls of the world. For a time our teachers serve us personally, as metres or milestones of progress. Once they were angels of knowledge and their figures touched the sky. Then we drew near, saw their means, culture and limits; and they yielded their place to other geniuses. Happy, if a few names remain so high that we have not been able to read them nearer, and age and comparison have not robbed them of a ray. But at last we shall cease to look in men for completeness, and shall content ourselves with their social and delegated quality. All that respects the individual is temporary and prospective, like the individual himself, who is ascending out of his limits into a catholic existence. We have never come at the true and best benefit of any genius so long as we believe him an original force. In the moment when he ceases to help us as a cause, he begins to help us more as an effect. Then he appears as an exponent of a vaster mind and will. The opaque self becomes transparent with the light of the First Cause.

Yet, within the limits of human education and agency, we may say great men exist that there may be greater men. The destiny of organized nature is amelioration, and who can tell its limits? It is for man to tame the chaos; on every side, whilst he lives, to scatter the seeds of science and of song, that climate, corn, animals, men, may be milder, and the germs of love and benefit may be multiplied. *(6)

Ralph Waldo Emerson left the ministry to pursue a career in writing and public speaking. Emerson became one of America's best known and best-loved 19th-century figures. More About Emerson

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The Great Man Theory of History

Jan 17, 2020 | Articles

(This essay was originally written as a chapter in my book, Heroes, Legends, Champions: Why Heroism Matters , and is an outtake from that book.)

Do specific geniuses or “great men” drive forward the events of history?   Is profound impact on social history the criterion of such great men or heroes?

This idea, known as “the great man theory of history,” was extensively argued during the 19th century, when Western support  for heroism was still pronounced.

Despite a fascinating philosophic debate among serious thinkers, the theory is fatally flawed.

The Great Man Theory

The essence of the hypothesis is that certain great men or heroes, by virtue of their genius, charisma, and/or military-political acumen, are the primary causal agents of historic events. Society does not shape great individuals; rather, great individuals shape society.

Napoleon—who, in accordance with this speculation, can be interpreted as seizing control of the French Revolution and imposing it on sundry European monarchs—is often advanced as an exemplar.

Thomas Carlyle, in his book, On Heroes, Hero-Worship, And The Heroic In History, analyzes writers, priests, and prophets as authentic examples of heroes, but definitively proclaims rightful rulers the greatest of the great. “The Commander over Men; he to whose wills our wills are to be subordinated, and loyally surrender themselves, and find their welfare in doing so, may be reckoned the most important of Great Men.” [i]

It is Carlyle’s fervent exhortation that we: “Find in any country the Ablest Man that exists there; raise him to the supreme place, and loyally reverence him….The Ablest Man; he means also the truest-hearted, justest, the Noblest Man: what he tells us to do must be precisely the wisest, fittest, that we could anywhere, anyhow learn;–the thing which it will in all ways behoove US, with right loyal thankfulness and nothing doubting, to do.” [ii]

Drawn from history, Carlyle’s principal examples of proper commanders over men are Cromwell and Napoleon who, presumably, he believes, will provide us guidance “the wisest, fittest, that we could anywhere, anyhow learn.”

Friedrich Nietzsche, although aphoristic and metaphoric in style—and hardly systematic—is a thinker vastly more profound; who mocks the “insipid muddleheaded Carlyle,” and who provides trenchant if brutal argumentation in support of his vision.

Ironically, Nietzsche, despite his devout atheism, holds a quasi-religious metaphysics, in which “will”—a feature of spirit or mind or consciousness—is presented as the impelling drive of reality itself.  He repudiates the mechanistic, “billiard ball” vision of the universe, which posits, in effect, a world composed of material entities moving, totally and unconditionally, in accord with the laws of physics; and does so, because such a view wrongly models human life and society, actuated as they are by passion and desire.

Nietzsche, rejecting dualism, and seeking a unified world view, resists a projection of inanimate matter’s form of causation onto man—and rather, projects man’s form of causation onto inanimate matter: “Let us assume that nothing is ‘given’ as real except our world of desires and passions….Would we not be allowed to experiment with the question whether these ‘givens’ are not sufficient for understanding the so-called mechanistic (or material) world?…To understand the material world as a pre-form of life?” [iii]

“Will-causality” is the sole form of causality he recognizes.  What are the will(s) composing reality willing? In some primordial sense, a drive to power, about which he works out no detailed theory applied to the universe, but does so applied to life. He writes:  “Life itself is essential assimilation, injury, violation of the foreign and the weaker, suppression, hardness, the forcing of one’s own forms upon something else, ingestion and—at least in its milder form—exploitation.” [iv]

For human beings, as for all organisms, the ultimate good is mastery, domination, subjugation.

(It is not to be overlooked that, for Nietzsche, the paradigm examples of the superior person or Overman were, most likely, such creative artists as Michelangelo, Leonardo, and Goethe; who harness the passion, the turbulence, the raw, burgeoning power of their frenzied souls, and, having gained self-mastery, project order onto the world’s intractable materials, bringing forth in structured, stylized beauty, a momentous work of art. “One must still have chaos in oneself to give birth to a dancing star.” [v] )

Nevertheless, the most frequent examples of the exuberantly hard, indomitably self-assertive, world-bursting individuals he extols are generals, politicians, ruthless leaders of men—Alexander, Caesar, Napoleon. These individuals topple city-states, overturn republics, crush freedom, not as wantonly destructive nihilism but so they may establish empire.

“Most of the overmen whom Nietzsche mentioned by name were politicians and generals whose creativity often expressed itself in the conquest of alien peoples or the subjugation of their fellow citizens.” [vi]

Such giants of history were “beyond good and evil” precisely because, in overturning the old political order among men, and imposing a new, they flouted, violated, shattered conventional moral codes and thrust upon society rules, guidelines, commandments inherently  their own.

“The History of the world is but the Biography of great men,” stated Carlyle in perfect, pithy expression of this view. [vii]

Nineteenth Century Criticisms of the Theory

Today, it is generally held that the great man theory was logically devastated by the withering critique of Herbert Spencer. Spencer, arguing for the causal role of society in shaping an individual, famously observed: “You must admit that the genesis of a great man depends on the long series of complex influences which has produced the race in which he appears, and the social state into which that race has slowly grown…Before he can re-make his society, his society must make him.” [viii]

William James, from a distinctively biological standpoint, critiqued Spencer’s critique. James pointed out, in terms of causation, a reciprocal relationship between geniuses (or great men) and society; comparing these to the mutual impact on each other of organism and physical environment, as elucidated in Darwinian theory.

“The causes of production of great men lie in a sphere wholly inaccessible to the social philosopher. He must simply accept geniuses as data, just as Darwin accepts his spontaneous variations…these data being given, how does the environment affect them, and how do they affect the environment? …the relation of the visible environment to the great man is in the main exactly what it is to the ‘variation’ in the Darwinian philosophy. It chiefly adopts or rejects, preserves or destroys, in short selects him. And whenever it adopts and preserves the great man, it becomes modified by his influence in an entirely original and peculiar way.” [ix]

For James, biological—not social—factors produce a great man: “Physiological forces, with which the social, political, geographical…conditions have just as much…to do as the condition of the crater of Vesuvius…with the flickering of this gas by which I write, are what make him.” [x]

Presumably, for James, expressed in contemporary terms, a genius arises due predominantly (perhaps exclusively) to genetic causation—either matches his environment or not—and by it is either accepted or rejected, embraced or crushed. When an individual’s genius matches his society, it welcomes him, and he becomes, for it, a driving catalyst of change. “The mutations of societies, then, from generation to generation, are in the main due directly or indirectly to the acts or the examples of individuals whose genius was so adapted to the receptivities of the moment…” [xi]

Or, as James puts it, writing in the late 19 th century: “Not every ‘man’ fits every ‘hour’…A given genius may come either too early or too late. Peter the Hermit [an 11 th century priest who helped incite the First Crusade] would now be sent to a lunatic asylum…Cromwell and Napoleon need their revolutions, Grant his civil war…” [xii]

There are a constellation of errors permeating this debate, some committed by this thinker, others by that.

These are: 1. Impact on historic events is not a primary criterion of heroism. 2. Mistakes regarding the complex relationship between an individual and society. 3. Failure to apprehend a fundamental aspect of a great individual’s greatness. 4. The critical error that everyman should obey the commands of heroes, who properly should hold political and legal dominion.

Let’s examine these one at a time.

Critiquing the Great Man Theory

One: Impact on social history: Regarding heroism, an individual’s impact on history is the wrong question to ask. Vivid counter-examples form the start of a counter argument; principles extracted from them, its culmination.

Attila and earlier Hun chieftains had an incalculable impact on social history. Their invasions of Eastern and Central Europe swept before them Germanic tribes, who, fleeing, burst the boundaries of the Roman Empire; catalyzing a series of migrations and battles that, decades later, contributed to the collapse of civilization and triumph of barbarism. Attila ravaged extensive portions of northern Italy and even threatened Rome itself.

Attila and prior Hun leaders were a powerful force in early medieval European history. Is this sufficient to make them heroes? No. Blood-drenched barbarians who dramatically augment the destruction of civilization are, no doubt, mighty villains—but, by virtue of this alone, are excluded from the ranks of heroes.

Epistemologically, the concept “hero” refers to the identification that, in real life, some rare individuals achieve goals that substantially advance human life; that support construction and life, not destruction and death. If a powerful Roman emperor had arisen—a latter-day Augustus—had selected skilled commanders, rallied his troops, defeated the invaders, saved Rome, restored and upheld some degree of intellectual freedom, thereby promoting a revival of civilization, and had continued to protect it against barbarians—this would be a hero.

A different example on the same theme: If impact on history is a prime criterion of heroism, then few can lay better claim to the title than Hitler. But, in truth, one of history’s most egregious mass murderers has even less claim to the title of “hero” than does Attila.

There is a fundamental flaw in the great man theory of history: It asks the wrong question.

The proper criterion of heroism is not impact on society—but benefit to human life. The individual who discovers new knowledge—or applies it to such life-promoting fields as music, agriculture, medicine, electrical engineering, or numerous others—the person who creates material or intellectual wealth—or who effectively protects the creators—the men and women responsible for originating civilization, for raising mankind out of the caves and the jungles, for immensely increasing living standards, life expectancies, leisure time, and for creating art, entertainment, and consequent immeasurable  enhancement of men’s ability to enjoy their earthly time—these are mankind’s heroes.

Heroes, by this measure, do greatly impact social history—but such influence is not the fundamental criterion of heroism. If we employ the Carlyle-Nietzsche definition of “great men,” then, in truth, all (epic)heroes are great men—but not all great men are heroes. Unfortunately, heroes are not as widespread a phenomenon as “great men;”  worse, “hero worship” has been too often directed at “great men” unworthy of it.

Two: The relationship between the great individual and society :  Looked at from one perspective—viewing society as an immense but nonetheless single entity, composed of an incalculable number of components—a reciprocal influence upon each other of great man and society is undeniably true.

Napoleon certainly shook European monarchies to their foundations.

But the causal factors animating such momentous events stretched back through centuries; including, most obviously, the French Revolution; but also the long-unchallenged power of the ancien regime —the thoughts, values, and actions of various Bourbon monarchs, their families, foes, and advisors—the teachings and actions of the Catholic Church, its popes, cardinals, and theologians; the writings of various philosophes, supporting the freedom of man’s mind, opposing the ancient regime; the influence, especially on Voltaire, of Britain’s gradual movement away from absolute monarchy in the direction of increased individual liberties; the prevalence across the Continent of oppressive hereditary monarchies, and the opposition of many to the ideals and goals of the Revolution; and so on, in incessant litany of causes and conditioning persons and events, that could not be exhaustively recounted in a dozen lifetimes by a regiment of Will Durants.

Napoleon was acted upon, by society, in ways too numerous to catalogue.

But viewing society as a single super-organism that thinks and acts and influences an individual is worse than a fiction of lazy minds unwilling to examine its multitude of constituent parts. It is the fallacy of reification writ large. “Reification…is the hypostatizing [thing-making] of entities, that is, the making of abstractions into substances.” [xiii]

That, in some sense, society exists, is not to be doubted. But in what sense? Surely, “American society” does not exist in the sense that, for example, Clint Eastwood—American citizen—exists. One could meet face-to-face with Eastwood, converse, dine, and tipple with him—might visually observe, on the silver screen, his impressively manly squint—applaud (or not) as he garners “Best Director” awards—and so on. Can one engage in such activities vis-à-vis “American society?” One cannot.

American society, or any other, is an amalgam of such an immense quantity of individuals—their thoughts, values, emotions, actions, and swirling interactions—as to be, in a literal sense, incalculable. One could not encounter all such social components, never mind remember, during the latter stage of encountering, those antecedently encountered; much less keep track—in the time elapsed during these subsequent encounters—of the further doings of those initially encountered.

The concept “society” is a mental construct subsuming an immeasurable quantity of data, much, although not all of it, observational.  To state the point simply: Society is a collection of individuals who act upon each other.

Whose actions impinge most heavily on others?

Napoleon exerted more influence—for better or worse—on far more individuals than the vast majority of other individuals exerted on him. Although it is true, in some sense, to say that “society” significantly influenced (but not “made” or “molded”) Napoleon, the conventional understanding of this claim is—including by many philosophers—at best, woozy.

The sense in which it is true is that many members of human society—individuals—exerted some influence on Napoleon, and that some members exerted much; this latter includes more than the usual suspects of parents, family, peers, teachers, and so on; but also some of history’s other “great men,”  including a wide array of diverse artists, philosophers, scientists, and statesmen who helped create both the relatively-advanced Western society in which Napoleon was educated and the opportunities it afforded.

James succinctly expresses the point: “…the important thing…is that what makes a certain genius now incompatible with his surroundings is usually…that some previous genius of a different strain has warped the community away from the sphere of his possible effectiveness. After Voltaire, no Peter the Hermit…” [xiv]

Regarding the exertion of influence, not all human beings are created equal.  A few exert substantially—in some cases vastly—more on other individuals than do other individuals on them (or than these other individuals do on the still other individuals composing the rest of society). A critically important question is: Is such influence for good or ill—or is it mixed? To make such a judgment, of course, requires a standard.

That Napoleon exerted enormous impact on European society is clear. Further, numerous of his policies effectively supported human life. He ended feudalism, abolished serfdom, and annulled the Inquisition. He advanced religious freedom in Europe, even for the long-oppressed Jews. Across the continent, he so weakened the ancient regime that it would not long survive his own demise.

But the blood, the guts, the enormous cost in human life, in service of his dreams of conquest and power, cannot be sanctioned. Although certainly not a scourge of civilization a la Attila, much less a monster, the countless youthful lives snuffed out, in endless procession of gory battles, to fulfill his imperial designs renders unconscionable an overwhelming preponderance of his career.

It is definitely tragic, and possibly criminal that we, the human race, have so often glorified conquerors. Stendhal, as but one example, praised Napoleon as “the greatest man to appear in the world since Caesar.” [xv] Alexander, Caesar, Napoleon, despite some noble qualities and beneficent policies, shed such an ocean of innocent blood as to dwarf their life-giving achievements. It is the creators and their protectors, not power-seekers and warmongers that deserve our respect and emulation. Nietzsche, in his best moments, understood this; unfortunately, his best moments were rare.

Three: The overlooked cause of a great man’s greatness: James, in effect, argues that geniuses or great men are born, not made. Presumably, the biological causes of a hero’s gifts are operative whether his society is ready or not for them; whether, to these gifts, it offers nurture or opposition; whether, for them, it provides outlet or stone wall.

In response to his chief opponent, he wrote: “Can it be that Mr. Spencer holds the convergence of sociological pressures to have so impinged on Stratford-upon-Avon about the 26 th of April, 1564, that a W. Shakespeare, with all his mental peculiarities, had to be born there, –as the pressure of water outside a certain boat will cause a stream of a certain form to ooze into a particular leak?  And does he mean to say that if the aforesaid W. Shakespeare had died of cholera infantum, another mother at Stratford-upon-Avon would needs have engendered a duplicate copy of him, to restore the sociologic equilibrium,–just as the same stream of water will reappear, no matter how often you pass a sponge over the leak, so long as the outside level remains unchanged?” [xvi]

Presumably, Spencer meant no such thing. What he most likely meant was a more conventional claim that, once born, a future genius receives from society nurturing, education, religious training, stable political environment, friendship, love, human intimacy, and much more, all of which contribute to the eventual great man; or, in Spencer’s overstated terms, are what “make him.”

One assumes Spencer does not mean what James ascribes to him: that society—its cultural evolution, educational system, government, and so forth —necessitates, at precisely that moment, the birth of a man with the vigorous brain activity of a Shakespeare; but merely, that once such an individual is born, society trains that brain to cognize, to value, to feel, in specific forms.  James is here guilty of a straw man fallacy.

Aside from the reification already described—and the realization that the education, cultural accomplishments, and so forth, provided the germinating genius proceed from other individuals and institutions founded, run, and supported by individuals—both disputants overlook a cardinal principle necessary to understand the gestation of any person’s thinking and values, including those of a genius: volition. (This is an oversight especially puzzling in the case of James, strong advocate of free will that he is.)

Do Spencer and James differ over no more than variants of determinism, with the former advocating a social—and the latter a biological—version? If so, this writer disagrees.

That a Shakespeare is born with a robust brain (and nervous system) generating rich, diverse, quick, multiple neural firings—or however 21 st century neuro-biology understands such functions—seems clear. Who doubts that the brain of a genius is pre-eminently active?

In a form analogous to how the coordinated muscle structure of an Olympic champion facilitates athletic accomplishments, just so the vigorous brain functioning of a Shakespeare is a necessary condition of  intellectual ones.  A certain type of brain and the neural activity it actuates are, presumably, foundations of the “one percent inspiration” of genius properly invoked by Edison.

Further, if an individual of prodigious cerebral endowment, such as a Shakespeare, is born to a primitive nomadic tribe, which has yet to formulate written language, the education, values, and training afforded by such a society provide scant opportunity for the potential Bard to actualize his surpassing literary gifts. (Although, he might be exactly the individual, in that society, who pioneers written language; the earlier absence of which itself provides opportunity). That the history, culture, education, political system, and so forth, of a given society emphatically affects the germination of a great individual’s intellect and values—on what basis can such a proposition be doubted?

Nevertheless, an individual is not the crafted outcome of what other individuals molded him to be; as many parents have ruefully discovered. He/she is not the sum total of the thoughts, appraisals, beliefs, emotions, and actions of the myriad individuals who have, to greater or lesser degree, impacted him. He is influenced; he is not molded.

If individuals are molded, who or what molded the original molders? (Or, in Spencer’s overstated terms, if society “make[s]” an individual, who makes the makers?) Somewhere in time, the process of molding began; otherwise, no process. Who initiated it? And what were the culture’s determining influence(s) on him (or them)? Or are we to assume that the human race’s progenitors made fundamental choices of which their descendants are incapable? If so, what principle explains the volition possessed by some members of humanity, as distinct and apart from the rest?

In short, the thesis that some individuals “make” an individual, is hopelessly entangled in an infinite regress of causes. For, the individuals that made Napoleon were themselves “made” by antecedent individuals, who, of course, were “made” by individuals prior to them, and so forth, ad infinitum. Positing such an infinite regress of causation is a more egregious logical error even than reification.

Further, does the super-charged brain activity of a Shakespeare necessitate its direction into literature? Was it neither neurologically nor socially possible for a man of such intellectual gifts to spark interest in mathematics or medicine or art? Indeed, was it necessary that he pursue an intellectual career at all? Many a time, honest observers have witnessed the sad spectacle of supremely gifted individuals squandering immense intellectual inheritance, as do some of their unfortunate counterparts regarding material ones.

As a striking example, Shakespeare’s brilliant contemporary, poet/dramatist, Christopher Marlowe, was, aged twenty-nine, stabbed to death under mysterious circumstances that might never be entirely understood.

Nevertheless, tragically, for the claim that Marlowe was as much a genius of low-living as he was of theater arts, there is abundant supporting evidence. An anonymous 16 th century contemporary wrote of him: “Pity it is that wit so ill should dwell, Wit lent from Heaven, but vices sent from hell.”

That a man possesses active brain and brilliant acumen provides no assurance that he values either—that he will doggedly pursue serious intellectual interests, literary or otherwise—or, so  doing, that he will not simultaneously court dissipation or early demise in riotous hedonism, gratuitous violence, or one or another of self-destruction’s myriad seductive forms.

Marlowe manifested a short but brilliant career. How many others, with equally potent brains and similarly powerful vices, manifested careers only short—or non-existent? The graveyards, one sadly suspects, are filled with skeletons of potential geniuses that, for one or another reason, were never heard from.

The truth is that Shakespeare was born with a vibrantly active brain that enabled prodigious intellectual achievement—that he appeared in a 16 th century English culture that prized theater and literature, providing thereby encouragement and opportunity—and that he chose an intellectual career and chose one distinctively in the field of literature.   

Choice, as a real aspect of human life, is known via direct introspective awareness–and the flaws of determinism, in any of its forms, are intellectually fatal.   (See Appendix B: “A Challenge to Determinism.”)

Four: Heroes possess no moral authority to command obedience:  Why do purveyors of the Great Man theory claim that a hero should rightfully possess unlimited political power?

Is it because he/she embodies a will to dominance that forms the core of metaphysical reality, is thereby incarnation of it, and entitled—as, in effect, reality’s certified deputy—to shunt, bestride, or trample lesser men? Or is it because the great individual possesses wisdom and judgment lacking in mere mortals, whose otherwise lost souls call out desperately for his guidance?

Is his/her rule justified by brute power—as, according to the most radical Greek Sophists—force was the final arbiter of right and wrong? [xvii] Or is it sanctioned by paternalism, similar to that of Plato’s vision of a Socrates-like Philosopher King? Is it the great person’s rightful destiny to overthrow societies, and, living “beyond” the conventional moral codes they embody, crush sniveling weaklings strewn athwart his path? Or, under the burden of noblesse oblige, must his/her reign embody not merely a material generosity to those less prosperous but, as well, a spiritual guidance to those less wise?

Clearly, for Nietzsche, the propositions contained in the former questions constitute his reasons; nor is it a matter of guesswork that, for Carlyle, those in the latter.

In his 1849 essay, “Occasional Discourse on the Negro Question,” Carlyle is brutally clear regarding the reasons of paternalism’s rectitude. It is here that Carlyle first applied his now-famous epithet “the dismal science” to economics. What is “dismal” regarding economics? The economists’ commitment to individuals making unfettered choices in free markets, unguided by their intellectual and/or moral superiors.

To be blunt, Carlyle regarded certain human beings—blacks, European serfs, Irishmen, low-born workers—as unqualified for self-governing. The principles of individualism, individual rights, and political-economic liberty cut asunder such persons from a hierarchical society that bestowed upon them a sustaining  guidance from their superiors.  For this reason, Carlyle fervently supported race-based slavery—and excoriated the economists because they did not. [xviii]   In the end, in politics, Carlyle embodies a bastardized version of Platonism.

In truth, however, to the extent that authoritarian rulers are upheld as heroes, and hero worship is held to be unreserved reverence for and unquestioning obedience to them, they are dangerous figures; properly, human beings should be fearful of such beliefs.  In the “Prologue” to her book, Heroes, Saviors, Traitors, and Supermen: A History of Hero Worship, Lucy Hughes Hallett warns against human willingness to “hand over their political rights to a glorious superman.” [xix]    Regarding this aspect of the complex issue, she is quite right.

Why? The answer can be succinctly stated: Rational beings possess the wherewithal, and must accept the responsibility, to govern their own lives. To surrender this right is not merely to threaten political liberty, and enshrine statism, but to undermine the role of the mind in each individual’s life. Did nature endow us with a mind to surrender it to a fatherly despot? When we are children, we need the loving supervision of our parents. Does it follow that, as adults, we yet require such supervision from the state?

Epistemologically, psychologically, morally—despite our years, experience, and wisdom attained—do we perennially remain akin to children? Do the vast majority of persons—healthy, able-bodied, possessing a human brain—require Political Big Daddy or Super Nanny to guide them? “An exaggerated veneration for an exceptional individual poses an insidious temptation. It allows worshippers to abnegate responsibility, looking to great men for salvation or for fulfillment which they more properly should be working to accomplish for themselves.” [xx]

A healthy adult living in a free society can and will deploy his/her intelligence to choose the education he receives, the field of study in which he specializes, the career he pursues, the locale of his residence, and so forth regarding the myriad values of human life.

Could the state, for example,  know for Jenny Smith—better than she could know—what is best for her regarding a single one of these values, much less the totality? By what means? Jenny Smith, let us say, chooses to study biology—but the state deems architecture a field for her better suited. What evidence could the state adduce to support its claim? Since Carlyle (and many others) assumes paternalism, the kinship of a benevolent state to a loving parent, the sought-after outcome must include the well-being of the individual citizen.

By what means could the state know that architecture, rather than biology, will best ensure Ms. Smith’s fulfillment? Will it administer a battery of sophisticated aptitude tests? Will it hire expert psychologists to interview and examine her? Will it coerce her—as a trial run—to spend x amount of time studying architecture?

And what if, after all of the state’s noblest efforts, Ms. Smith persists in obdurate commitment to biology? Will the state coerce her into its preferred field? If so, is it reasonable to expect that, under conditions of forced labor, Ms. Jenny Smith will achieve career fulfillment?

Further, once this aspect of Ms. Smith’s drama is resolved, the state is yet faced with guiding her life regarding other significant human values. Multiply this dilemma by the fifty million citizens (or greater) populating a given society, and the insuperable epistemological difficulties faced by a paternalistic state become manifest.

Or, if it is assumed that the state need concern itself only with the best interest of society as a whole—rather than the fulfillment of individual citizens—how is this achieved? Under individual rights and freedom, individuals pursue their own values. But the impelling premise of paternalism is that the wise political rulers know what is best for each citizen—more ably than he/she can know for himself/herself.

If the state “guides,” that is, can coerce a person toward the end it—but not he/she—cherishes, how many members of society will be fulfilled? How many will work conscientiously, as opposed to resentfully and half-heartedly? How many will commit suicide? How is the best interest of society—a composite of millions of individuals—served by the enforced frustration of countless of those individuals?

Thus far, we have discussed only education and career. Throw in the values of friendship, romantic love, marriage, and children, and the prescription for state-dominated misery becomes irresistible.

Related: Nietzsche, in his best moments and moods, recognizes that the greatest individuals or most perfected heroes are not conquerors or kings, but creative artists and intellectual geniuses. About this, he is correct. What of such creative minds under paternalism? Are we to believe the wise rulers those most capable of identifying and nurturing such nascent talent? And what ensues if the germinating genius seeks independence from the state, as do teen-agers from parents, and dares disagree with its edicts and policies?

What occurs if he/she persists in such disagreement into adulthood, using his creative gifts to convey his message to the public? Stripped of the right to govern his/her life by application of his own intelligence, and obligated to—in all matters—accept the state’s superior wisdom, is he inevitably faced with the brutal alternative: Kowtow or die? How thick is the irony when Plato’s politics, embodied, results in the execution of a future Socrates?

Politically, this form of hero worship necessitates state worship. Ironically, in its milder form, it makes life exceedingly difficult for the great creative minds that constitute mankind’s grandest heroes; in its most virulent form, it crushes them.

The great man theory of heroism, as debated in the 19th century, is fatally flawed. Impact on society or on history is not a proper criterion of heroism; nor are many of the individuals hero-worshipped worthy of it. Heroes are “made” by neither genetic inheritance nor social conditioning nor a combination of the two; although these are impactful factors, they do not cover the waterfront; additionally, heroes choose to perform the life-enhancing feats they do, often under great duress and against social opposition; such courageous choices are part of what make them heroes. Heroes, as earlier discussed, are to be worshiped and emulated; not blindly obeyed.

Get your copy of Heroes, Legends, Champions: Why Heroism Matters today!

[i] Thomas Carlyle, On Heroes, Hero-Worship, And The Heroic In History (Middlesex, England: Echo Library, 2007), p. 123.

[ii] Ibid.,  p. 123.

[iii] Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, tr. M. Cowan (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1955), pp. 42-43.

[iv] Ibid. , p. 201.

[v] Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra, in The Portable Nietzsche, ed. Walter Kaufman (New York: Viking, 1954), p. 129.

[vi] W.T. Jones, A History of Western Philosophy, vol. 4, “Kant and the Nineteenth Century” (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1975), p. 257.

[vii] Carlyle, op. cit., p. 21.

[viii] Herbert Spencer, The Study of Sociology (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1896), p. 34.

[ix] William James, “Great Men and their Environment” in The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1956), pp. 225-26.

[x] Ibid., pp. 234-35.

[xi] Ibid., p. 227.

[xii] Ibid., p. 230.

[xiii] Ward Fearnside and William Holther, Fallacy: The Counterfeit of Argument (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1959), p. 43.

[xiv] James, op. cit., p. 230.

[xv] Quoted in Will and Ariel Durant, The Story of Civilization, vol. 11, “The Age of Napoleon” (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1975), p. 773.

[xvi] Ibid., p. 235.

[xvii] W.T. Jones, A History of Western Philosophy, Volume One, “The Classical Mind” (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1969), pp. 68-71.

[xviii] Carlyle, “Occasional Discourse on the Negro Question,” www.efm.bris.ac.uk/het/carlyle/occasion.htm . Retrieved July 16, 2016. David Levy, How The Dismal Science Got Its Name (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001), pp. xiii-xv, 3-28, 41-57, 147, 158-197, and passim. Levy, “150 years and Still Dismal!”  www.fee.org/articles/150-years-and-still-dismal/. Retrieved July 16, 2016.

[xix] Lucy Hughes-Hallett, Heroes, Saviors, Traitors, and Supermen: A History of Hero Worship (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2004), p. 14.

[xx] Ibid., p. 5

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What is the name of the theory opposite to the Great Man theory?

The Great Man theory is a 19th-century idea according to which history can be largely explained by the impact of "great men", or heroes; highly influential individuals .

In nearly every lecture on historical sociology I've heard, this idea was disputed. What is the name of the opposing theory, that states the leaders are usually only an outcome of actual trends in society and that if they weren't here, there would be other "great men" on their place?

• political-history
• terminology
• social-history

• 5 Might it be possible that there is more than one opposing theory? The name or names of such theories might be inferred by thinking back who criticised the theory of great man and what they themselves proposed. One answer that was already given might then be called "marxist theory of history". –  openmedi Commented May 7, 2017 at 18:39
• 1 "History" requires you to tell some "story". It's easy to tell a fascinating story about a great man (either evil or good), but it's quite hard to find anyone interested in a story about GDP rising 1.4%. –  kubanczyk Commented May 7, 2017 at 21:01
• 1 Not a strict answer to your question but 'Big History' often seems to allude to a progression of history by other means than individual men. –  Cdn_Dev Commented May 8, 2017 at 11:59
• 2 Marxian History was in part a direct repudiation of the Great Man Theory that was prevalent in Marx's time. However, it is centered around the idea of History having specific stages it progresses through (culminating naturally with Marx's Communism). There's no analog to that in Great Man Theory, so I don't think you can call it a complete opposite. –  T.E.D. ♦ Commented May 8, 2017 at 13:46

5 Answers 5

The opposite view holds that extra-human dynamics govern the courses of events. This is a recurring theme of Tolstoy's War and Peace , a fundamental principle of Marx's dialectical materialism; it is also regurgitated by Jared Diamond in his Guns Germs & Steel.

People who believe in governing dynamics would argue that the Renaissance was caused by draught in over-populated central Asia, which drove the nomads westwards, who overran Constantinople and flushed out books and scholars to Italy, where, upon contact with these ancient intellectual stimuli, the Italians reignited their interests in learning, which in turn started a rapid progress that lasted more than 500 years till this day.

However, people who believe in great individuals would ask why Byzantine, for a thousand years and with all these books and scholars, had been stagnant. One reasonable answer is that Byzantine had books and scholars but no great men; Italy, on the other hand, had great men, but no books.

• 2 I would not say that Byzantium had been stagnant for a thousand years. Granted, they last centuries would have been very poor, but at those times it was just an almost powerless remmant. –  SJuan76 Commented May 7, 2017 at 15:51
• 3 I'm sorry for formulating the question wrong: I'm not asking what the opposing theory is about but what's it called –  Probably Commented May 7, 2017 at 16:36
• 3 The "extra-human dynamics" explanation for Byzantium would probably be that the combination of plague and heavy warfare with Persia allowed the Arabs to rise, cutting off Byzantium from the grain fields of Egypt and Africa, thereby preventing it from doing much more than survive. Personally, I think that both ideas are wrong, and that history is a chaotic system, sometimes plowing through in one direction despite all human action, other times standing at a knife-edge where a single person can push it one way or the other. –  user15620 Commented May 7, 2017 at 16:53
• 1 Both governing dynamics and great men theory are valid as long as no one calls the other false. Yes, human affairs are deterministic just as the positions of the planet earth is deterministic, but along the causal chains of events, there are such links which we may rightly call great men. –  George Chen Commented May 7, 2017 at 17:16
• 3 It is historically inaccurate to describe the 1100 year old. Byzantine civilization as "stagnant". True, the Byzantines did not produce nearly the volume of intellectual advancements that their Alexandrian and Athenian predecessors had produced. However, the cultural contributions of the Byzantines in Theology, iconography, architecture, music, military technology, urban planning, the earliest Monastic communities in History, as well as the furtherance of its higher educational system with the University and Library of Constantinople, were not exactly signs of a "stagnant" civilization. –  user26763 Commented Sep 27, 2017 at 18:39

Not every thesis has a single antithesis or opposite. However, we can highlight a few trends or schools of thought in historiography (the study of history) that contrast most sharply with the Great Man Thesis.

One such answer is implicitly given in the question itself: historical sociology . The early sociologist Herbert Spencer directly critiqued the Great Man theory. A key theme that sociology, anthropology and other social sciences share with history is the question of structure versus agency . The Great Man Thesis is an approach which strongly emphasizes a specific form of agency , in contrast with more structural approaches.

Within the field of history itself, perhaps the most explicitly structural perspectives are that of the Annales School (for example see Fernand Braudel ) and of Marxist historiography (for example see Eric Hobsbawm ).

Another way to look at this question is that the Great Man thesis emphasizes the roles of heroes and leaders. In that sense, the opposite approaches are social history and " people's history ". The work of E. P. Thompson is a good example here. He is definitely not a structuralist, but instead emphasizes the agency of the working class.

• Thanks, I'll get it if there's no single term but all those things you mention are rather disciplines or approaches that might disprove the Great Man theory but aren't really the theory I was describing. –  Probably Commented May 7, 2017 at 18:51
• Right... I suspect that the specific thing you are looking for doesn't exist, but maybe someone else will know of something. –  Brian Z Commented May 7, 2017 at 19:42
• 2 Well, every thesis has an opposite (in this case, that history cannot largely be explained by the impact of "great men"). But the opposite thesis doesn't necessarily have a catchy name –  David Richerby Commented May 7, 2017 at 20:44

It's called "History from Below". I justify this by quoting Herbert Spencer:

You must admit that the genesis of a great man depends on the long series of complex influences which has produced the race in which he appears, and the social state into which that race has slowly grown.... Before he can remake his society, his society must make him.

-- Herbert Spencer, The Study of Sociology .

Spencer's position on this is typically associated with History from Below , aka People's History .

From Wikipedia:

A people's history, history from below, is a type of historical narrative which attempts to account for historical events from the perspective of common people rather than leaders. There is an emphasis on disenfranchised, the oppressed, the poor, the nonconformists, and otherwise marginal groups. The authors are typically on the left and have a Marxist model in mind, as in the approach of the History Workshop movement in Britain in the 1960s.

I'm not sure Spencer was especially socialist, but the observation has been seized as a justification by those who are. Spencer's point, as I interpret it, is that "great" men are simply able men who happen to be ready when conditions are ripe; in the right place at the right time. They are artefacts of events rather than prime movers, and merely the first to move of several potential actors.

This is certainly the antithesis of the GM theory, and whoever put the reference to History from Below in the Wikipedia piece on GM theory clearly shares this opinion, so presumably takes a similar interpretation of Spencer.

Key to this perspective is the insight that we are not masters of our own destiny. We can choose how we react to circumstances but we cannot choose the circumstances themselves. We can try, but as every other person is also trying to control events it cancels out like the magnetic fields of micro-domains in iron; influence is strong locally but on a grander scale they come to nothing.

• I've known about people's history but it is not really a theory, it is an area you can focus on where writing about history, it doesn't really "say" individuals are unimportant in history –  Probably Commented May 8, 2017 at 8:27

There's an old historical saying......."Does the man make the times or do the times make the man?"

In our contemporary history and historiography, The (now dismissed and largely discredited), "Great Man Theory of History"-(originated by Thomas Carlyle), was, in a way, a reading and studying of History through a biographical-(almost Plutarchian) lens. That is to say, History, had been determined and impacted solely by "Great" historical figures, such as certain Generals, Statesmen, Inventors, Scientists, Artists, Religious Leaders and Philosophers. In a way, (despite the rabidly leftist history and historiography that has been produced over the past 25 plus years), Carlyle's (allegedly) anachronistic "Great Man" Theory may not be so implausible-(Of course, it all depends on how one defines, "Great". Alexander III of Macedon was and is still described as, "Great", whereas Ivan was and is still described as, "The Terrible". Even Attila is referred to as, "The Hun", which did not, nor does it exactly connote a complimentary meaning. So again, it all depends on how one defines, "Great" and /or "Greatness").

The opposite reading of Carlyle's "Great Man of History", would probably consist of 2 socio-historical schools of thought, very much to the left of center:

The older Marxist school-(which originally emanated from the earlier Hegelian school, though Hegel's Dialectics were quite distinct from Marxian Dialectics), has been one of the more popular approaches towards historical study, writing and research within the West since the mid 1960's-(and perhaps earlier).

The Marxist approach towards History is predicated on the idea of class struggle; a uniting of working peoples to determine the future outcome of society and civilization through a radical campaign of depersonalization and deindivdiualization, followed by the dissolution of the Corporate class and the State, as a way achieving the Greater and collective virtue of universal equality. In other words, people, not individuals, communities and not leaders, catalyze the historical, as well the unfolding of events.

The 2nd and more recent school of thought, is Post-Modernism, founded and popularized by the French Philosopher and Social Critic, Michele Foucault. Although Foucault wrote most of his major works during the 1960's, his intellectual legacy would come a generation or so later, better known as "Political Correctness". Michelle Foucault may not have been directly responsible for the onslaught of Political Correctness, unfortunately though, his writings were very influential.

The essence of Post-Modernism and indeed, Post-Modern thinking is that the concept of truth does not exist. That the traditionally defined properties and categories of knowledge are not universally provable, but instead, are of relative consequence. Therefore, there is no Objectivity, nor is there a meaningful search or exposition of evidence, because such a search and such an assumption do not exist.

With regard to historiography, Post-Modernism-(and its rabidly righteous twin, Political Correctness), has been the dominant and encompassing approach towards the research, writing and teaching of history at the secondary, college and graduate levels within the United States for the past 25 plus years. It is a philosophy and social movement that is to the left of Marxism!-(if one can imagine that).

However, both Marxist and Post-Modern historiographies, share one thing in common, a mutual contempt for individuality and a centralization-(even a romanticizing) of the collective and the group dynamic. For Marxists and Post-Modernists, individuals have never determined historical outcomes, it has always been progressed, advanced and determined by an activist populace and citizenry.

To the Marxists and Post-Modernists, NEITHER "the man makes the times, nor the times make the man", because man, that is to say, the individual is either, an elitist or the individual does not exist because the very notion of an individual is the product of a social construction. Either way, the loss of historical individuality has been central to both of these above mentioned movements..........(and they are winning to this day).

This is a completely intuitive answer - I would call it the tidal force interpretation of history. The great voyages of exploration did not acheive technological or political feasibility until many evolutionary steps, in ship-building, in the development of trading arrangements, in nation-building, in the conflicts arising all accreted to engender the conditions sufficient & necessary for such undertakings, with their manifestly portentous consequences, over the following centuries.

Now, reducing that long emerging historical process to the single inspiration of a Columbus or Magellan would be a caricature, historically speaking. That said, on the margins, individuals can have great effect - but the argument concerns the great tide of history, not its accidents, which are often enough provisional based upon current somewhat arbitrary conditions (say, the carving up of the Levant & Arabia post WWI). Was Balfour a great man, or simply the clerk in charge of drawing the lines empowered by the great powers, whose interests were bound to be represented, however haphazardly as turned out.

So I propose, in counter to the individualistically-centered Great Man theory of history, the Tidal Force (or Mass Effects or Emergent Process) theory of history.

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Leadership Research and Theory

• First Online: 17 November 2017

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Leadership theories are plagued by the absence of a definitional consensus among scholars. Many theories have emerged about leadership over the years. This chapter examines and evaluates the different early theories of leadership. The Great Man theory focuses on heroic individuals, implying that only a selected few can achieve greatness. The trait theory conceptualises leadership on the universality of some given attributes. The skill theory focuses on the abilities of a leader. Behavioural theory views leaders based on their actions and behaviour, while the contingency theory concerns the context of leadership. The shortcomings and limitations of these different theories, which have led to newer approaches to leadership, are also examined. Case studies are available to assess the reader’s understanding of the relevant approaches in this chapter.

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Carlyle, Freud, and the Great Man Theory more fully considered

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A literary perspective on the limits of leadership: tolstoy’s critique of the great man theory, ‘no more heroes’: critical perspectives on leadership romanticism, who leads, who follows critical review of the field of leadership studies, re/searching leadership: a critique in two agonies and nine fits, from rome to tyre to london: shakespeare’s pericles, leadership, anti-absolutism, and english exceptionalism, leadership traits of suleiman the magnificiant, in terms of "great man" theory,, the archaeology of heroes: carlyle, foucault and the pedagogy of interdisciplinary narrative discourse, the unspeakable victorian: thomas carlyle, ideology and adaptation, united i stand: an investigation of power distance value and endorsement of the great man theory through american social identities, leadership research and theory, 30 references, romancing leadership: past, present, and future ☆, freud and his followers, flawed from the “get-go”: lee iacocca and the origins of transformational leadership, how leaders woo followers in the romance of leadership, the dark side of transformational leadership: a critical perspective, advances in leader and leadership development: a review of 25years of research and theory, no more heroes… as all managers become leaders at lancashire county council, leaders: strategies for taking charge, actor-network theory, anti-history and critical organizational historiography, group psychology and the analysis of the ego, related papers.

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